Opinion
Case No. EDCV 13-1314-JPR
08-27-2014
MINODORA BECK, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER
I. PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner's final decision denying her applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). This matter is before the Court on the parties' Joint Stipulation, filed April 17, 2014, which the Court has taken under submission without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed and judgment is entered in her favor.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on May 29, 1950. (AR 179.) She obtained a GED and is a certified nursing assistant. (AR 211.) She previously worked as a machinist, nanny, inpatient caregiver, in-home caregiver, and caregiver to her mother. (AR 32-33, 198, 211.)
Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on August 16, 2011. (AR 179-92.) She alleged that she had been unable to work since July 17, 2010, because of a broken right ankle, plates and screws in that ankle, back injury, and pain in both shoulders. (AR 210.) After her applications were denied, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (AR 117-18.)
A hearing was held on June 22, 2011. (AR 24-56.) Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified, as did a vocational expert. (Id.) In a written decision issued April 17, 2012, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 12-20.) On May 30, 2013, the Appeals Council denied her request for review. (AR 1-3.) This action followed.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The ALJ's findings and decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. Id.; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court "must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1996). "If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing," the reviewing court "may not substitute its judgment" for that of the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21.
IV. THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY
People are "disabled" for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or which has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992).
A. The Five-Step Evaluation Process
The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in assessing whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996). In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting her ability to do basic work activities; if not, a finding of not disabled is made and the claim must be denied. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments ("Listing") set forth at 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform her past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The claimant has the burden of proving she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets that burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id. If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant work, the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is not disabled because she can perform other substantial gainful work available in the national economy. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). That determination comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.
RFC is what a claimant can do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989).
B. The ALJ's Application of the Five-Step Process
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since July 17, 2010. (AR 14.) At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had severe impairments of "old fracture of right distal tibia, status post internal fixation and old fracture of the right lateral malleolus, status post internal fixation." (Id.) Because the treatment record did not show ongoing problems with the spine, gluteal region, or right shoulder, the ALJ found the alleged impairments in those areas to be nonsevere. (AR 15.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal a Listing. (Id.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform medium work with some additional limitations. (AR 15-16.) Based on the VE's testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work as a nurse's assistant as generally performed. (AR 19.) Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 20.)
"Medium work" involves "lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds." §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c).
V. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing the opinion of Dr. Terrance P. Flanagan and discounting Plaintiff's credibility. (J. Stip. at 3.)
A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing Dr. Flanagan's Opinion
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide an adequate basis for discounting Dr. Flanagan's findings, particularly with respect to her right shoulder. (J. Stip. at 4.)
1. Background
On September 4, 2011, Dr. Flanagan performed a complete orthopedic evaluation of Plaintiff at the request of the California Department of Social Services. (AR 279-84.)
He noted Plaintiff's complaints of pain in her neck, upper back, lower back, both shoulders, left hand, right foot, right ankle, and both hips. (AR 279; see also AR 280.) Dr. Flanagan observed that Plaintiff sat and stood with normal posture, rose from a chair without difficulty, had normal gait, and walked without difficulty and without an assistive device. (AR 281.) She had full range of motion in her neck with pain and had tenderness in the cervical paraspinal muscles. (Id.) Her range of motion in her back was limited by pain. (Id.) She also had pain with rotation of her trunk and tenderness in the thoracic and lumbar paraspinal muscles. (Id.)
Plaintiff had normal range of motion in her shoulders but positive Hawkins and Neer signs on the right. (Id.) She had normal range of motion in her hips but pain upon palpation of her gluteal muscles. (AR 282.) She had pain with palpation and range of motion in her right ankle. (Id.) Plaintiff demonstrated motor strength of four out of five in bilateral hip flexion, knee extension, ankle plantar and dorsiflexion, and bilateral shoulder abduction, but Dr. Flanagan attributed her diminished ability in these exercises to limited effort because of pain rather than "a true neurologic result." (AR 283.) Her motor strength was otherwise grossly normal. (Id.) Straight-leg-raise and other neurologic tests were negative. (Id.) The rest of the examination was also normal. (See AR 281-83.)
Neer and Hawkins-Kennedy impingement tests are used to diagnose impingements and tears in the rotator cuff. See Physical Therapist's Guide to Rotator Cuff Tear, Am. Physical Therapy Ass'n, http://www.moveforwardpt.com/symptomsconditionsdetail.aspx?cid=95bd746b-b25f-46f5-8373-fb56c9f6b46a#.Uxo2Pz9dVc0 (last visited July 14, 2014).
Dr. Flanagan diagnosed cervical, thoracic, and lumbar myofascial strain, bilateral gluteal strain, right-rotator-cuff tendinitis, and right-ankle and foot posttraumatic degenerative changes. (Id.) He opined that Plaintiff could lift and carry only 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently on the right but 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently on the left. (AR 284.) She could stand or walk and sit for six hours each in an eight-hour day. (Id.) She could climb, stoop, kneel, and crouch frequently and reach overhead on the right occasionally. (Id.)
For persons suffering myofascial pain syndrome, pressure on sensitive points in the muscles causes pain in seemingly unrelated parts of the body. See Diseases and Conditions: Myofascial Pain Syndrome, Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.org/ diseases-conditions/myofascial-pain-syndrome/basics/definition/CO N-20033195?p=1 (last updated Jan. 5, 2012).
2. Applicable law
Three types of physicians may offer opinions in Social Security cases: (1) those who directly treated the plaintiff, (2) those who examined but did not treat the plaintiff, and (3) those who did not treat or examine the plaintiff. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. A treating physician's opinion is generally entitled to more weight than that of an examining physician, and an examining physician's opinion is generally entitled to more weight than that of a nonexamining physician. Id.
When a treating or examining doctor's opinion is not contradicted by other evidence in the record, it may be rejected only for "clear and convincing" reasons. See Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31). When a treating or examining physician's opinion is contradicted, the ALJ must provide only "specific and legitimate reasons" for discounting it. Id.
3. Analysis
The ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for giving only "some weight" to Dr. Flanagan's opinion. (AR 19.)
The ALJ found that Dr. Flanagan's recommendation that Plaintiff be restricted to light work with her right-upper extremity was not supported by his findings. (AR 19.) Although Dr. Flanagan noted positive Hawkins and Neer signs in Plaintiff's upper right shoulder, she had normal range of motion in both shoulders. (AR 18; see AR 282.) And Dr. Flanagan dismissed her apparent weakness when abducting her shoulders as attributable to limited effort because of pain rather than indicative of a neurological issue. (AR 18; see AR 283.) Plaintiff herself reported that her right-shoulder pain was only intermittent but worsened with overhead activity (AR 18; see AR 280), a limitation the ALJ took into account by limiting Plaintiff to only occasional overhead reaching with her right arm (see AR 16, 19), just as Dr. Flanagan recommended. That Dr. Flanagan's findings did not support a restriction to light work with the right shoulder but only a limitation on right-shoulder abduction was a legitimate basis upon which to discount his opinion. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); Batson v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ need not accept medical opinion that is inconsistent with clinical findings). Moreover, the ALJ was entitled to rely on the vocational expert's testimony that it was not "reasonable that somebody would be able to lift and/or carry 50 pounds occasionally on the left . . . with just one arm, and then have a limitation to light . . . on the other" (AR 50), as Dr. Flanagan had opined. Cf. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005).
The ALJ also found that Dr. Flanagan's findings were inconsistent with the longitudinal medical evidence. (AR 14-15, 19.) Although Dr. Flanagan diagnosed myofascial strain, gluteal strain, and right-rotator-cuff tendinitis, the ALJ found "very little indication the claimant has [been] treated for these impairments after the alleged onset date" and "no evidence of ongoing, persistent treatment or problems associated with these impairments after the alleged onset date." (AR 14.) Even Plaintiff's attorney acknowledged that there was "minimal evidence" and that the record was "one of the thinnest that I've even been really a part of." (AR 30.) The medical evidence of back, neck, and shoulder pain consisted primarily of treatment notes from chiropractor David G. Madison, which reflected only intermittent treatment and few references to shoulder pain. (See AR 245-78.) As the ALJ noted, the record contains little diagnostic evidence pertaining to these ailments. (AR 18.) Dr. Madison's treatment notes contain occasional range-of-motion measurements (see AR 250, 261) but primarily report Plaintiff's reports of her symptoms, any muscle tenderness or spasm, and the manipulations he performed (see, e.g., AR 246-48, 250, 254-56, 259). And it appears Plaintiff did not mention neck, back, or shoulder pain in either of her visits to Dr. Michele Martinez. (See AR 238-39.) Plaintiff stated that she visited Dr. Martinez rarely because she could not afford an office visit. (AR 60.) Dr. Martinez's notes reflect, however, that even when Plaintiff did visit her, the doctor did not prescribe urgent or substantial treatment. (See AR 238-44.)
Additionally, Plaintiff acknowledged that with chiropractic care she was able to care for her mother, who weighed about 300 pounds, was bedridden, and relied upon Plaintiff to help her go to the bathroom, sit up, and roll over. (AR 40.) Being able to work with treatment is inconsistent with being disabled. See §§ 404.1520(a)(iv), 416.920(a)(iv) ("If you can still do your past relevant work, we will find that you are not disabled."); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (response to conservative treatment undermined allegations of disabling impairments). Indeed, Plaintiff stopped working only because her mother died.
Moreover, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's pain was treated conservatively, with chiropractic care and nonsteroidal antiinflammatory medications. (AR 16-17; see AR 247, 251, 254, 259; but see AR 60 (Plaintiff reporting she took hydrocodone when she could afford it).) Nor do her treatment notes indicate that her pain had grown worse. (AR 17; see also AR 29, 39-40 (Plaintiff testifying that most of her problems had existed before onset date and while she was working or caring for her mother); AR 82 (Plaintiff reporting on Dec. 16, 2011, "no worsening of medical condition").) In fact, the treatment notes suggest that Plaintiff improved with the conservative treatment she received. (AR 14-15; see AR 248 (on Aug. 10 and 13, 2010, Plaintiff reporting lumbosacral area was "a little better"); id. (on Aug. 16, 2010, cancelling appointment because "doing better"); AR 246 (on Aug. 20, 2010, reporting lumbosacral area "still bothers me some but it's better th[a]n before"); id. (on Aug. 27, 2010, reporting lumbosacral area "not to[o] bad" but "some" pain in upper back and collarbone); id. (on Sept. 3, 2010, cancelling appointment because "doing better").)
Neither of Plaintiff's treating practitioners recommended greater restrictions than those in the RFC; indeed, neither Dr. Martinez's nor Dr. Madison's notes reflect significant complaints of right-shoulder pain. (AR 17; see generally AR 238-39, 246-78, 288.) Moreover, the state-agency physicians who examined Plaintiff's medical records opined that she was capable of medium work, including with her right side, as long as she was limited to only occasional overhead reaching with her right arm. (AR 19; see AR 62-63, 84-85.) That Dr. Flanagan's opinion that Plaintiff could do only light work with her right arm was not supported by his own findings or by Plaintiff's treatment record and was contradicted by the findings of state-agency physicians were legitimate bases upon which to discount his opinion. See §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4) (explaining that more weight should be afforded to medical opinions that are consistent with the record as a whole); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (holding that ALJ may discredit physicians' opinions that are "unsupported by the record as a whole . . . or by objective medical findings"). Remand is not warranted on this basis.
B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing Plaintiff's Credibility
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her credibility. (J. Stip. at 11.)
1. Applicable law
An ALJ's assessment of pain severity and claimant credibility is entitled to "great weight." See Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1986). "[T]he ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In evaluating a claimant's subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ engages in a two-step analysis. See Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36. "First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment [that] could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged." Id. at 1036 (internal quotation marks omitted). If such objective medical evidence exists, the ALJ may not reject a claimant's testimony "simply because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably produce the degree of symptom alleged." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original). When the ALJ finds a claimant's subjective complaints not credible, the ALJ must make specific findings that support the conclusion. See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010).
Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, those findings must provide "clear and convincing" reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. If the ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the reviewing court "may not engage in second-guessing." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.
2. Analysis
Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting her credibility. The ALJ found her allegations of disabling pain to be inconsistent with both the objective medical evidence and Plaintiff's activities, which he found indicated "an attempt by the claimant to exaggerate the severity of her symptoms." (AR 17.)
With respect to the medical evidence, as noted above, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was prescribed only conservative treatment for her back, neck, and shoulder ailments and had improved with that treatment. Plaintiff's reliance on and response to conservative treatment is a clear and convincing reason to discount her allegations of disabling impairments. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040 (holding that claimant's response to conservative treatment undermined his reports of disabling symptoms); Parra, 481 F.3d at 751 (noting "evidence of 'conservative treatment' is sufficient to discount a claimant's testimony regarding severity of an impairment"). Moreover, Plaintiff's treatment records contained little diagnostic evidence of debilitating back, neck, or shoulder pain. And although Dr. Flanagan opined that Plaintiff's right shoulder required a light-work limitation, there is little evidence of shoulder treatment in the record, and neither her treating practitioners nor the state-agency physicians found her to require greater restrictions than those in her RFC. That Plaintiff's allegations of pain were inconsistent with the medical evidence was a legitimate basis for discounting her credibility. See Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040 (in determining credibility, ALJ may consider "whether the alleged symptoms are consistent with the medical evidence"); see also Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 ("Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant's subjective testimony."); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.").
Claimant also testified that she had used a cane "very often" since 2007 because of the pain in her back and hips. (AR 47.) There's no evidence, however, that the cane was prescribed to her by a medical provider, and she did not use it when examined by Dr. Flanagan or at the hearing. (Id.)
Plaintiff's statements about her activities also undermined her claims of disabling impairments. As the ALJ noted, although Plaintiff alleged disability beginning in July 2010, her impairments began significantly earlier, there is little if any evidence that they worsened with time, and she continued working despite them. (AR 17.) She reported to Dr. Flanagan that she had suffered joint pain for approximately a decade and broke her ankle in March 2007. (AR 280.) She testified, however, that she left private employment as a nurse's assistant in 2007 not because of these impairments but in order to become a full-time caregiver to her mother, a job she testified required comparable exertion. (AR 16, 17-18; see AR 34-35, 38.) For instance, Plaintiff testified that she spent all of her waking hours caring for her mother, who was bedridden and weighed 300 pounds, including lifting, turning, bathing, dressing, and feeding her. (AR 16; see AR 38-42.) Thus, she was employed as a caregiver to others and then became her mother's full-time caregiver while suffering almost all of the medical complaints she later alleged made her disabled, and she stopped working only when her mother died. (See AR 28-29 (Plaintiff testifying that her complaints related to "body parts [that] were bothering [her] when [she was] working"); AR 34-35 (testifying that she could have returned to her prior position after her broken ankle healed); AR 39-40 (testifying that she suffered dizziness and fatigue while caring for mother); AR 41, 277 (reporting to chiropractor that she could not walk or stand a long time more than a year before she stopped caring for her mother).) This was a proper basis to discount her allegations of disabling impairments. Cf. Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (as amended) (affirming adverse credibility finding because claimant stopped working when laid off, not when injured); Lobato v. Astrue, No. SACV 11-01337-MAN, 2012 WL 5992280, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (finding that work history was proper basis to discount credibility of allegations when claimant was gainfully employed for years while suffering from allegedly disabling impairments and no evidence suggested she stopped working because of those impairments). Moreover, the ALJ found, based on Plaintiff's testimony, that she likely "would have continued to provide this care had her mother not passed away" in July 2010. (AR 16; see AR 41 (Plaintiff complained of trouble standing and walking a year before she stopped caring for her mother).) He found that this too detracted from the credibility of Plaintiff's claim that she became disabled in July 2010. (See AR 16-17); see Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) ("If a claimant is able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting, a specific finding as to this fact may be sufficient to discredit a claimant's allegations.").
That Plaintiff's "allegedly disabling impairments were present at approximately the same level of severity prior to the onset date" and that she worked "despite having the pain symptoms and dizziness that [plagued] her" at the time of the hearing are clear and convincing reasons for discounting her allegations. (AR 17); see Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding ALJ's adverse credibility determination in part because claimant "recently worked as a personal caregiver for two years, and has sought out other employment since then"); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (holding that ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant's credibility, including "ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as . . . inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms . . . and . . . the claimant's daily activities").
This Court is limited to determining whether the ALJ properly identified reasons for discrediting Plaintiff's credibility. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. The inconsistencies between Plaintiff's allegations and both the medical evidence and her activities as a caregiver were proper and sufficiently specific bases for discounting her claims of disabling symptoms, and the ALJ's reasoning was clear and convincing. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039-40; Houghton v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 493 F. App'x 843, 845 (9th Cir. 2012). Because the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence, this Court may not engage in second-guessing. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.
Remand is not warranted on this ground.
VI. CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing, and pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties. DATED: August 27, 2014
This sentence provides: "The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing."
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/s/_________
JEAN ROSENBLUTH
U.S. Magistrate Judge