(1) the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter. . . .See Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Gomes, 544 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Alaska 1976); Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970).Anchorage Roofing Co., Inc. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501, 504 (Alaska 1973); see Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286-87, 56 S.Ct. 190, 193, 80 L.Ed. 229, 232-33 (1935).
Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board, 411 P.2d 209, 210 (Alaska 1966). See also Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590, 595-96 (Alaska 1979); Hawkins v. Green Associated, 559 P.2d 118, 119 (Alaska 1977); Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 997 (Alaska 1970); 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 12.20 at 276 (1978). Smallwood's theory is that his employment conditions, particularly his work on the haul road to the North Slope, aggravated his pre-existing renal dysfunction by preventing him from getting proper medical attention and maintaining a low salt diet necessary to control hypertension, which accelerated his ultimate renal failure.
Brown then points to several supposed uncertainties that, she asserts, make this rule germane to her case: (1) the three rheumatologists who dealt with her case agreed that she suffers from "chronic pain/fibromyalgia" and that her fall caused or "could have caused" this condition; (2) Dr. Ling "conceded" that it was "not medically impossible" for a fall such as hers to cause fibromyalgia; (3) the board disregarded a book by a prominent rheumatologist supporting Brown's theory of causation; (4) Dr. Vandenbelt failed to physically examine her and never "definitively" diagnosed her condition; and (5) Drs. Schlosstein and Caner made certain statements during their testimony that arguably favored Brown's position. 477 P.2d 993, 997 (Alaska 1970) (citing Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 411 P.2d 209, 211 n. 7 (Alaska 1966)). Yet the rule for resolving doubt we mentioned in Beauchamp will not readily stretch to cover Brown's situation.
The point of our statement, derived from Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. , was that administrative adjudicators' expertise gained from repeated exposure to information in adjudications can support conclusions made from the evidence presented in a specific case. 747 P.2d 528, 533-34 (Alaska 1987) (citing Wilson v. Erickson , 477 P.2d 998, 1001 (Alaska 1970) ; Beauchamp v. Emp'rs Liab. Assurance Corp. , 477 P.2d 993, 996 (Alaska 1970) ).See Beauchamp , 477 P.2d at 996 & n.8 (quoting 2A Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 79.50, at 299 (1970)) (discussing extent to which expert medical testimony is necessary in compensation cases); see also 2 Kristin E. Hickman & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 9.6, at 1052-53 (6th ed. 2019) (discussing adjudicators' use of their own knowledge to assess evidence).
Pietro underwent the urine test about two months after Dr. Armstrong took him off work because of his arthritis; this suggests that the negative urine test result was not probative of Pietro's exposure at UNOCAL. See AT T Alascom v. Orchitt, 161 P.3d 1232, 1242 (Alaska 2007) (citing Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 996-97 (Alaska 1970)) (holding that the Board permissibly relied on expert medical and lay testimony to find that a worker suffered work-related overexposure to radiation). Medical testing can provide important objective evidence in workers' compensation cases, but it is not the only way a worker can prove his claim.
Childs v. Copper Valley Elec. Ass'n, 860 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Alaska 1993) (citing 3 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 80.32, at 15-834 to -835 (1992)); see also Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22, 27 (Alaska 1998) (stating that "merely reciting the proper words as an opinion is not necessarily enough to rebut the presumption of compensability").Libor, 536 P.2d at 132; Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 996 97 (Alaska 1970). We are unable to determine here whether the board applied an incorrect legal rule that would have required Smith to provide a physician's statement which used a term like "probability" in order to prove his claim.
In particular, Robinett's co-workers testified, as did Robinett, to both the rugged jarring conditions in the rock quarry and their observations of Robinett's condition before and after his alleged injury.See Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 996-97 (Alaska 1970) (uncontradicted lay testimony, coupled with inconclusive medical testimony, is sufficient to establish a preliminary link to raise the presumption of compensability); see also Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Rogers Babler, 747 P.2d 528, 533 (Alaska 1987) ("the claimant need only prove that `but for' the subsequent trauma the claimant would not have suffered disability at this time, or in this way, or to this degree. In other words, to satisfy the `but for' test, the claimant need only prove, as indicated above, that the aggravation, acceleration or combination was a substantial factor in the resulting disability.").
In reviewing the Board's decision, our task is to determine if its findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by "substantial evidence in light of the whole record." Delaney v. Alaska Airlines, 693 P.2d 859, 863 (Alaska 1985); Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 997 (Alaska 1970). Under this standard, we may not reweigh the evidence or choose between competing reasonable inferences.
Delaney v.Alaska Airlines, 693 P.2d 859, 863 (Alaska 1985); Smallwood II, 623 P.2d at 315. In Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 997 (Alaska 1970) we said: On review, the court may not weigh the evidence or choose between competing inferences reasonably possible from the evidence.
Miller v. ITT Arctic Services, 577 P.2d at 1046. Upon reviewing a determination that the employee has or has not met that burden, the court must apply the "substantial evidence" test set out in Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993, 997 (Alaska 1970):See also Delaney v. Alaska Airlines, 693 P.2d 859 (1985).