Under the facts of this case, we believe that summary disposition was properly granted in favor of defendant. See Beamon v Highland Park, 85 Mich. App. 242; 271 N.W.2d 187 (1978). Affirmed.
“Generally, the question of whether a street defect, otherwise actionable against the municipality, ‘has existed a sufficient length of time and under such circumstances that the municipality is deemed to have notice is a question of fact, and not a question of law.’ ” Cruz v. Saginaw, 370 Mich. 476, 481, 122 N.W.2d 670 (1963), quoting Hendershott v. Grand Rapids, 142 Mich. 140, 143, 105 N.W. 140 (1905) ; see also Beamon v. Highland Park, 85 Mich.App. 242, 246, 271 N.W.2d 187 (1978). In the instant case, after discovery had closed, defendant moved for summary disposition arguing, inter alia, that there was no genuine issue of material fact that defendant did not know or have reason to know of the alleged defect.
Such notice will be "conclusively presumed when the defect existed so as to be readily apparent to an ordinarily observant person for a period of 30 days or longer before the injury took place." MCL 691.1403; see also Beamon v City of Highland Park, 85 Mich App 242, 245; 271 NW2d 187 (1978). "Generally, the question of whether a street defect, otherwise actionable against the municipality, 'has existed a sufficient length of time and under such circumstances that the municipality is deemed to have had notice is a question of fact, and not a question of law.'" Cruz v City of Saginaw, 370 Mich 476, 481; 122 NW2d 670 (1963), quoting Hendershott v City of Grand Rapids, 142 Mich 140, 143; 105 NW 140 (1905).
Notice may be shown by: (1) actual notice; (2) existence of the defect for over thirty days, which establishes a conclusive presumption of notice; or (3) evidence showing that the agency should have discovered and repaired the defect in the exercise of reasonable diligence, i.e., constructive notice. Beamon v City of Highland Park, 85 Mich. App. 242, 245; 271 N.W.2d 187 (1978), lv den 405 Mich. 831 (1979). In this case, there is no evidence that defendant had actual notice of the defect, nor was there testimony presented in relation to how long the defect had been present.
Id. at 382-83. See also Caldwell v. Fox, 394 Mich. 401, 231 N.W.2d 46 (1975); Cunningham v. Garber, 361 Mich. 90, 104 N.W.2d 746 (1960); S.C. Gray, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 92 Mich. App. 789, 286 N.W.2d 34 (1979); Yoder Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 92 Mich. App. 386, 284 N.W.2d 810 (1979); Dowell v. General Telephone Co., 85 Mich. App. 84, 270 N.W.2d 711 (1978); Beamon v. City of Highland Park, 85 Mich. App. 242, 271 N.W.2d 187 (1978); Cody v. Marcel Electric Co., 71 Mich. App. 714, 248 N.W.2d 663 (1976); Taft v. J.L. Hudson Co., 37 Mich. App. 692, 195 N.W.2d 296 (1972). This Court notes that the Sixth Circuit has concluded that the Michigan standard for judgments n.o.v. is legally equivalent to the federal standard.