Opinion
No. 1D22-513
06-07-2023
Michael BEASLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Darcy Townsend, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Darcy Townsend, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Osterhaus, J. Michael Beasley appeals his convictions for grand theft of an automobile and petit theft of tools that were in the vehicle. He contends that his dual convictions were for the same core offense and violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions. We affirm because the thefts constituted distinct criminal acts, wherein Appellant obtained the automobile and tools under different circumstances, they were owned by different victims, and Appellant manifested different theft-related intentions.
I.
Appellant agreed to help a friend repair her car. In the course of completing the job, the friend's sister allowed Appellant to borrow her son's tools. After visiting a storage shed to obtain the tools for Appellant, they returned to the friend's house. Appellant later drove the friend's vehicle away to pick up some cigarettes (along with the tools in the vehicle) but he didn't return. A week later, Appellant brought his friend's car back (after she had contacted law enforcement) but he never returned the tools.
Appellant was charged with grand theft of the car and theft of the tools. A jury found Appellant guilty of both crimes. Appellant's single argument on appeal is that his dual conviction and sentence violates double jeopardy.
II.
"A determination of whether double jeopardy is violated based on undisputed facts is a legal determination; thus, this Court's review is de novo." State v. Drawdy , 136 So. 3d 1209, 1213 (Fla. 2014). "[B]oth the United States and Florida Constitutions contain double jeopardy clauses that ‘prohibit subjecting a person to multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal offense.’ " State v. Maisonet-Maldonado , 308 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 2020) (quoting State v. Shelley , 176 So. 3d 914, 917 (Fla. 2015) ). "In cases of theft convictions, where the offenses are ‘merely degree variants of the core offense of theft ... dual convictions based on the same core offense’ " violates double jeopardy " ‘because each offense [is] simply an aggravated form of the underlying offense of theft, distinguished only by degree factors.’ " Mixson v. State , 857 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (quoting Sirmons v. State, 634 So. 2d 153, 153-54 (Fla. 1994) ).
Car theft cases, where other things located within the car are also taken, present difficult double jeopardy issues involving the potential for having multiple punishments given for the same offense. In Johnson v. State , 228 So. 3d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), for instance, we reversed and vacated separate convictions for grand theft auto and theft of property within the vehicle where there wasn't "sufficient separation in time, place, and circumstance between the two alleged theft offenses to avoid a double jeopardy problem." Cf. Hayes v. State , 803 So. 2d 695, 704 (Fla. 2001) (advising courts "look to whether there was a separation of time, place, or circumstances between the [thefts]").
"[T]he prohibition against double jeopardy does not prohibit multiple convictions and punishments where a defendant commits two or more distinct criminal acts." Id. at 700. In this case, Appellant deprived separate victims of separate property. The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Hearn v. State , 55 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1951) is helpful to determining when double jeopardy problems can arise in a case with separate victims. Cf. Sims v. State , 260 So. 3d 509, 514 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (noting difficulty assessing whether a case involving multiple victims would violate double jeopardy). In Hearn , the Florida Supreme Court determined that multiple convictions for one theft transaction violated double jeopardy where the appellant stole eleven cattle at the same time which belonged to two different people. Id . at 560. The Court determined that multiple convictions violated double jeopardy because "to permit the dividing into several larcenies of objects which are the subject of larceny, although belonging to separate owners, when stolen at the same time, from the same place, and under the same circumstances with the same intent, would be violative of the spirit of the Constitution ... that a man should not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense." Id . at 561.
Unlike Hearn , this is not a case involving objects stolen at the same time, from the same place, and under the same circumstances with the same intent. Rather, the characteristics of Appellant's theft of the car and tools involved separate circumstances and intent. Notably, the trial testimony shows that Appellant sought and obtained the tools from the friend's sister before he took the car. Only after returning to the friend's home to resume his work with the tools did Appellant then leave in the car and not return. At that point, he took his friend's car under the guise of getting cigarettes (after taking the tools from the friend's sister under the guise of using them to fix the car). Appellant also manifested different intentions with respect to the property. While Appellant returned the car to his friend days later (after law enforcement was notified), he never returned the tools to the friend's sister. And so, different from Hearn , we cannot conclude that Appellant committed both thefts "under the same circumstances with the same intent." Id . In view of the different circumstances and intent involved with Appellant's thefts, both offenses can be punished. Cf. Moore v. State , 904 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (approving affirmance in an earlier case against a double jeopardy argument where the vehicle was owned by one person and the merchandise by someone else).
III.
We affirm the judgment and sentence.
Bilbrey and Nordby, JJ., concur.