Our predecessor Court held long ago "[t]he general rule is that compensation must be allowed for all of the injurious consequences flowing from the original injury, and not attributable to an independent, intervening cause." Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Cox, 314 Ky. 743, 744, 237 S.W.2d 56 (1951). In that case, the injured employee followed his prescribed treatment instructions to walk around following surgery "in order to expedite healing by stimulating circulation, reducing stiffness of the knee and ankle joints, and restoring the general muscle tone."

[4] Since the commission in our case did find that the first injury "proximately resulted in further disability consisting in amputation of the index finger," we may set it aside upon the ground that applicant's negligence caused the injury only if the commission's contrary finding is not sufficiently supported in the record. The following salient facts controvert the claim of negligence, however, supporting that finding: (1) the cutting of the firewood was a comparatively simple task to an expert carpenter who had long used the power saw without incident; (2) the use of the saw did not violate any order of the doctor, and the absence of such proscription is an important element negating negligence ( Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Cox (1951), 314 Ky. 743 [ 237 S.W.2d 56, 57]); (3) the physician had ordered the employee to exercise his eyes; the employee was obviously attempting to rehabilitate himself and had been told by the physician he could return to work as soon as he did so, and, indeed, the physician had previously informed the employee he could resume work on April 7, four days before the second injury; (4) the petitioner's charge that the saw was unguarded and that the employee acted negligently in using it cannot stand because (a) there is no evidence in the record as to what safety features the saw did or did not require, (b) the burden of producing such evidence rested upon petitioner, (c) the safety orders of the Division of Industrial Safety, upon which petitioner relies, apply to places of employment rather than to the employee's home (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, § 8:3202), (d) finally, assuming its pertinence, the record does not show that petitioner was aware of Bulletin 141, issued July, 1957, by the California Divisio

Ford Motor Co. v. Jobe, 544 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Cox, 314 Ky. 743, 744, 237 S.W.2d 56 (1951)).

Magellan Behavioral Health v. Helms, 140 S.W.3d 579 (Ky. App. 2004). Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Cox, 314 Ky. 743, 744, 237 S.W.2d 56, 57 (1951). Hush v. Abrams, 584 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1979); Carte v. Loretto Motherhouse Infirmary, 19 S.W.3d 122 (Ky. App. 2000).

Magellan Behavioral Health v. Helms, 140 S.W.3d 579 (Ky.App.2004).Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Cox, 314 Ky. 743, 744, 237 S.W.2d 56, 57 (1951).Hush v. Abrams, 584 S.W.2d 48 (Ky.1979); Carte v. Loretto Motherhouse Infirmary, 19 S.W.3d 122 (Ky.App.2000).

All of the harmful changes in the human organism that result from a work-related injury and that are not attributable to an independent, intervening cause are compensable. See Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Cox, 314 Ky. 743, 237 S.W.2d 56 (1951); Elizabethtown Sportswear v. Stice, 720 S.W.2d 732 (Ky.App. 1986). The claimant alleged that Douglas's injury caused a number of harmful changes.

All of the harmful changes in the human organism that result from a work-related injury and that are not attributable to an independent, intervening cause are compensable. See Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Cox, 314 Ky. 743, 237 S.W.2d 56 (1951);Elizabethtown Sportswear v. Stice, 720 S.W.2d 732 (Ky.App. 1986). The claimant alleged that Douglas's injury caused a number of harmful changes.

As amended effective December 12, 1996, KRS 342.0011(1) provides that an injury is a work-related traumatic event that proximately causes a harmful change in the human organism. It has long been the rule that a worker may be compensated for all of the harmful changes that flow from a work-related injury and that are not attributable to an independent, intervening cause. See Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Cox, 314 Ky. 743, 237 S.W.2d 56 (1951); Elizabethtown Sportswear v. Stice, 720 S.W.2d 732 (Ky.App. 1986). Therefore, the claimants were entitled to benefits for Williams' death if they succeeded in proving that it resulted from his injury rather than an independent, intervening cause.

Causation is a matter to be decided by the fact-finder. The general rule is that all of the injurious consequences that flow from a work-related physical injury and that are not attributable to an unrelated cause are compensable. Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Cox, Ky., 237 S.W.2d 56 (1951). Furthermore, anxiety over a workers' compensation claim is not an unrecognized phenomenon.

Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 13.11 (1996), as follows: "The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original injury or a new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a compensable primary injury." See also Dutton v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 140 Ariz. 448, 682 P.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1984); and Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Cox, Ky., 314 Ky. 743, 237 S.W.2d 56 (1951). Thus, even though the subsequent injury was to a different part of the back and followed a non-work-related incident, the medical expenses arising therefrom are compensable since the work-related injury caused the part of the back that was subsequently injured to be more susceptible to injury.