Beaver v. Taylor

39 Citing cases

  1. Thiede v. Utah Territory

    159 U.S. 510 (1895)   Cited 60 times
    In Thiede v. Utah, 159 U.S. 510, 519-20 (1895), a homicide appeal, the Court held that swearing in one of the jurors as an interpreter during the trial was not prejudicial to the defendant's rights because the defendant consented to the arrangement.

    Such an exception is insufficient to compel an examination of each separate instruction. It is enough that any one of the series is erroneous. In Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U.S. 46, 54, this precise question was presented, and the court said: "The entire series of propositions was presented as one request; and, if any one proposition was unsound, an exception to a refusal to charge the series cannot be maintained." See also Indianapolis St. Louis Railroad v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 295; Block v. Darling, 140 U.S. 234; Bogk v. Gassert, 149 U.S. 17, 26; Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91; Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303, 316; Allis v. United States, 155 U.S. 117; Newport News c. Valley Co. v. Pace, 158 U.S. 36.

  2. Palmer v. Hoffman

    318 U.S. 109 (1943)   Cited 950 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an accident reports prepared by a railroad did not carry the indicia of reliability of a routine business record because it was prepared at least partially in anticipation of litigation

    Where a party might have obtained the correct charge by specifically calling the attention of the trial court to the error and where part of the charge was correct, he may not through a general exception obtain a new trial. See Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall. 132, 139; Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U.S. 46, 54-55; Mobile Montgomery Ry. Co. v. Jurey, 111 U.S. 584, 596; McDermott v. Severe, 202 U.S. 600, 611; Norfolk W. Ry. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U.S. 114, 122; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Minds, 250 U.S. 368, 375. That long standing rule of federal practice is as applicable in this type of case as in others. That rule cannot be avoided here by reason of the requested charge.

  3. United States v. Atkinson

    297 U.S. 157 (1936)   Cited 1,021 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that errors which "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings" may be raised for the first time on appeal

    The verdict of a jury will not ordinarily be set aside for error not brought to the attention of the trial court. This practice is founded upon considerations of fairness to the court and to the parties and of the public interest in bringing litigation to an end after fair opportunity has been afforded to present all issues of law and fact. Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U.S. 46; Allis v. United States, 155 U.S. 117, 122, 123; United States v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 512, 529; Guerini Stone Co. v. Carlin Construction Co., 248 U.S. 334, 348; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Minds, 250 U.S. 368, 375; Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328, 336; see Shannon v. Shaffer Oil Refining Co., 51 F.2d 878, 880. It is substantially that adopted by Rule 10, Subdivision 1, of the rules of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which requires the party excepting to the charge "to state distinctly the several matters of law" to which he excepts, and directs that "those matters of law, and those only, shall be inserted in the bill of exceptions." In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

  4. Burns v. United States

    274 U.S. 328 (1927)   Cited 35 times
    In Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328, 331, 332, 47 S. Ct. 650, 651, 71 L. Ed. 1077, the court said: "The instruction must be taken in connection with the evidence bearing on the matter referred to and is to be considered in the light of the charge as a whole.

    Plaintiff in error does not contend that all of them are erroneous, and obviously they are not. The rule is well-established that, where a series of instructions are excepted to in mass, the exception will be overruled if any one of them is correct. Johnston v. Jones, 1 Black 209, 220; Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U.S. 46, 54; McDermott v. Severe, 202 U.S. 600, 610. Exceptions to a charge must be specifically made in order to give the court opportunity then and there to correct errors and omissions, if any. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Minds, 250 U.S. 368, 375, and cases cited; Allis v. United States, 155 U.S. 117, 122. Even if some of the instructions were erroneous, the exceptions taken were not such as to require a new trial.

  5. Frey Son v. Cudahy Packing Co.

    256 U.S. 208 (1921)   Cited 79 times
    Noting that essence of a conspiracy is concerted action

    To quote from some of the decisions: "One object of an exception is to call the attention of the circuit judge to the precise point as to which it is supposed he has erred, that he may then and there consider it, and give new and different instructions to the jury, if in his judgment it should be proper to do so." Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U.S. 46, 55. "While it is the duty of this court to review the action of subordinate courts, justice to those courts requires that their alleged errors should be called directly to their attention, and that their action should not be reversed upon questions which the astuteness of counsel in this court has evolved from the record. It is not the province of this court to retry these cases de novo.

  6. United States v. U.S. Fidelity Co.

    236 U.S. 512 (1915)   Cited 123 times
    In United States v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 512, 529, 35 S.Ct. 298, 303, 59 L.Ed. 696, "the actual damages exceed[ed] the amount of the penalty" named in the surety bond. Cf. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 157 F.2d 859.

    An exception, therefore, furnishes no basis for reversal upon any ground other than the one specifically called to the attention of the trial court. Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U.S. 46, 55; Robinson Co. v. Belt, 187 U.S. 41, 50; Addis v. Rushmore, 74 N.J.L. 649, 651; Holt v. United Security Life Ins. Co., 76 N.J.L. 585, 593. And the practice respecting exceptions in the Federal courts is unaffected by the Conformity Act, § 914, Rev. Stat. Chateaugay Iron Co., Petitioner, 128 U.S. 544, 553; St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 153.

  7. Jones v. East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Rd. Co.

    157 U.S. 682 (1895)   Cited 4 times

    This exception was insufficient. Rule 4; Rogers v. The Marshal, 1 Wall. 644; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328; Insurance Co. v. Sea, 21 Wall. 158; Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U.S. 46; Block v. Darling, 140 U.S. 234, 238. Judgment affirmed.

  8. Bogk v. Gassert

    149 U.S. 17 (1893)   Cited 66 times
    Noting that "[i]t not infrequently happens that the defendant himself, by his own evidence, supplies the missing link" of evidence

    quested twelve instructions, all of which were given, except the second, sixth and seventh, "to which action of the court," says the bill of exceptions, "the defendant then and there objected, for the reason that said instructions numbered two, six and seven correctly state the law as applicable to the facts in evidence, and are necessary in order that the jury may arrive at a correct conclusion; but, notwithstanding said objection, the court refused to give said instructions two, six and seven, to which action the defendant, by his counsel, excepted," etc. This exception, as well as the one taken to the granting of the plaintiff's requests, is open to the objection so often made that a general exception taken to a refusal of a series of instructions taken together, and constituting a single request, is improper, and will not be considered if any one of the propositions be unsound. Johnston v. Jones, 1 Black, 200, 220; Rogers v. The Marshal, 1 Wall. 644; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328; Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U.S. 46; Worthington v. Mason, 101 U.S. 149; Moulor v. American Life Insurance Co., 111 U.S. 335. This is not only the rule in this court but also in the courts of Montana. Woods v. Berry, 7 Mont. 195. Although since this case was decided, and at a session of the legislature in 1887, the law was changed so that the giving or refusal to give instructions are deemed excepted to, and no exception need be taken. The first of these instructions, (No. 2,) stripped of its verbiage, assumes that an absolute deed and a separate written contract to reconvey, both under seal, bearing even date, executed and delivered at the same time, between the same parties, and relating to the same land, the agreement to reconvey being conditioned upon the payment by the grantor to the grantee of a certain sum of money within a certain period, constitute in law and fact a mortgage, and will not convey any interest in the premises, or entitle the grantee to the possession of the land described.

  9. Union Ins. Co. v. Smith

    124 U.S. 405 (1888)   Cited 49 times
    In Union Ins. Co. v. Smith, 124 U.S. 405, the policy was identical with the one at bar, and it was there held that the defendant, having set up in its answer that the loss was occasioned by want of ordinary care in managing the vessel, it was not error to charge the jury that such want of ordinary care must be shown by a fair preponderance of proof on the part of the insurers.

    As to the fourteen requests to charge which were refused by the court, except so far as they were covered by the charge which it had already given, the statement in the bill of exceptions is, that the defendant excepted to the "refusal to charge," that is, to the refusal to charge the requests as a whole. The exception is a general one, to the refusal to charge the entire series of the fourteen propositions; and it is well settled that such a general exception is bad, provided any one of the series is objectionable. Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U.S. 46; Worthington v. Mason, 101 U.S. 149; United States v. Hough, 103 U.S. 71. The first one of this series of propositions was clearly objectionable, namely, that, under all the testimony in the case, the verdict of the jury should be for the defendant. As to the parts of the charge which may be considered as having been excepted to, namely, the parts included in brackets, the argument on behalf of the defendant is, that, after the tug's shaft had been broken, so that she was unable to navigate herself as a tug, she became unseaworthy for all purposes; and that, if the plaintiff took the tug, while she was in that condition, past a port where he might have had her repaired, such conduct would prevent a recovery upon the policy if she were lost while she continued in such unseaworthy condition, even though the loss did not arise from the breaking of the shaft.

  10. Iron Mountain Railway v. Knight

    122 U.S. 79 (1887)   Cited 19 times

    , 12 How. 272; The Columbo, 3 Blatchford, 521; 630 Casks of Sherry Wine, 7 Ben. 506, 509; S.C. 14 Blatchford, 517; Bissel v. Price, 16 Ill. 408; Barrett v. Rogers, 7 Mass. 297 [ S.C. 5 Am. Dec. 45]; Shepherd v. Naylor, 5 Gray, 591; Michigan Southern Railroad v. Shurtz, 7 Mich. 515; Platt v. Hibbard, 7 Cowen, 497; St. Louis, c., Railroad v. Montgomery, 39 Ill. 335; Roskell v. Waterhouse, 2 Starkie, 461; O'Neil v. New York Central Railroad, 60 N.Y. 138; Barron v. Eldredge, 100 Mass. 455. Mr. Julius Rosenthal and Mr. Abram M. Pence for defendants in error, submitted on their brief, citing: Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 307 [ S.C. 23 Am. Dec. 607]; Stevenson v. Farnsworth, 2 Gilman, 715; Gaddy v. McCleave, 59 Ill. 182; Templeton v. Hayward, 65 Ill. 178; Dwight v. Newell, 15 Ill. 333; Walker v. Krebaum, 67 Ill. 252; The Idaho, 93 U.S. 575; Robinson v. Memphis, c., Railway, 16 F. 57, 60; Moulor v. American Life Insurance Co., 111 U.S. 335; Indianapolis, c., Railroad Co. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291; Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U.S. 46; Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266; Ottawa Fox River Railroad v. McMath, 91 Ill. 111; St. Louis Iron Mt. Railroad v. Larned, 103 Ill. 293; Armour v. Mich. Central Railroad, 65 N.Y. 111; Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 22 How. 96. ASSUMPSIT against plaintiff in error, defendant below, as a common carrier, to recover on a bill of lading for goods not delivered.