Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1792-11T1
03-08-2013
LUIS R. BEAUCHAMP and MARIA BEAUCHAMP, his wife, per quod, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. IMTIAZUDDIN SIDDIQUI and NAFEESA SIDDIQUI, Defendants-Respondents.
Luis R. Beauchamp, appellant pro se (Mitchell J. Makowicz, Jr., on the brief). Barry, McTiernan & Wedinger, attorneys for respondents (Laurel A. Wedinger, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fisher and Alvarez.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-3245-09.
Luis R. Beauchamp, appellant pro se (Mitchell J. Makowicz, Jr., on the brief).
Barry, McTiernan & Wedinger, attorneys for respondents (Laurel A. Wedinger, on the brief). PER CURIAM
On December 24, 2007, plaintiff Luis Beauchamp lost his balance and fell at the junction of his driveway and lawn. At that time, plaintiff had occupied the single-family home he rented from defendants Imtiazuddin and Nafeesa Siddiqui for more than ten months. When he fell, plaintiff was clearing snow accumulation and salting his driveway, and he sustained injuries. This suit followed. In deposition, plaintiff acknowledged he mowed the lawn every two days the prior summer and kept the area surrounding his home free of snow and ice.
Maria Beauchamp, plaintiff's wife, also pursues a per quod claim disposed of by the summary judgment motion addressed in this appeal. References to "plaintiff," however, are to Luis Beauchamp only.
On November 3, 2011, the Law Division judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his complaint. We affirm.
Summary judgment is warranted where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R. 4:46-2(c). In making the determination, a court must consider the competent evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" and determine whether the evidence is "sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). The motion should be denied only where the evidence meets that standard.
In reviewing appeals from such decisions, we employ the same analysis. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998). After our review of the record and consideration of plaintiff's arguments on appeal, we agree with the trial judge that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, even when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
As the trial judge cogently stated:
Here the condition admittedly is the difference in the elevation between the driveway and the lawn. And the fact that both the landlord and the tenant knew of what could be, or reasonably could discover, that it could be a dangerous condition that you have a six-inch drop in the elevation is one that does, in fact, relieve the landlord of liability under the circumstances here, which is that the tenant knew of the danger. The danger being the difference in the elevation.
A reasonable juror could not determine that someone with that knowledge would be unaware that when the ground is covered with snow that they might go off the edge of that elevation. That's what makes this case very different from the decision in Filipowicz v. Diletto, 350 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div.[), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 362 (2002)], which is cited by the [p]laintiff, and certainly in that case it is clear that there is not a duty, unless there is some suggestion that this dangerous condition was one that was violative of some sort of code regulation or something along those lines that would say that the landlord of residential premises
has to do anything other than to notify the tenant of the conditions that exist on the property that may give rise to some unreasonable risk of harm.
. . . .
Here it's undisputed, at least on these facts, that the [p]laintiff did, in fact, know of the allegedly dangerous condition, and just for whatever reasons on this particular day, either because the snow had accumulated and it was necessarily demarked perfectly or obviously, or distraction by someone else calling his attention to coming in, trying to rush, didn't appreciate what he knew to be there and stumbled.
In other words, the trial judge concluded that plaintiff's actual knowledge of the dangerous condition relieved defendants of any legal liability.
Plaintiff contends that summary judgment was improvidently granted because defendants "have the status of commercial lessors . . . " and defendants breached their duty of care to plaintiff. The arguments lack merit. Plaintiff leased a single-family dwelling from defendants; this did not make them commercial landlords. It is undisputed that the duty of care owed by commercial property owners, including the owners of apartment buildings, requires maintenance of sidewalks in a safe condition. See Hambright v. Yglesias, 200 N.J. Super. 392, 395 (App. Div. 1985); but see Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191, 207 (2011) (condominium building in which ten percent of the units are rentals is nonetheless considered residential in determining the duty of care of the condominium association to maintain the sidewalk in front of the building).
But in this case, even casting the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, defendants were indisputably residential and not commercial landlords. Therefore the standard of care required the lessor to disclose a condition involving an unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons on rental premises. See Reyes v. Edner, 404 N.J. Super. 433, 457 (App. Div. 2009). Here, the lessee, plaintiff, was actually familiar with the allegedly dangerous condition.
Therefore, we agree with the court's ruling both that the duty of care imposed on commercial lessors is inapplicable, and that, in any event, plaintiff's undisputed actual knowledge of the dangerous condition relieved the landlord of any legal liability arising from the incident. As the judge described it, no "reasonable juror could . . . determine that someone with that knowledge would be unaware that when the ground is covered with snow that they might go off the edge of that elevation." Defendants did not breach a duty of care as to the condition. For the reasons stated by the trial judge, we affirm.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION