Opinion
CV-23-00199-TUC-JCH
05-04-2023
Melina Angelica Beas-Campo, Plaintiff, v. Hilary L Case, Defendant.
ORDER
Honorable John C. Hinderaker, United States District Judge.
This case alleges civil rights violations related to the removal of Plaintiff's minor children by an Arizona Department of Child Safety ("DCS") employee. On April 26, 2023, pro se Plaintiff filed a Complaint and Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP Application"). Docs. 1, 2. For reasons explained below, the Court will grant the IFP Application and dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, she should specifically plead the who, what, when, where, how, and why of the facts in support of her legal claims as explained below.
I. Background
The Complaint alleges the following:
DCS, through an unnamed individual, began an investigation into Plaintiff on January 10, 2019. Compl. ¶ 8. It appears that the initial investigation began when Plaintiff's minor son refused to go to school, Plaintiff took his tablet away, and later a Tucson Police Officer followed-up with Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 21. On January 10, 2019, the same date as the investigation, Plaintiff claims she was served with a court order for the removal of her children based on allegations related to "childhood physical abuse, neglect, domestic violence and failure to protect." Compl. ¶ 21.
The matter evolved into a dependency action and appeared before Judge Kellie Johnson, who issued an Under Advisement Ruling at some unknown date. Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff does not allege the nature of those initial accusations, who made them, or what happened at prior proceedings before the Under Advisement Ruling issued. Plaintiff alleges that she motioned for the return of her minor child in light of "new false accusations" but fails to describe the nature of the new accusations or who made them. Compl. ¶ 10. Judge Johnson found Plaintiff had made progress, presumably with respect to conditions set by the Court, and there was no longer a physical, mental, or emotional risk to the minor child. Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff argues that the Court's ruling should have prompted the minor child's return to Plaintiff's care and custody. Compl. ¶ 11.
The Complaint is unclear whether the State of Arizona initiated dependency proceedings as to all of Plaintiff's minor children or a single child.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hilary L. Case ("Ms. Case"), a DCS Investigation Specialist, subsequently made false allegations, including Plaintiff testing positive for methamphetamine "2 weeks before Plaintiff's Dependency close out court date." Compl. ¶¶ 1, 12, 13. Ms. Case also accused Plaintiff of maintaining a relationship with the children's father and allegedly sent two investigators to Plaintiff's home "on Thanksgiving at 2 AM." Compl. ¶ 20. The Complaint is unclear whether Plaintiff was prohibited from engaging with the children's father, or if Ms. Case was involved when the dependency action was filed or at a later point. False reports were allegedly filed with the juvenile court, and the children were again removed on an unspecified date. Compl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff seemingly asserts that the new allegations resulted in additional DCS involvement, including a safety plan and case plan. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15. The Complaint does not allege the details of the safety plan or the case plan.
Before the children's removal, Plaintiff took steps to address the "conflicting relationship" between Ms. Case and herself by, among other things, submitting "numerous complaints" requesting a new case worker. Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff also tried "to get a court order to have minor child examined by a medical professional on the new false allegations" on the day after the removal. Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff seems to suggest that Ms. Case became "overly obsessed with Plaintiff's minor daughter" and attempted to include her in the dependency action. Compl. ¶ 22.
Plaintiff alleges that her children suffered emotionally and physically because of the unjustified removals. At some unspecified time, Plaintiff's daughter was hospitalized, (Compl. ¶ 28), Plaintiff's son experienced trauma and injuries while at a group home and continues to self-harm (Compl. ¶ 27). Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and punitive damages. Compl. ¶¶ 46-47.
II. Exhibits
As an initial matter, the Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to file the exhibits to the Complaint under seal. The Complaint includes attached, unredacted exhibits related to juvenile court and/or child dependency proceedings and reports, emails, report cards, text messages, and photographs of the minor children. See Docs. 6, 7. Rule 5.2 prohibits litigants from submitting documents that contain personal information, including, inter alia, the names of persons under the age of 18, who are to be identified by initials only. Fed. R. Civ. P.
III. The IFP Application
The Court may authorize the commencement and prosecution of a civil action in forma pauperis "without prepayment of fees or security therefor" if the plaintiff submits an affidavit including a statement of all assets. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In in forma pauperis proceedings officers of the court "shall issue and serve all process." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3).
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs IFP Application. Doc. 2. An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of life. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). The relevant statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient assets and the Ninth Circuit has recognized, "[o]ne need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis statute." Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960). Nonetheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty "with some particularity, definiteness and certainty." United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff indicates that she receives public assistance for food and housing and that her monthly rent and utility expenses ($1050) exceed her monthly gross take-home pay ($669). Doc. 2 at 1-2. Plaintiff's monthly income and assets will not cover the filing fee without hardship. Id. The Court finds that Plaintiff has shown she is unable to pay the fees as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and grants the IFP Application.
IV. In Forma Pauperis Screening
A. Standard of Review
The Court has a statutory obligation to screen a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint before ordering it served. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). "[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). A district court must screen and dismiss actions filed by a plaintiff in forma pauperis if the action is "frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001).
B. Analysis
i. Pleading Standard
Rule 8 requires that every complaint contain "[a] short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 also requires that "each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Jozwiak v. Raytheon Missile Sys., No. CV-20-00039-TUC-DCB, 2020 WL 1308007, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2020) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1)).
A formulaic recitation of a cause of action with conclusory allegations is insufficient; a plaintiff must plead facts pertaining to her own case making a violation "plausible," not just "possible." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."). The "mere possibility of misconduct" or "unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]" fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
Furthermore, allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). Each claim must be stated in a separate count. See Bautista v. Los Angeles Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 840-41 (9th Cir. 2000). Separate counts are necessary to help the defendant to respond or to help the court and the other parties to understand the claims. Id. at 840 (internal citations omitted). Courts require separate counts where multiple claims are asserted or where separate statements will require a clear presentation. Id. at 840-41.
Here, Plaintiff has set forth a narrative account of incidents but does not provide specific dates for when certain events or conduct occurred. The Complaint references various exhibits that may shed light on some of the details lacking in the Complaint itself, but the Court cannot import details from exhibits into the Complaint. See Kerman-Ray of the House of Carr v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 16-CV-01705-RM-NYW, 2016 WL 7178320, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 8, 2016) ("Perhaps the bases for each claim against each Defendant may be cobbled together through Claimants' exhibits coupled with the amended complaint, but it is not the Court's task to attempt to do so."). In other words, Plaintiff cannot rely on her exhibits to explain the who, what, when, where, how, and why of the facts in support of her legal claims. The Court finds the allegations to be unintelligible and confusing such that the defendant could not reasonably or fairly respond to the Complaint through denials or admissions. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, the Complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claims and must allege facts that state the elements of each claim plainly and succinctly. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).
For example: Compl. ¶ 12 ("Exhibit 43 are the new false allegation presented 2 weeks before Plaintiff's Dependency close out court date. Page 2 minor child is denying the false accusations."); Compl. ¶ 23 ("Exhibit 1 page 4 supports Plaintiff's testimony on how one minor child has a history of refusing."); Compl. ¶ 18 ("Exhibits 37, 32, 33 [Plaintiff] takes appropriate steps to file complaint on case manager prior to removal of false accusations and a violation of Plaintiff's civil rights."); Compl. ¶ 27 ("Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, Exhibit 4 page 4, minor child removed for false allegations is causing self-harm. Page 8, 10, 12.")
The Complaint is dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to file an amended complaint if she so chooses. Plaintiff is advised that to state a claim, she must explain what each defendant did to her, when the defendant did it, how the defendant's action harmed her, and what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.
ii. Section 1983 Claims
It appears that Plaintiff is seeking to address purported violations of her civil rights by attempting to assert claims under Section 1983, which "is a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it may be inferred that (1) she was deprived of a federal right, and (2) a person or entity who committed the alleged violation acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1976). A plaintiff must also demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of her rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. Plaintiff must clearly identify which defendant(s) she believes are responsible for each violation of her constitutional rights and the supporting factual basis. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).
a. Section 1983 Due Process Claims
Plaintiff alleges due process claims related to the removal of her child or children by DCS. Compl. ¶ 28. Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care and custody of their children. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). A parent "may state a cause of action under [Section] 1983 when she alleges that the state terminated her parent-child relationship without due process of law." Smoot v. City of Placentia, 950 F.Supp. 282, 283 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The Ninth Circuit has generally characterized the right to familial association as a liberty right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685-86 (9th Cir. 2001); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Parents and children have a well-elaborated constitutional right to live together without governmental interference .... That right is an essential liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that parents and children will not be separated by the state without due process of law except in an emergency."). See also Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining constitutional standards for evaluating claims based upon removal of children).
Social workers, however, are entitled to two types of immunity. Absolute immune shields social workers from civil liability for claims concerning their "discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions to institute court dependency proceedings to take custody away from parents." Beltran v. Santa Clara Cty., 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Meyers v. Contra Costa Cty. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987). Absolute immunity also "covers the official activities of social workers only when they perform quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial functions in juvenile dependency court." Hardwick v. Cty. of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017). Social workers have absolute immunity when discharging functions that are "critical to the judicial process itself." Beltran, 514 F.3d at 908.
Social workers are also entitled to qualified immunity for their investigatory conduct, discretionary decisions, or recommendations. Tamas v. Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 842 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Miller, 335 F.3d at 898. Examples of such discretionary decisions include "decisions and recommendations as to the particular home where a child is to go or as to the particular foster parents who are to provide care." Miller, 335 F.3d at 898.
Here, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts showing she was deprived of her due process rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard in her child dependency proceedings, except in conclusory terms. See Kirk v. I.N.S., 927 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Procedural due process requires adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard."). Nor are there sufficient facts alleging "reckless, intentional and deliberate acts and omissions of defendants" constituting an "unwarranted interference" with the rights of familial association. Cf. Lee, 250 F.3d at 685-86. As such, the Court will also dismiss the Complaint for failure state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To the extent Plaintiff intends to allege that Ms. Case performed functions within the social work roles described above, Ms. Case would be entitled to both (1) absolute immunity for quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial functions and (2) qualified immunity for investigatory conduct, discretionary decisions, or recommendations. Plaintiff is further advised that she may not bring claims on behalf of her minor children without adding them as plaintiffs in the amended complaint. Minor children must be identified by initials only. V. Leave to Amend
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint for both failure comply with Rule 8 and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a first amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the "First Amended Complaint." The first amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by reference. Plaintiff may include only one claim per count.
A first amended complaint supersedes the original Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. RichardFeiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat the original Complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised in the original Complaint and that was voluntarily dismissed or was dismissed without prejudice is waived if it is not alleged in a first amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Any amended complaint filed by Plaintiff must conform to the requirements of Rules 8(a) and (d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff is warned that if she elects to file an amended complaint that fails to comply with the Court's instructions explained in this order, the action will be dismissed pursuant to section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and/or Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
VI. Order
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is GRANTED;
2. The Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons indicated herein. Plaintiff may file a First Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order; and
3. DIRECTING the Clerk of the Court to file under seal the proposed Exhibits, lodged at Docket Nos. 6 and 7.