Bean v. Fuel Company

8 Citing cases

  1. Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Redwine

    757 F.2d 1544 (5th Cir. 1985)   Cited 41 times
    Interpreting an identical section of the Delaware General Corporation Laws as prescribing the manner in which actions are pursued, not restricting causes of action that have traditionally been available

    Likewise, the directors continue in their capacities as directors after dissolution and therefore oversee the final acts of the corporation. Carle v. International Clay Products Co., 15 Del. 166, 132 A. 892, 892 (Del.Ch. 1926). In effect, § 278 prolongs the dissolved corporation's life, giving it authority to decide its own conclusion.

  2. Rioux v. Water District

    170 A. 63 (Me. 1934)   Cited 10 times

    The question before the trial Judge on the motions for mistrials was whether or not the acts of the juror and the witness might have influenced the juror's mind, or were of such a nature as to have any tendency to influence it, rather than whether the mind of the juror had been actually influenced. Driscoll v. Gatcomb, 112 Me. 289, 92 A. 39; York v. Wyman, 115 Me. 353, 98 A. 1024; Bean v. Fuel Company, 125 Me. 260, 132 A. 892. This rule excludes actual influence on the juror as a test of the necessity for a mistrial, but does not preclude an inquiry into it. In many instances we have no doubt such an inquiry is the only logical and practical approach to the real question to be decided.

  3. ARN v. BRADSHAW OIL GAS CO

    93 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1938)   Cited 9 times

    They contend that under the statutes of Delaware, the corporation's life continues with the corporation as trustee for three years, and as to suits brought by it within the period, until they end. Cf. Atkins v. Harriman Co., 2 Cir., 69 F.2d 66; Grey, Attorney General, v. Newark Co., 65 N.J.L. 603, 48 A. 557; Lyman v. Knickerbocker Co., 55 App. D.C. 323, 5 F.2d 538; Big Sespe Oil Co. v. Cochran, 9 Cir., 276 F. 216; Carle v. International Clay Products Co., 15 Del. Ch. 166, 132 A. 892; Bucki Son Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Lumber Co., 5 Cir., 128 F. 332. Appellees' counter contention is that the suit plaintiffs have brought here is not a suit by the corporation because it was not brought on the authority of the corporation, acting either through its board of directors, or officers, nor of a receiver or trustee appointed by a Delaware court for it.

  4. International Pulp Equip. Co. v. St. Regis Kraft Co.

    54 F. Supp. 745 (D. Del. 1944)   Cited 22 times
    Rejecting argument that trustee must be appointed before suit can be brought because officers retain no power to act for dissolved corporation

    Since the matter is one of substance, it necessarily is controlled by the law of Delaware. American Transportation Co. v. Swift Co., 2 Cir., 24 F.2d 310. There are many cases which have, in effect, rejected the argument urged by defendant here that action must first be had under Sec. 43 before suit may be commenced under Sec. 42. See, United Automatic Rifles Corp. v. Johnson, D.C., 41 F. Supp. 86; Trounstine v. Bauer, Pogue Co., Inc., D.C., 44 F. Supp. 767; Arn v. Bradshaw Oil Gas Co., 5 Cir., 93 F.2d 728. At least one Delaware authority runs counter to defendant's argument. In Carle v. International Clay Products Co., 15 Del. Ch. 166, 132 A. 892, a case decided after the 1925 amendments referred to and relied on by defendant, it was held that, in an action under Sec. 43, good cause must be shown to have a receiver appointed during the three year period the corporation survives after dissolution. If a litigant has a cause of action against a dissolved corporation, it would hardly seem rational that Carle holds the litigant must first convince the chancery court he should be allowed to sue. Cf. Salembier v. Great Neck Bond Mortgage Corp., 1937, 22 Del. Ch. 183, 194 A. 35.

  5. Rockland Chemical Co., Inc. v. F F Manufacturing

    166 N.W.2d 735 (Neb. 1969)

    In Missouri and Maine, signature is a formality, is for the benefit of the witness, and does not bar admissibility. Will Docter Meat Co. v. Hotel Kingsway (Mo. App.), 232 S.W.2d 821; Hoyberg v. Henske, 153 Mo. 63, 55 S.W. 83; Bean v. Camden Lumber Fuel Co., 125 Me. 260, 132 A. 892. Our problem is solved by the express words and clear purpose of our statute.

  6. Balavich v. Yarnish

    97 A.2d 540 (Me. 1953)   Cited 2 times

    Derosby v. Mathieu, 136 Me. 91, wherein a ride was given a juror by the plaintiff after verdict. See also Ellis v. Emerson, 128 Me. 379, invitation to dinner by plaintiff's attorney, and State v. Brown, 129 Me. 169, where deputy sheriff, an officer of the State, gave free transportation; Bean v. Fuel Co., 125 Me. 260, attorney giving juror ride. The foregoing statute relates to a gratuity given by a party, or his attorney, before or after trial during the term. It is, however, the well established rule that any misconduct on the part of juror, or friend of a party, may be ground for new trial.

  7. State ex Rel. General Mills v. Waltner

    156 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1941)   Cited 5 times
    In State ex rel. General Mills, Inc. v. Waltner, 348 Mo. 852, 156 S.W.2d 664 (1941), the court found that a suit against a parent for the tort of its subsidiary requires different allegations and proof than a suit against the subsidiary for its own tort.

    R.S. 1939, sec. 871; Thompson v. Allen, 86 Mo. 85; Sylvester Hall v. School District No. 4, 36 Mo. App. 21; Clements v. Greenwell, 40 Mo. App. 589; Haney v. Thompson, 339 Mo. 505, 98 S.W.2d 639; Jordan v. C. A. Ry. Co., 105 Mo. App. 446, 79 S.W. 1155. (a) The allegation made by the plaintiff in his motion to amend his pleadings, process, records and return and in his return to this court's preliminary writ do not constitute evidence of the facts therein inserted. Hodges v. Stuart Lumber Co., 140 Ga. 569, 79 S.E. 462; Jordan v. C. A. Ry. Co., 105 Mo. App. 446, 79 S.W. 1155. (b) The Star Milling Company of Delaware was subject to suit in the courts of Kansas for a period of more than two years after September 3, 1935. Revised Code of Delaware, 1935, chap. 65, sec. 42; Carle v. International Clay Products Co., 132 A. 892; Townsend v. Delaware Glue Co., 103 A. 576; Lyman v. The Knickerbocker Theatre Co., 5 F.2d 538; General Statutes of Kansas, 1935, sec. 17-804. (c) The serving of a copy of plaintiff's motion to amend his pleadings, process, records and return upon relator, by plaintiff's attorney, did not give the court jurisdiction over General Mills, Inc. Anderson v. Anderson, 55 Mo. App. 268.

  8. Derosby v. Mathieu

    2 A.2d 170 (Me. 1938)   Cited 2 times

    "We have placed the seal of condemnation, not alone upon the attempts of parties by word or deed to influence or prejudice jurors outside the court room, but also upon the indiscretion of their friends along the same line. And we have not stopped to inquire whether the attempt was successful, nor whether the mind of a juror was actually influenced, but only whether or not the mind of a juror might have been influenced by the attempt, or whether the attempt might have any tendency to influence the mind of the juror." This language is reiterated in Bean v. Fuel Co., 125 Me. 260. In that case, counsel for the plaintiff tendered to one of the jurors and the latter accepted gratuitous conveyance in an automobile of such counsel over a distance which would have, by public conveyance, entailed upon the juror the expenditure of money.