Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.

37 Citing cases

  1. Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs.

    577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978)   Cited 72 times
    Concluding that same evidence introduced to rebut presumption of compensability was adequate to support board's determination that claimant failed to prove job-relatedness by preponderance of evidence

    (1) the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter. . . .See Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Gomes, 544 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Alaska 1976); Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970).Anchorage Roofing Co., Inc. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501, 504 (Alaska 1973); see Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286-87, 56 S.Ct. 190, 193, 80 L.Ed. 229, 232-33 (1935).

  2. Burgess Const. Co. v. Smallwood

    623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that a preexisting condition does not disqualify a claim if the employment aggravated the condition to produce injury or disability

    Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board, 411 P.2d 209, 210 (Alaska 1966). See also Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590, 595-96 (Alaska 1979); Hawkins v. Green Associated, 559 P.2d 118, 119 (Alaska 1977); Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 997 (Alaska 1970); 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 12.20 at 276 (1978). Smallwood's theory is that his employment conditions, particularly his work on the haul road to the North Slope, aggravated his pre-existing renal dysfunction by preventing him from getting proper medical attention and maintaining a low salt diet necessary to control hypertension, which accelerated his ultimate renal failure.

  3. Brown v. Patriot Maintenance, Inc.

    99 P.3d 544 (Alaska 2004)   Cited 6 times
    Noting that experts had accepted facts described by lay witnesses, but facts were not material

    Brown then points to several supposed uncertainties that, she asserts, make this rule germane to her case: (1) the three rheumatologists who dealt with her case agreed that she suffers from "chronic pain/fibromyalgia" and that her fall caused or "could have caused" this condition; (2) Dr. Ling "conceded" that it was "not medically impossible" for a fall such as hers to cause fibromyalgia; (3) the board disregarded a book by a prominent rheumatologist supporting Brown's theory of causation; (4) Dr. Vandenbelt failed to physically examine her and never "definitively" diagnosed her condition; and (5) Drs. Schlosstein and Caner made certain statements during their testimony that arguably favored Brown's position. 477 P.2d 993, 997 (Alaska 1970) (citing Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 411 P.2d 209, 211 n. 7 (Alaska 1966)). Yet the rule for resolving doubt we mentioned in Beauchamp will not readily stretch to cover Brown's situation.

  4. Rusch v. Se. Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium

    453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019)   Cited 4 times
    Describing difficulty scheduling surgery when insurer would not preauthorize it

    The point of our statement, derived from Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. , was that administrative adjudicators' expertise gained from repeated exposure to information in adjudications can support conclusions made from the evidence presented in a specific case. 747 P.2d 528, 533-34 (Alaska 1987) (citing Wilson v. Erickson , 477 P.2d 998, 1001 (Alaska 1970) ; Beauchamp v. Emp'rs Liab. Assurance Corp. , 477 P.2d 993, 996 (Alaska 1970) ).See Beauchamp , 477 P.2d at 996 & n.8 (quoting 2A Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 79.50, at 299 (1970)) (discussing extent to which expert medical testimony is necessary in compensation cases); see also 2 Kristin E. Hickman & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 9.6, at 1052-53 (6th ed. 2019) (discussing adjudicators' use of their own knowledge to assess evidence).

  5. Pietro v. Unocal Corp.

    233 P.3d 604 (Alaska 2010)   Cited 10 times

    Pietro underwent the urine test about two months after Dr. Armstrong took him off work because of his arthritis; this suggests that the negative urine test result was not probative of Pietro's exposure at UNOCAL. See AT T Alascom v. Orchitt, 161 P.3d 1232, 1242 (Alaska 2007) (citing Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 996-97 (Alaska 1970)) (holding that the Board permissibly relied on expert medical and lay testimony to find that a worker suffered work-related overexposure to radiation). Medical testing can provide important objective evidence in workers' compensation cases, but it is not the only way a worker can prove his claim.

  6. Smith v. University of Alaska, Fairbanks

    172 P.3d 782 (Alaska 2007)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that an employer "may rebut the presumption by presenting substantial evidence . . . that directly eliminates any reasonable possibility that employment was a factor in causing the disability" (citing Bradbury, 71 P.3d at 906)

    Childs v. Copper Valley Elec. Ass'n, 860 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Alaska 1993) (citing 3 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 80.32, at 15-834 to -835 (1992)); see also Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22, 27 (Alaska 1998) (stating that "merely reciting the proper words as an opinion is not necessarily enough to rebut the presumption of compensability").Libor, 536 P.2d at 132; Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 996 97 (Alaska 1970). We are unable to determine here whether the board applied an incorrect legal rule that would have required Smith to provide a physician's statement which used a term like "probability" in order to prove his claim.

  7. Robinett v. Enserch Alaska Const

    804 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1990)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that worker provided sufficient evidence to attach presumption through testimony of coworkers and their observations of his condition

    In particular, Robinett's co-workers testified, as did Robinett, to both the rugged jarring conditions in the rock quarry and their observations of Robinett's condition before and after his alleged injury.See Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 996-97 (Alaska 1970) (uncontradicted lay testimony, coupled with inconclusive medical testimony, is sufficient to establish a preliminary link to raise the presumption of compensability); see also Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Rogers Babler, 747 P.2d 528, 533 (Alaska 1987) ("the claimant need only prove that `but for' the subsequent trauma the claimant would not have suffered disability at this time, or in this way, or to this degree. In other words, to satisfy the `but for' test, the claimant need only prove, as indicated above, that the aggravation, acceleration or combination was a substantial factor in the resulting disability.").

  8. Bailey v. Litwin Corp.

    713 P.2d 249 (Alaska 1986)   Cited 21 times
    Endorsing territorial court's definition of temporary total disability in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 17 Alaska 658, 665 (D.Alaska 1958) (quoting Gorman v. Atl. Gulf Pac. Co., 12 A.2d 525, 529 (Md. 1940)) as " `the time during which the workman is wholly disabled and unable by reason of his injury to work' "

    In reviewing the Board's decision, our task is to determine if its findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by "substantial evidence in light of the whole record." Delaney v. Alaska Airlines, 693 P.2d 859, 863 (Alaska 1985); Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 997 (Alaska 1970). Under this standard, we may not reweigh the evidence or choose between competing reasonable inferences.

  9. Burgess Const. Co. v. Smallwood

    698 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1985)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that employer rebutted presumption where a medical expert testified that although there was a possibility that the employee's work aggravated his renal failure, the renal failure was probably the natural result of a progressive disease

    Delaney v.Alaska Airlines, 693 P.2d 859, 863 (Alaska 1985); Smallwood II, 623 P.2d at 315. In Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 997 (Alaska 1970) we said: On review, the court may not weigh the evidence or choose between competing inferences reasonably possible from the evidence.

  10. Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer

    693 P.2d 865 (Alaska 1985)   Cited 47 times
    Concluding that the employer rebutted the presumption of compensability by presenting circumstantial evidence, coupled with the employee's statements regarding his condition, to create a "reasonable inference" that the new injury was "merely a flare-up" of the earlier injury

    Miller v. ITT Arctic Services, 577 P.2d at 1046. Upon reviewing a determination that the employee has or has not met that burden, the court must apply the "substantial evidence" test set out in Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 997 (Alaska 1970):See also Delaney v. Alaska Airlines, 693 P.2d 859 (1985).