Beattie v. Mickalich

3 Citing cases

  1. Britten v. Circle H Stables, Inc.

    No. 360427 (Mich. Ct. App. Sep. 14, 2023)

    Amburgey, 238 Mich.App. at 246. See also Beattie v Mickalich, 486 Mich. 1060, 1060 (2010) (citing Amburgey in support of the assertion that the EALA abolished the common-law theory of strict liability for injuries caused by certain domestic animals as it relates to equines).

  2. Sholberg v. Truman (In re Estate of Sholberg)

    No. 307308 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012)

    Rather, Beattie v Mickalich, 486 Mich 1060; 784 NW2d 38 (2010) (internal citation omitted). [p]ursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of the EALA, if a participant's injuries result from an inherent risk of an equine activity, the participant may not make a claim for damages against an equine professional; conversely, the equine professional is free from the "penalty" or "burden" of claims for damages.

  3. Perry v. Whitley County 4-H Clubs, Inc.

    931 N.E.2d 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 4 times
    Holding 4-H club was entitled to immunity under Equine Activity Statute

    Thus, Indiana's Equine Activity Statute, like equine activity statutes in some states but unlike some others, is silent on the place of sponsor negligence in the overall scheme of equine liability. Compare Lawson v. Dutch Heritage Farms, Inc., 502 F.Supp.2d 698, 700 (N.D.Ohio 2007) (noting Ohio's Equine Activity Liability Act, like some other states', is "silent as to simple negligence as an inherent risk") (quotation omitted); with Beattie v. Mickalich, 486 Mich. 1060, 784 N.W.2d 38 (Mich. 2010) (per curiam) (Michigan's Equine Activity Liability Act abolishes strict liability for equines but expressly provides liability is not limited "`if the . . . person . . . [c]ommits a negligent act or omission that constitutes a proximate cause of the injury5" (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws ยง 691.1665)). Because it is as important to recognize what a statute does not say as what it does say, City of Evansville v. Zirkelbach, 662 N.E.2d 651, 654 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996), trans. denied, and statutes granting immunity, being in derogation of the common law, are strictly construed, see Mullin v. Municipal City of South Bend, 639 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Ind. 1994), we conclude the Equine Activity Statute was not intended by the general assembly to abrogate the cause of action for common-law negligence of an equine activity sponsor.