Opinion
1:21-cv-156
10-27-2022
CHRISTOPHER ROBERT BEAUSOLEIL, Petitioner v. D.B. OBERLANDER, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, and DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ERIE COUNTY, Respondents
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF NO. 3)
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 3, be denied and that no certificate of appealability issue.
II. Report
A. Procedural history
Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner Christopher Robert Beausoleil pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 3. Petitioner is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest, serving a sentence of imprisonment imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylvania.
A review of the record and the criminal docket for Petitioner's underlying convictions in Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, No. CP-25-CR-0003319-2017 (Erie Cnty. Com. Pl.), reveals the following. Petitioner pled guilty to charges of aggravated assault, driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance, and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. On May 29, 2018, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 13 to 27 years' imprisonment. He filed post- sentence motions, which were denied on June 8, 2018. On November 19, 2018, Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46.
This PCRA petition concerned three separate criminal proceedings: the one at issue in this petition (“3319”); CP-25-CR-0003418-2017 (“3418”), at which Petitioner was convicted of harassment; and CP-25-CR-0002202-2017 (“2202”), at which Petitioner was convicted of harassment (in a separate incident from that at issue in 3418). That-petition was dismissed on May 1, 2019. Petitioner filed an appeal from the dismissal. Concerning that appeal, on December 19, 2019, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held:
As an initial matter, Appellant filed a PCRA Petition raising various issues regarding three separate criminal proceedings at Criminal Docket Nos. 2202-2017, 3319-2017, and 3418-2017. In his brief to this Court, Appellant likewise raises claims of error concerning convictions at all three docket numbers. However, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal only at Criminal Docket No. 2202-2017. See Notice of Appeal, filed 5/13/19 (listing “Case No.: CP-25-CR-0002202-2017, ET. AL.” in its caption). Accordingly, the only case before us for review is Criminal Docket No. 2202-2017, and we decline to address any of the issues that Appellant raises regarding Criminal Docket Nos. 3319-2017 and 3418-2017.Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 225 A.3d 1172 (Pa. Super. 2019) (table); 2019 WL 6970579 at *2.
The Superior Court disposed of that appeal by affirming the PCRA Court's order of dismissal at 2202.
Petitioner filed another PCRA petition on July 21, 2020; that petition was dismissed as untimely on September 10, 2020. Petitioner did not appeal that dismissal.
Petitioner commenced this litigation by placing his petition in the prison mailing system on September 10, 2020. ECF No. 3 at 15 Respondents filed a response. ECF No. 9. Petitioner filed a traverse. ECF No. 11. The petition is now ripe for review.
The petition and its accompanying documents were postmarked on September 11, 2020, ECF No. 1-4, but for - reasons which are not clear from the docket, they were not docketed until May 25, 2021, ECF No. 1. Pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), the petition is considered filed on September 10, 2020.
B. Analysis
Respondents first argue that this habeas petition is untimely because it was filed outside of the one-year limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). ECF No. 9 at 2-3. However, as Petitioner correctly points out in his traverse, Respondents' argument is based on an inaccurate timeline. ECF No. 11 at 2. Respondents omit the PCRA petition filed on November 19, 2018, from their calculation. ECF No. 9 at 2. They also misstate the filing date of the petition. Id. at 3. Nonetheless, the petition is indeed untimely.
Petitioner argues that Respondents omit from their calculation a PCRA petition that he filed on January 8, 2019, which was dismissed on March 21, 2019. Id. The trial court docket does not reflect that a PCRA petition was filed on January 8, 2019; further, utilizing this 72-day period to toll the limitations period would not inure to Petitioner's benefit in the calculation of timeliness. As explained infra, the Court utilizes a greater tolling period of 428 days, which period encompasses the January 8, 2019 to March 21, 2019 period.
This omission may stem from the fact that although it is clearly listed on the 3319 docket, the petition appears to have been filed at 2202, one of the other docket numbers it concerned.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year limitations period for state prisoners seeking federal habeas review. It is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant' to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall . run from the latest of -
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or .
(D) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be . counted toward any period of limitation under this section.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In analyzing whether a petition for writ, of habeas corpus has been timely filed under the one-year limitations period, a federal court must undertake a three-part inquiry. First, the court must determine the “trigger date” for the one-year limitations period pursuant to section 2244(d)(1). Caldwell v. Mahally, et al., 2019 WL 5741706, *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019). Second, the court must determine whether any “properly filed” applications for post-conviction or collateral relief were pending during the limitations period that would toll the statute pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). Id. at *6. Third, the court must determine whether any of the other statutory exceptions or equitable tolling should be applied on the facts presented. Id. at *8.
Petitioner asserts two grounds for relief in his petition. These grounds concern his conviction and sentence. ECF No. 3 at 5-8. The “trigger date” for these claims is the date on which Petitioner's judgment of sentence became final. That date was July 9, 2018, when the time for filing a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence expired. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review). The one-year limitations period for filing a habeas corpus petition was triggered on that date. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, Petitioner had to file any federal habeas petition concerning these claims by July 9, 2019.
However, Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the one-year limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a “properly filed” state post-conviction proceeding. Petitioner's first PCRA petition was pending for 428 days: from November 19, 2018, when it was filed, to January 21, 2020, the date of expiration of the time for filing with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court a petition for allowance of appeal from the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision. Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a), Swartz, 204 F.3d at 420-21. Tacking the tolled period of 428 days onto the original expiration date of July 9, 2019, Petitioner had to file his habeas petition by September 9, 2020. As set forth above, this petition was filed September 10, 2020, and is thus untimely by one day.
Petitioner's July 21, 2020, petition, which was determined by the state court to be untimely, was not properly filed and thus its litigation did not toll the limitations period. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”) (quotation marks and brackets deleted); id. at 417 ("Because the state court rejected petitioner's PCRA petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,' and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”).
Because the Superior Court found that Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal as to 3319, it is arguable that the relevant PCRA proceedings concluded at the expiration of time to file such a notice of appeal; however, because this petition is untimely even when giving Petitioner the benefit of tolling during the appeal, the Court will utilize the longer period of tolling in its calculation.
The Court notes that Petitioner signed the petition on September 9, 2020, but declared that the petition was placed' in the prison mailing system on September 10, 2020. ECF No. 3 at 15. As set forth above, pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, a document is deemed to be filed on the date it is given to prison officials for mailing. Houston, 487 U.S. 266. Given Petitioner's declaration as to that date, his signature date is irrelevant. See Moody v. Conroy, 762 Fed.Appx. 71, 73 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding that a litigant who signed complaint on date of expiration of the statute of limitations was one day late because he acknowledged that he gave the complaint to prison authorities for mailing the day after he signed it).
The one-year statute of limitations mandated by Section 2244(d)(1) is subject to equitable tolling. Martin v. Adm 'r N.J. State Prison, 23 F.4th 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2022) (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-49 (2010)). A petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he (1) has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented a timely filing of the habeas petition. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). Petitioner does not attempt to establish either factor.
Accordingly, the petition should be dismissed as untimely.
C. Certificate of Appealability
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from ... the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Applying those standards here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether Petitioner's claims should be dismissed as untimely. Accordingly, no certificate of appealability should issue.
III. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation, Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).