Only estoppel against a party and in favor of the opponent is ancillary to the question of priority. Bechtold v. Lanser, 82 F.2d 415, 23 CCPA 1051, 29 USPQ 130 (1936). The estoppel against Mindick suggested by Meitzner would not be "in favor of" Meitzner, but rather "in favor of" Corte.
Therefore, it must be given the broadest interpretation which it will reasonably support. Bechtold v. Lanser, 82 F.2d 415, 23 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1051, and Henry P. Field v. Audley Hart Stow, 49 P.2d 840, 18 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1437. Appellant contends that the structure of appellee does not meet the limitation of the count for "latch means for holding said controlling member in operative position" and the further limitation for the "reset means for actuating said armature to attracted position and in the actuating of the armature to attracted position being operable to move said latch means to position to pick up said controlling member for actuation thereof to operative position."
If there is no ambiguity and no need for construction, and if the counts broadly read upon the Jackson disclosure, it is not seen how it can logically be urged that there is any necessity for confusing the issues by considering the many contentions which appellant makes with respect to what the language means in his patent. See Shultz v. Dunham, 67 F.2d 501, 21 C.C.P.A., Patents, 706; Bechtold v. Lanser, 82 F.2d 415, 23 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1051; Frey v. Wagner, 87 F.2d 212, 24 C.C.P.A., Patents, 823; and Holdsworth v. Goldsmith, 129 F.2d 571, 29 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1047. Compare Field v. Stow, 49 F.2d 840, 18 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1437; Sweetland v. Cole, 53 F.2d 709, 19 C.C.P.A., Patents, 751; Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 26 C.C.P.A., Patents, 937, and cases there cited. Under the circumstances, we think that we and the tribunals below are justified in accepting appellant's admission that there is no ambiguity in the disputed limitations regardless of whether, under other circumstances, we might be called upon to determine whether or not the controverted limitations involve language which is ambiguous and of indefinite and uncertain meaning.
Counsel for appellant is clearly mistaken. If appellant is in fact the first inventor, the claims in the Heston patent, 1 to 5, inclusive, are invalid, and under the application of the two-year rule the invention embraced in the claims before us is now abandoned to the public, through appellant's failure to include them in his original patent, and laches on his part in seeking a reissue if he was otherwise entitled thereto. In the case of Bechtold v. Lanser, 82 F.2d 415, 419, 23 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1051, we said: "If appellee had never made his application for reissue, the invention here involved would have been dedicated to the public, he being in fact the first inventor thereof. In such case the claim in appellant's patent corresponding to the count here involved would clearly have been invalid.
" We are in agreement with this statement of the Board, which is in accordance with the rule approved by us. Daley v. Trube, 88 F.2d 308, 24 C.C.P.A., Patents, 964; Bechtold v. Lanser, 82 F.2d 415, 23 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1051. Upon oral argument before us, appellant's counsel expressly waived any contention with respect to the sufficiency of the oath in appellee's reissue application.
Therefore, the tribunals correctly ruled that the grounds upon which appellant based his motion to dissolve raised a question not ancillary to priority and properly refused to give consideration to the same. Bechtold v. Lanser, 82 F.2d 415, 23 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1051; Derby v. Whitworth, 62 F.2d 368, 20 C.C.P.A., Patents, 791. In this view of the case, it next becomes necessary for us to give consideration to the proof of record in order to determine who was the prior inventor of the subject matter of the counts.