Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied under the facts as found is a question of law which this court reviews independently.See Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477, 479 (Alaska 1993), overruled in part on other grounds by B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514, 520 n. 47 (Alaska 1999).See Wright, 856 P.2d at 479 n. 2.

Several courts have refused to apply the estoppel doctrine without proof that the father's denial of paternity would result in economic detriment to the child. See B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1999) (holding that doctrine of "paternity by estoppel" may not be employed without proof of financial detriment or prejudice); Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546 (Md. 1986) (father not estopped from denying paternity of child without proof of financial detriment to the child); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985) (father not estopped from denying paternity when there was no proof that father's actions precluded son from pursuing a child support claim against his biological father). In adopting the equitable estoppel theory in this case, we are persuaded by M.H.B. v. H.T.B., a case with a fact pattern practically indistinguishable from the present case.

Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 803 (Alaska 2002). Id. (first citing Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477, 480 (Alaska 1993), overruled on other grounds by B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1999); then citing Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Alaska 1989)). Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987).

With respect to the third element, prejudice, we have recently narrowed the type of conduct which can qualify. In B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514, Op. No. 5114 (Alaska, May 14, 1999), we held that the only prejudice that can be considered is the impairment of the right to obtain support from the natural father. Previously we had indicated that two other types of prejudice could be considered: "serious and lasting emotional injury from the denial of paternity," and "social injury from the removal of the status of legitimacy."

We also highlighted that the father had crossexamined the mother about her proposed custody schedule and filed an opposition to her custody motion.Weathers v. Weathers, 425 P.3d 131, 137 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477, 480 (Alaska 1993), overruled on other grounds by B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514, 520 n.47 (Alaska 1999)). Id. at 138; see Cushing v. Painter, 666 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Alaska 1983) (holding that parent "[a]cting under the impression" that expedited hearing would "determine solely the question of interim custody" for school year lacked adequate time to prepare and make her case); Lashbrook, 957 P.2d at 329-30 (vacating custody modification made based on domestic violence incident when parties were not informed permanent custody was at issue during domestic violence trial); Debra P. v. Laurence S., 309 P.3d 1258, 1261 (Alaska 2013) (concluding that self-represented parent was denied due process, when she expressed confusion at hearing and did not understand that interim custody hearing would become final custody hearing).

Accordingly it was not an abuse of discretion to find "no good cause" to reopen the trial record.Cf. Wright v. Black , 856 P.2d 477, 480 (Alaska 1993) (concluding that appellant had waived right to object to his lack of notice that paternity would be at issue at child support modification hearing because he failed to object when the master "announced at the beginning of the hearing that he would resolve the paternity issue, ... asked if anyone had a problem with his taking testimony on both issues, ... [and] directed his questions to the paternity issue"), overruled on other grounds by B.E.B. v. R.L.B. , 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1999).Cf. Jaymot v. Skillings-Donat , 216 P.3d 534, 544 (Alaska 2009) ("An issue raised [for the first time in a motion for reconsideration] is untimely and is not properly before the court on appeal.").

Lashbrook v. Lashbrook , 957 P.2d 326, 328 (Alaska 1998) ("The adequacy of the notice and hearing afforded a litigant in child custody proceedings involves due process considerations.").Wright v. Black , 856 P.2d 477, 480 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co. , 520 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Alaska 1974) ), overruled on other grounds by B.E.B. v. R.L.B. , 979 P.2d 514, 520 & n.47 (Alaska 1999).Cushing v. Painter , 666 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Alaska 1983).

See Hubbard , 44 P.3d at 156 n.7 ("[R]equiring a non-biological father to assume a post-divorce support obligation is unlikely to encourage a lasting bond between the non-biological father and the child."); B.E.B. v. R.L.B. , 979 P.2d 514, 520 (Alaska 1999) (holding that "the risk of emotional harm inherent in severing a child's relationship with a psychological parent cannot itself suffice as a basis for invoking the doctrine of paternity by estoppel").But Forrest has not sought to disestablish his parental relationship to the son here.

The Wright court acknowledged that notice at the hearing “still may not have been constitutionally sufficient,” but it held that even if the notice were assumed deficient for due process purposes, the appellant had waived his right to object..856 P.2d at 479–80,overruled on other grounds by B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1999).Id. at 480.

"); Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477, 481 (Alaska 1993) ("We conclude that the application of equitable estoppel to paternity cases advances sound policies in the law, and therefore adopt its application."), overruled on other grounds by B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1999). 951 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1998).