Opinion
Civil Action No. 15-cv-00846-REB-MJW
02-03-2016
CHRISTOPHER BEDDINGFIELD, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER BROWN, DREW JELTES, and CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, Defendants.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 23)
Plaintiff sues for false arrest and related claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants moved to dismiss (Docket No. 23), and District Judge Robert E. Blackburn referred the motion to the undersigned. The Court has reviewed the parties' filings (Docket Nos. 23, 33, & 34); taken judicial notice of the Court's entire file in this case; and considered the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, statutes, and case law. Now being fully informed, the Court recommends that Defendant's motion be granted.
Facts as Alleged in the Complaint
"On April 23, 2013 Plaintiff was riding his bicycle home from his friend's house when Defendants stopped and arrested Plaintiff." (Docket No. 1, ¶ 8.) The individual Defendants "stopped and arrested Plaintiff under the false pretext of Plaintiff lacking a sufficient headlight for his bicycle," "without reasonable suspicion or probable cause." (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) Unspecified criminal charges were filed. (Id. ¶ 11.) "Because he was unable to make bail, Plaintiff was jailed from April 23, 2013 to December 24, 2013." (Id. ¶ 12.) Later, "[a]ll charges were dropped." (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff's suit claims false arrest and unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and municipal liability for those Fourth Amendment violations under Monell.
The Complaint also includes common-law tort claims, which Plaintiff has since withdrawn. (Docket No. 33, p.4.)
Further Facts
Defendant submits a number of public records from Plaintiff's criminal case, asking the Court to take judicial notice of the records. See Van Woudenberg ex rel. Foor v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 560, 568 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he court is permitted to take judicial notice of its own files and records, as well as facts which are a matter of public record."), abrogated on other grounds by McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2001). As is relevant here, the records show that Plaintiff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that he was wearing a headlamp and therefore no reasonable suspicion supported the Terry stop. (Docket Nos. 23-5.) The state court granted the motion to suppress all evidence. (Docket Nos. 23-4, p.6.)
Legal Standards
Defendants move under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Judge Blackburn has said:
Defendants also moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction due to Colorado's sovereign immunity. That portion of the motion is moot because Plaintiff withdrew the state-law claims.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), I must determine whether the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a claim within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). . . .Countryman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 865 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1109-10 (D. Colo. 2012) aff'd, 545 F. App'x 762 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
Pursuant to the dictates of Twombly, I now review the complaint to determine whether it contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. . . .
As previously, I must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true. Contrastingly, mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not be sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Moreover, to meet the plausibility standard, the complaint must suggest more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. For this reason, the complaint must allege facts sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. The standard will not be met where the allegations of the complaint are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent. Instead the allegations must be enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly (not just speculatively) has a claim for relief.
The nature and specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on context and will require the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Nevertheless, the standard remains a liberal one, and a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.
Discussion
Individual Defendants
Plaintiff's claims are based on the Fourth Amendment (see Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 10, 15)—specifically, Plaintiff claims he was stopped without reasonable suspicion. To justify an investigatory stop, an "officer must have reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot." United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he existence of objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity does not depend upon any one factor, but on the totality of the circumstances." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The parties raise two questions. First, Defendants argue that they had reasonable suspicion to believe Plaintiff was in violation of the city ordinance requiring a safety light on his bicycle—regardless of whether the state-court judge later decided that a headlamp satisfies the ordinance. Second, Plaintiff argues that collateral estoppel precludes Defendants from raising that argument.
Both arguments are easily settled in Defendants' favor. A motion to suppress in a criminal case has no preclusive effect in later § 1983 proceedings against the arresting officers. Novitsky v. City Of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1252 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Morgan v. Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999); Kinslow v. Ratzlaff, 158 F.3d 1104, 1105-07 & n. 3 (10th Cir. 1998)). And on the merits, a Terry stop based on a reasonable mistake of law is not a Fourth Amendment violation. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014). The records subject to judicial notice suggest that Plaintiff was stopped either because (1) his bicycle had no safety lamp at all, or (2) it had no rear safety lamp on his bicycle. The ordinance at issue clearly and plainly requires "bicycles," not "bicyclists," to be equipped with safety lamps (Docket No. 23- 1)—and there is no dispute here that Plaintiff did not have a safety lamp on his bicycle. If the arresting officers were mistaken about whether the headlamp would satisfy the ordinance, the mistake was reasonable. Accordingly, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court recommends that Count One be dismissed.
The affidavit supporting criminal charges indicate that the stop occurred because Plaintiff was "riding a bicycle without any light." (Docket No. 23-2, p.2.) The motion to suppress states something a bit different: "According to discovery tendered to the defense to date, [the officers stopped Plaintiff] because he did not have a light on the back of his bike." (Docket No. 23-5 ¶ 2.) This distinction is material, inasmuch as the city ordinance requires a forward safety lamp but is silent on rear lamps. Nonetheless, the Complaint alleges that the stop was predicated on "lacking a sufficient headlamp." (Docket No. 1 ¶ 8.) And in any event, Plaintiff makes no argument that Defendants' mistake was unreasonable. Plaintiff argues only collateral estoppel, and thereby waives any argument about the reasonableness of Defendants' mistake.
City Defendant
To support municipal liability, Plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing that the City of Colorado Springs, rather than the individual Defendants, is fairly to blame for wrongful conduct. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Generally speaking, a single instance is insufficient to make this showing. See Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under [Monell], unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker." (citation omitted)); Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1318 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Although a single incident generally will not give rise to liability, [inadequate training] may be found absent a pattern of unconstitutional behavior if a violation of federal rights is a highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a municipality's action." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
The complaint here makes literally no effort to meet this standard. In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues only that a reasonable jury could find an unlawful pattern or practice. This does not satisfy the pleading standards in federal court. The Court recommends that Count Two be dismissed.
Recommendation
It is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 23) be GRANTED and this case DISMISSED under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) , the parties have fourteen (14) days after service of this recommendation to serve and file specific written objections to the above recommendation with the District Judge assigned to the case. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. The District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party's failure to file and serve such written, specific objections waives de novo review of the recommendation by the District Judge, Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 148-53 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. Makin v. Colo. Dep't of Corr. , 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse , 91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996). Dated: February 3, 2016
Denver, Colorado
/s/ Michael J . Watanabe
Michael J. Watanabe
United States Magistrate Judge