Opinion
C.A. No. 04-527L.
March 31, 2005
Report and Recommendation
Normand Bedford ("Bedford" or "petitioner"), pro se, an inmate lawfully confined at the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Adult Correctional Institutions, filed with the Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to overturn a prison disciplinary board's decision revoking good time credit and confining him in segregation for a period of forty-five days. Petitioner also alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment. Respondent A.T. Wall has moved to dismiss the instant application. Bedford has objected. This matter has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for a report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the Respondent's motion to dismiss be granted.
Background
Petitioner Normand Bedford is an inmate legally incarcerated at the Rhode Island Department of Corrections ("DOC"), Adult Correctional Institutions ("ACI"). Respondent A.T. Wall is the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections. At all times relevant to this action, petitioner was confined in the medium security facility at the ACI.
While incarcerated, petitioner filed numerous grievances that were deemed frivolous by DOC officials. Due to his voluminous, unfounded grievances, in November of 2004 DOC officials notified the petitioner that he was being removed from the grievance process. DOC officials also notified the petitioner that if he filed any further grievance, disciplinary sanctions would be imposed. Notwithstanding this warning, petitioner filed two more grievances. Accordingly, DOC officials charged the petitioner with a disciplinary violation for each grievance filed.
A hearing thereafter commenced before a disciplinary board and the board found the petitioner guilty of the violations. As a sanction, the board ordered Bedford to serve 20 days in segregation for the first violation and 25 days in segregation for the second violation. The board also ordered Bedford to forfeit a total of 45 days of good time credit for both violations.
Styled as an "appeal," Bedford brought suit in December of 2004 in this Court seeking to overturn the disciplinary board's decisions. Petitioner claims that deficiencies in the disciplinary hearing amounted to a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he seeks a restoration of good time credit. The Court has construed this filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner also alleges, in the petition and in subsequent filings, that he has been subjected to unlawful conditions of confinement. Respondent has moved to dismiss this action. Bedford has objected.
Discussion
a. Habeas Corpus Claims
Title 28, Section 2241 of the U.S. Code confers jurisdiction on the district courts to issue writs of habeas corpus in response to a petition from a state or federal prisoner who is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) and (c)(3). Title 28, Section 2254 of the U.S. Code "implements the general grant of habeas corpus authority found in § 2241" when a person is in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2000). Section 2254 provides that an application for habeas "shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. . . ." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A). This is known as the exhaustion doctrine.
A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion doctrine by fairly presenting his claims to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider them. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.1, 9 (1992); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). This means that Bedford must have presented the substance of his federal constitutional claim to the state appellate court so that the state court had the first chance to correct the claimed constitutional error. See Lanigan v. Maloney, 853 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1988). Only if the same factual and legal theory that forms the basis of the petitioner's habeas petition has been presented to the state court will the petition for writ be properly before the federal court. Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1994); Nadonworthy v. Fair, 872 F.2d 1093, 1096 (1st Cir. 1989). A claim is not considered exhausted if the petitioner has the right under the law of the state to raise, by any procedure available, the question presented.
In the instant application, Bedford bases his habeas petition on an alleged denial of due process during prison disciplinary hearings. However, Bedford has not presented this claim to the state courts for determination and has not given the state courts "one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues" through "one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Thus, Bedford's instant claim is unexhausted.
Exhaustion will be required unless "there is no opportunity to obtain redress in the state court or if the corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain relief." Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981). Here, Bedford has an avenue in the state courts to present such a claim, see R.I. Gen. Laws. 10-9.1-1 et seq., and no showing has been made that this avenue is deficient for Bedford to obtain relief.
Accordingly, before this Court may consider the instant habeas petition, Bedford must present his claims to the state courts for consideration. Since he has not done so, the Respondent's motion to dismiss should be granted and Bedford's instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed. I so recommend.
b. Conditions of Confinement Claims
In his petition and in subsequent filings in this case, Bedford also seeks damages for certain conditions of confinement claims. However, these matters are not properly before the Court. In a habeas petition, such as this, the Court can only reach those matters relating to the petitioner's alleged unlawful custody. Accordingly, I recommend that the petitioner's conditions of confinement claims be dismissed, without prejudice.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, I recommend that the Respondent's motion to dismiss be granted. Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within ten (10) days of its receipt. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Local Rule 32. Failure to file timely, specific objections to this report constitutes waiver of both the right to review by the district court and the right to appeal the district court's decision. United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1986) ( per curiam); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1980).