See Bradley v. State, supra, at 730. See also Beck v. State, 492 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973). Thus, the fact that the jury was unable to reach a verdict at appellant's trial for the offense which was subsequently used to revoke his probation, is inconsequential to this appeal.
Further, the testimony of the principal Caudillo at the hearing on February 23, 1976, reflected that he knew of the November 20, 1975, setting and had discussed the setting with one of his attorneys prior thereto. Another of the principal's attorneys did testify that he did not have knowledge of the November 20th setting, but the court was the trier of the facts and could believe or reject testimony as it chose. Beck v. State, 492 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Farmer v. State, 475 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Under any circumstances, the principal was shown to have knowledge of the setting and we cannot conclude the appellants have shown an uncontrollable circumstance which prevented his appearance in court.
Tex.Cr.R. 438, 272 S.W.2d 104 (1954), are among some of the earlier cases decided directly contrary to appellant's contention, and since, this court has consistently so held from that time. See, i.e., Ex parte Bruinsma, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 358, 298 S.W.2d 838 (1957), cert. denied 354 U.S. 927, 77 S.Ct. 1386, 1 L.Ed.2d 1439; Gorman v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 633, 317 S.W.2d 744 (1958); Hulsey v. State, 447 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Hood v. State, 458 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Rosaschi v. State, 471 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Aguilar v. State, 471 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Irby v. State, 475 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Bennett v. State, 476 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Lamas v. State, 482 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Vance v. State, 485 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Richardson v. State, 487 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 972, 93 S.Ct. 2167, 36 L.Ed.2d 694; Beck v. State, 492 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Hancock v. State, 491 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). In fact, in Farmer v. State, 475 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), this court speaking through Judge Roberts said:
However, the trial court is the trier of facts in a probation revocation hearing, and is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See Beck v. State, 492 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Guillory v. State, 487 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); Parsons v. State, 486 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972). We find the evidence sufficient to support the Court's exercise of discretion in revoking appellant's probation.
Even if the State later dismisses the offense or if the defendant is later acquitted, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by revoking the probation. Beck v. State, 492 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Russell v. State, 551 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Viewing the evidence presented at the revocation hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we conclude that the finding that Appellant committed an assault is supported by the preponderance of the evidence.