Becton, Dickinson Co. v. Inverness Medical Tech.

4 Citing cases

  1. Vertical Tank, Inc. v. BakerCorp

    Case No. 1:18-CV-00145-LJO-JLT (E.D. Cal. May. 22, 2019)   Cited 5 times
    Rejecting defendant's argument that the Court should "'factor out'" lengths of the various components depicted in the design patents because they were functional, where "[n]othing in the design or any other evidence of which the Court is aware provides absolute lengths. . . . It is therefore entirely unclear how, if at all, the Court should or could 'factor out' lengths from a design patent that does not obviously claim specific lengths"

    FIG. 6 While these drawings from the '843 Design Patent are extrinsic evidence in relation to the '543 Patent, the Court may nonetheless consider extrinsic evidence where not inconsistent with intrinsic material. See Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Inverness Med. Tech., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 258, 270 (D. Del. 2001) (information from prosecution history of another patent used as extrinsic evidence to interpret patent in dispute); see generally Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1308. The Court concludes for purposes of claim construction that the upper conduit depicted in Figure 9 of the '543 Patent is intended to be the same design as that in Figure 1 of the '843 Patent and therefore that Figure 1 of the '843 Patent is useful in interpreting Figure 9 of the '542 Patent.

  2. Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Grp. Inc.

    Civil Action No. 15-980-LPS-CJB (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    2001) ("In the absence of a special definition of the term 'contact' in the specification, that term should be given its ordinary and accustomed meaning[, which is] 'touching.'"); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Inverness Med. Tech., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 258, 269 (D. Del. 2001) (adopting "'the coming together or touching of two objects or surfaces'" as the plain meaning of "'contacting'"). As stated repeatedly at other points above, the fact that a single embodiment might incorporate a particular limitation (e.g., something more than "touching") does not demand that a construction of the term in question requires incorporation of that restriction.

  3. ADE Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp.

    220 F. Supp. 2d 303 (D. Del. 2002)   Cited 2 times

    The question being addressed on summary judgment is whether the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Becton, Dickinson Co. v. Inverness Med. Tech., Inc., 176 F. Supp.2d 258, 272-73 (Del. 2001) (McKelvie, J.) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)); accord Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 107 F. Supp.2d 477, 488 (Del. 2000) (McKelvie, J.). It is the opinion of this court that a material fact does exist as to whether a person skilled in the art of silicon wafer inspection would consider the broader language of the '551 patent supported by the written description. See Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Science Inc., 61 F. Supp.2d 133, 188 (Del. 1999) (quoting Regents of Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) ("To satisfy the written description requirement, the patent's specification must describe an invention in sufficient detail so that one skilled in the art can conclude that `the inventor invented the claimed invention.'"); see also Id. (quoting In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) ("The applicant need not describe the subject matter claimed in exact terms.

  4. ADE CORPORATION v. KLA-TENCOR CORPORATION

    Civil Action No. 00-892-## (MPT) (D. Del. Aug. 8, 2002)

    The question being addressed on summary judgment is whether the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Beckon, Dicks on Co. v. Inverness Med. Tech., Inc., 176 F. Supp.2d 258, 272-73 (D.Del. 2001) (McKelvie, J.) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)); accord Glaxo Welcome Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 107 F. Supp.2d 477, 488 (D. Del 2000) (McKelvie, J.). It is the opinion of this court that a material fact does exist as to whether a person skilled in the art of silicon wafer inspection would consider the broader language of the `551 patent supported by the written description. See Monsanto Co. v. Michigan Plant Science Inc., 61 F. Supp.2d 133, 188 (D.Del. 1999) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lily Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("To satisfy the written description requirement, the patent's specification must describe an invention in sufficient detail so that one skilled in the art can conclude that `the inventor invented the claimed invention.'"); see also Id. (quoting In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("The applicant need not describe the subject matter claimed in exact terms.