Once a person is on inquiry notice of an injury, the statute begins to run even if that person is unaware of the cause of the injury.Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353, 356 (Del. 1982); Burrell v. AstraZeneca LP, 2010 WL 3706584, at *5-7 (Del. Super. Sept. 20, 2010); Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 451 (Del.
Instead, PwC highlights, Plaintiffs did not even inquire how they could contact its auditing representatives. 455 A.2d 353 (Del. 1982) (defining "time of discovery" for statute of limitations purposes and holding that a "time of discovery" rule tolling the statute of limitations did not apply where the existence of the complained-of roof defect was reasonably discoverable prior to the running of the statute). 655 F. Supp. 631 (D. Del. 1987) (holding that once a plaintiff becomes aware of sufficient "storm warnings" of securities fraud to be placed on "inquiry" notice, that plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence in investigating the cause of action for fraud).
Hydro alleges that the first discovery of any defect in the expansion joints occurred on October 8, 1978. (D.I. 1, ¶¶ 18 19.) Although Zallea thereafter attempted to repair the expansion joints, this fact does not affect the running of the three year statute of limitations on tort claims under 10 Del.C. § 8106. This was the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353 (Del.Supr. 1982). In that case, a roofing contractor completed a roof for a shopping mall developer in November, 1971, and was paid for his services at that time.
It protects only those "persons performing or furnishing, or causing the performance or furnishing of, any such construction of such an improvement or against any person performing or furnishing or causing the performing or furnishing of, any such designing, planning, supervision, and/or observation of . . . such an improvement . . . ." 10 Del. C. § 8127(b). It does not protect suppliers who do not perform or furnish construction, Becker v. Hamada, Inc., Del.Supr., 455 A.2d 353 (1982), nor persons in "actual possession or actual control, as owner, tenant or otherwise . . .", 10 Del. C. § 8127(d). As the Supreme Court found in the case of Becker v. Hamada, Inc., such statutes:
Delaware courts apply a common sense understanding of the word construction. That is, it is the "act of building; erection; act of devising and forming; fabrication; [or] composition." Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353, 356 (Del. 1982) (citing Webster's New International Dictionary, 572 (2d. ed., G.C. Merriam Co. 1951). Where the party merely supplies raw materials, it is not entitled to the protections of § 8127. Thus, where the party is more than a mere supplier of the materials in question in that it actually fabricates them to the specifications of the buyer, that party furnishes construction. City of Dover, 514 A.2d at 1089.
Coleman, 854 A.2d at 842 (citing Isaacson, Stolper & Co., 330 A.2d at 132-33); accord Wal-Mart, 860 A.2d at 319.See Wal-Mart, 860 A.2d at 319 (citing Coleman, 854 A.2d at 842); Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353, 356 (Del. 1982); Isaacson, Stolper & Co., 330 A.2d at 133; Layton, 246 A.2d 794. Here, the Superior Court found that "in 2007, the State told O'Rourke to stop clearing trees on the property and that it intended to build a highway over Parcel 46 because it owned the land."
Coleman v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLC., 854 A.2d 838, 842 (Del. 2004); See Child, Inc. v. Rodgers, 377 A.2d 374, 377 (Del. Super. 1977) rev'd in part, aff'd in pertinent part, 401 A.2d 68 (Del. 1979); Isaacson, 330 A.2d at 133 (stating title defects are inherently unknowable to the average layman because he may not perceive existing title defects based on a reasonable inspection of settlement documents); Ruger v. Funk, 1996 WL 110072, at *3 (stating "a client who fails to investigate the quality of a title search without circumstances placing him on notice of a problem in that search remains `blamelessly ignorant.'").Id. (quoting Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353, 356 (Del. 1982)). (11) When reviewing the motion judge's decision to grant a motion to dismiss, we focus on the complaint.
The Statute affords protection to those performing or furnishing construction of such improvement as well as those performing or furnishing any design, plan, supervision, or observation of such improvement. It does not protect suppliers who do not perform or furnish construction, Becker v. Hamada, Inc., Del.Supr., 455 A.2d 353 (1982), or persons "in actual possession or actual control, as owner, tenant, or otherwise. . . ." 10 Del. C. § 8127(d).
This second category is referred to as "inquiry notice." Dean Witter, 1998 WL 442456, at *5 (citing Halpern, 313 A.2d at 143); Coleman, 854 A.2d at 842 (quoting Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353, 356 (Del. 1982)) ("[T]he statute of limitations begins to run upon the discovery of facts 'constituting the basis of the cause of action or the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery' of such facts."). The undisputed facts in the record compel the conclusion as a matter of law that Ocimum was, at a minimum, on inquiry notice before August 21, 2012 of facts that should have prompted it to investigate a breach of contract claim.
Butler argues that its products were engineered and specially fabricated for the Janosik Building. LTL argues that Butler's products were nothing more than generic construction materials used by Merit to construct the Janosik Building. Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353, 355 (Del. 1982) citing Webster's New International Dictionary, 1021 (2d ed., G.&C. Merriam Co. 1951). 10 Del. C. §8127(a)(2).