This Court has stated, in effect, in many cases that in a suit for specific performance by a vendor of real estate, the purchaser will not be compelled to accept a deed unless it is proven that the title is marketable, or that its marketability is free from reasonable doubt. See, for example, Hill Co. v. Pallottine Fathers, 220 Md. 526, 154 A.2d 821 (1959); Wm. H. McCeney, Inc. v. Thibadeau, 215 Md. 77, 137 A.2d 206 (1957); Berlin v. Caplan, 211 Md. 333, 127 A.2d 512 (1956); Sinclair v. Weber, 204 Md. 324, 104 A.2d 561 (1954); Housing Eng. Co. v. Andrew Co., 184 Md. 290, 40 A.2d 368 (1945); Bealmear v. James, 147 Md. 274, 128 A. 40 (1925); Shea v. Evans, 109 Md. 229, 72 A. 600 (1909); Md. Construction Co. v. Kuper, 90 Md. 529, 45 A. 197 (1900); Levy v. Iroquois Co., 80 Md. 300, 30 A. 707 (1894). But in all of these cases the purchaser contended that there was some defect in the vendor's title.

Riverbank Imp. Co. v. Chadwick, 224 Mass. 424, 113 N.E. 215, and 228 Mass. 242, 117 N.E. 244, L.R.A. 1918B, 55; Roscoe Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33 Harvard Law Rev. 813. Like this case, Bealmear v. James, 147 Md. 274, 128 A. 40, 41, was one for specific performance of a real estate contract. There too, the question was whether or not certain restrictions, assumed to be valid originally, had been abandoned and disregard of them acquiesced in.

They refrained from a contest until experience with the particular violation stirred them to enforcement; and they might do so without loss of rights from it. Bacon v. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396, 399, 60 N.E. 936; Bealmear v. James, 147 Md. 274, 277, 128 A. 40. The endorsement of Rinehart's character, to aid him in securing a license for the sale of liquors, however it might prevent objection to the selling so licensed, would not work an estoppel against the enforcement of the covenant of the Wengerts. Whether it would indicate an abandonment of the restriction generally is another question.

, testimony was taken, exhibits filed, the parties heard, and at the conclusion of the hearing the court granted the relief prayed. From that decree the vendee appealed. It is undisputed that, apart from the supposed restrictions, the vendor is ready, able, and willing to convey the land to the vendee by a good and merchantable title. It is settled law that restrictions which limit the use which an owner may make of his land are incumbrances which are inconsistent with an absolute and unfettered title thereto, and that one who has agreed to purchase land upon the condition that the vendor convey to him a good and merchantable title is not, unless he had notice of them when the contract was made, required to accept a title burdened with restrictions. Tiffany on Real Property, 1686; 27 R.C.L. 508; 66 C.J. 909, 913; Devlin on Deeds, secs. 1514, 1520; Batley v. Foerderer, 162 Pa. 460, 29 A. 868; Shea v. Evans, 109 Md. 229, 72 A. 600; Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co., 70 Md. 493, 17 A. 372; Bealmear v. James, 147 Md. 274, 128 A. 40; Peabody Heights Co. v. Willson, 82 Md. 186, 32 A. 386, 1077. The single question which the appeal presents therefore is whether the land which is the subject of this proceeding is in fact burdened with any restrictions which will limit the free, unfettered, and complete use and enjoyment thereof by the owner.