Beauharnais v. Illinois

335 Citing cases

  1. Garrison v. Louisiana

    379 U.S. 64 (1964)   Cited 1,475 times   3 Legal Analyses
    In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, it is said of Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, in a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, that it was "a case decided by the narrowest of margins, should be overruled as a misfit in our constitutional system and as out of line with the dictates of the First Amendment. I think it is time to face the fact that the only line drawn by the Constitution is between `speech' on the one side and conduct or overt acts on the other."

    That argument is well stated in Edward Livingston's explanation of the defamation provisions of his proposed penal code for Louisiana: In affirming appellant's conviction, before New York Times was handed down, the Supreme Court of Louisiana relied on statements in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-487, and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266, to the effect that libelous utterances are not within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and hence can be punished without a showing of clear and present danger. 244 La., at 833-834, 154 So.2d, at 416-417.

  2. Collin v. Smith

    578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)   Cited 107 times
    In Collin v. Smith, supra, 578 F.2d at 1205, we concluded that cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan had so washed away the foundations of Beauharnais that it could not be considered authoritative.

    The asserted falseness of Nazi dogma, and, indeed, its general repudiation, simply do not justify its suppression. The Village's second argument, and the one on which principal reliance is placed, centers on Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952). There a conviction was upheld under a statute prohibiting, in language substantially (and perhaps not unintentionally) similar to that used in the ordinance here, the dissemination of materials promoting racial or religious hatred.

  3. Roth v. United States

    354 U.S. 476 (1957)   Cited 2,346 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that California obscenity statute was not preempted by federal law prohibiting the mailing of obscene material because the state law did not burden or interfere with the federal postal functions

    Since obscenity is not protected, constitutional guaranties were not violated in these cases merely because, under the trial judges' instructions to the juries, convictions could be had without proof either that the obscene material would perceptibly create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct, or probably would induce its recipients to such conduct. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250. Pp. 485-490. (a) Sex and obscenity are not synonymous.

  4. TM v. MZ

    326 Mich. App. 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 31 times
    Observing that, consistent with the First Amendment, states may prohibit "those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals."

    For example, "[l]ibelous utterances [are] not ... within the area of constitutionally protected speech," and a state may therefore enact laws punishing them. Beauharnais v. Illinois , 343 U.S. 250, 266, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952). Prohibitions relating to content, however, are few, because of the First Amendment’s "bedrock principle" that an idea cannot be prohibited "simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

  5. Tollett v. United States

    485 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1973)   Cited 29 times
    Construing a law "in the light of the First Amendment rather than in the light of any regulatory power granted to the Postal Service"

    See, e. g., T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 543 (1970). Although the case has been subjected to great criticism, a state's power to punish group libel was narrowly upheld by the Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952). For a full discussion of the history of criminal libel laws see, e. g., Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 Kan.L.Rev. 295 (1958); Note, Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel, 52 Col.L.Rev. 521 (1952).

  6. People v. Heinrich

    104 Ill. 2d 137 (Ill. 1984)   Cited 7 times
    Upholding criminal libel statute that was aimed at fighting words and neither a public plaintiff nor a public issue was involved

    The historical justification for criminal libel has been its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace. ( Garrison v. Louisiana (1964), 379 U.S. 64, 67-68; 13 L.Ed.2d 125, 129, 85 S.Ct. 209, 212; Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), 343 U.S. 250, 254, 96 L.Ed. 919, 926, 72 S.Ct. 725, 729; People v. Spielman (1925), 318 Ill. 482, 489.) The legislation in question incorporates this rationale as it provides:

  7. Katzev v. County of Los Angeles

    336 P.2d 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 1 times

    Among them are obscenity, profanity, libelous or fighting words tending to cause a breach of the peace. Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 544, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring); Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440, 77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 500, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (Mr.

  8. R.A.V. v. St. Paul

    505 U.S. 377 (1992)   Cited 1,659 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding the government may not "license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules"

    We have recognized that "the freedom of speech" referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra ("`fighting' words"); see generally Simon Schuster, supra, at 124 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment). Our decisions since the 1960's have narrowed the scope of the traditional categorical exceptions for defamation, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see generally Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1990), and for obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), but a limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our First Amendment jurisprudence.

  9. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.

    418 U.S. 323 (1974)   Cited 3,934 times   16 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a private defamation plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages without proving actual malice

    "In a more abstract and more significant sense, however, both they and we have been aware that the adoption of the principle of self-government by 'The People' of this nation set loose upon us and upon the world at large an idea which is still transforming men's conceptions of what they are and how they may best be governed."See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). Brant, who interprets the Framers' intention more liberally than Chafee, nevertheless saw the free speech protection as bearing upon criticism of government and other political speech.

  10. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton

    413 U.S. 49 (1973)   Cited 787 times
    Holding that "the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment and . . . possibly, the public safety itself" is implicated in "stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity"

    As Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated, there is a "right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society . . .," Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (dissenting opinion). See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 457 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-257 (1952); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-88 (1949). "In this and other cases in this area of the law, which are coming to us in ever-increasing numbers, we are faced with the resolution of rights basic both to individuals and to society as a whole.