State ex rel. Johnson v. Atchison, 105 Conn. 315, 324, 135 A. 456 (1926); Johnson v. Miller, 13 Conn. Sup. 116, 117-18 (1944); see Kleinsmith v. Planning Zoning Commission, 157 Conn. 303, 310, 254 A.2d 486 (1968). There is no requirement that the published notice describe the proposed action in detail or with exactitude. Bedard v. Cunneen, 111 Conn. 338, 341, 149 A. 890 (1930); Bull v. Warren, 36 Conn. 83, 85 (1869); and see Gravel Hill School District v. Old Farm School District, 55 Conn. 244, 246, 10 A. 689 (1887). "[General Statutes] Sec. 7-3, WARNING OF TOWN AND OTHER MEETINGS. The warning of each town meeting, and of each meeting of a city, borough, school district or other public community or of an ecclesiastical society, shall specify the objects for which such meeting is to be held. Notice of a town meeting shall be given by posting, upon a signpost or other exterior place nearest to the office of the town clerk of such town and at such other place or places as may be designated as hereinafter provided, a printed or written warning signed by the selectmen, or a majority of them, and by publishing a like warning in a newspaper published in such town or having a circulation therein, such posting and such publication to be at least five days previous to holding the meeting, including the day that notice is given and any Sunday and any legal holiday wh
Meigs v. Theis, supra, 593, 594. Approved practice requires that a judgment file be drawn and filed and that the certificate of election based upon the judgment be issued under the seal of the court. Bedard v. Cunneen, 111 Conn. 338, 340, 149 A. 890; Denny v. Pratt, 104 Conn. 396, 398, 133 A. 107. Finally, the statute authorizes the issuance of a writ of mandamus to enforce the decision. Acting under this statute, ten plaintiffs who stood for election at the November, 1967, aldermanic election in New Haven brought their complaint to a judge of the Superior Court, naming, as defendants, the chief moderator of the election, the town clerk and ten candidates of the opposing party.
The presumption of falsity which favored the defendant in Thomas v. Bowen, supra, is a presumption of fact, and such presumptions do not aid a pleading. Bedard v. Cunneen, 111 Conn. 338, 149 A. 890. Truth is a defense and must be alleged by the defendant, Thomas v. Bowen, supra; Clark on Code Pleading, 2d ed, page 620; and Atwater v. The Morning News Company, 67 Conn. 504, 34 A. 865. The defendant has the burden of establishing his plea of truth with evidence, Grubb v. Johnson, 205 Or. 624, 289 P.2d 1067; Cooley v. Hiner, 164 Or. 161, 100 P.2d 608. The purpose of requiring parties to set forth their facts in their pleadings is to bring the facts to light. By going through that process each party gains knowledge of the contentions of his adversary, and the result of their efforts provides the man on the bench, so far as the individual case is concerned, with something in the nature of a compass.
There is a presumption that public officers have done their duty until the contrary appears. State ex rel. Fitzroy v. Trustees of Firemen's Relief Fund, 122 Conn. 650, 657, 191 A. 729; Bedard v. Cunneen, 111 Conn. 338, 341, 149 A. 890. But even this presumption does not exist as to a private individual's compliance with the law. Miles v. Sherman, 116 Conn. 678, 682, 166 A. 250. The railroad, a private individual in the sense in which the term is used in this connection, was the party ordered by the commissioners to build this bridge, and accordingly there is no presumption that it complied with the provision for a twelve-foot clearance.
The demurrer must stand or fall upon the allegations of the pleading demurred to, which cannot be aided by importing into it facts not therein alleged. Ryan v. Knights of Columbus, 82 Conn. 91, 92, 72 A. 574; Bedard v. Cunneen, 111 Conn. 338, 341, 149 A. 890.
See Practice Book, 1963, 106. It is elementary that such a motion must rely wholly upon the factual allegations of the pleading addressed and may not contain affirmative factual assertions which could only be proved by evidence. Bedard v. Cunneen, 111 Conn. 338, 341, 149 A. 890 (1930); Ryan v. Knights of Columbus, 82 Conn. 91, 92, 72 A. 574 (1909). The defendant's motion to strike the acknowledgment of paternity, which contains numerous factual statements concerning the circumstances under which the defendant signed that document, fails to comply with this principle.
A motion to strike "must rely wholly upon the factual allegations of the pleading addressed and may not contain affirmative factual assertions which could only be proved by evidence.State v. Bashura, 37 Conn. Sup. 745, 748, 436 A.2d 785 (App. Sess. 1981), citing Bedard v. Cunneen, 111 Conn. 338, 341, 149 A. 890 (1930). The motion "admits all well pleaded allegations and all facts provable thereunder."
A motion to strike "must rely wholly upon the factual allegations of the pleading addressed and may not contain affirmative factual assertions which could only be proved by evidence.State v. Bashura, 37 Conn. Sup. 745, 748, 436 A.2d 785 (App. Sess. 1981), citing Bedard v. Cunneen, 111 Conn. 338, 341, 149 A. 890 (1930)). The motion "admits all well pleaded allegations and all facts provable thereunder."
A motion to strike "must rely wholly upon the factual allegations of the pleading addressed and may not contain affirmative factual assertions which could only be proved by evidence. State v. Bashura, 37 Conn. Sup. 745, 748, 436 A.2d 785 (App. Sess. 1981), citing Bedard v. Cunneen, 111 Conn. 338, 341, 149 A. 890 (1930)). The motion "admits all well pleaded allegations and all facts provable thereunder."
A motion to strike "must rely wholly upon the factual allegations of the pleading addressed and may not contain affirmative factual assertions which could only be proved by evidence. State v. Bashura, 37 Conn. Sup. 745, 748, 436 A.2d 785 (App. Sess. 1981), citing Bedard v. Cunneen, 111 Conn. 338, 341, 149 A. 890 (1930)). The motion "admits all well pleaded allegations and all facts provable thereunder."