Opinion
UWYCV136020940
11-27-2015
Nancy Beale, Administratrix for the Estate of Lindsey Beale v. Luis Martins et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #168
Barbara Brazzel-Massaro, J.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Nancy Beale, as Administratrix of the Estate of Lindsey Beale, has filed this action dated August 9, 2013 with a return date of September 17, 2013. The defendant Luis Martins was the operator of the Hyundai Velostar that was involved in the motor vehicle accident in which Lindsey Beale was the passenger and died as a result of the accident. Jorge Martins is the father of Luis who along with Luis purchased the car from the defendant Danbury Fair Hyundai, LLC. (Hereinafter Danbury Hyundai.) The remaining defendants are Adam Jarvis, the operator of the other car which was involved in the accident and his employer, Eagle Electric Service, Inc. The defendant, Danbury Hyundai, filed a motion for summary judgment with memorandum and exhibits on February 17, 2015. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment dated April 5, 2015. The parties appeared at short calendar on October 19, 2015 for argument.
The motion for summary judgment does not include any issue related to the remaining defendants and thus any reference to defendant in this memorandum unless specified is related only to Danbury Fair Hyundai.
FACTS
The defendants Jorge Martins and Luis Martins are father and son, respectively. In May of 2013 they went to Danbury Hyundai where they decided to purchase a motor vehicle. They purchased a Velostar from the dealer on May 9, 2013. At the time of the purchase the dealer was unable to register the car because the dealer did not have the certificate of origin in their possession. The dealership allowed the defendants Luis and Jorge Martins to take the car from the lot after they signed a loan agreement which was to run from May 9, 2013 until June 9, 2013. The defendant also required proof of insurance coverage and valid driver's licenses. The defendant, Danbury Hyundai, then placed a dealer's license plate on the car to allow the use of the motor vehicle. This license plate was present on the car on the afternoon of June 8, 2013 when the automobile was involved in an accident with Adam Jarvis which caused the death of the passenger, Lindsey Beale.
The agreement called for the return of the plate by 6 p.m. of June 9, 2013. (Exhibit A, sub exhibit M.) The date in the exhibit is beyond the 31 days but the accident occurred on June 8, 2013 which is the relevant date for the application of the statute.
The defendant contends that the license plate was legally placed on the automobile pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-60. The defendant further argues that the statute provides protection from liability in the facts as alleged in the instant action and thus summary judgment should be granted. The plaintiff argues that the defendant did not properly comply with the requirements of the statute and that even if the statute applied, the protections were no longer valid because the plates were used for more than the 30 days permitted by the statute.
DISCUSSION
" Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Provencher v. Enfield, 284 Conn. 772, 790-91, 936 A.2d 625 (2007).
" In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988). " In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10-11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008). This means that the party moving for summary judgment, in this instance the Bayer defendants, must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 317, 477 A.2d 1005 (1984).
" The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 11. See also 2830 Whitney Ave. Corp. v. Heritage Canal Development Associates, Inc., 33 Conn.App. 563, 567, 636 A.2d 1377 (1994) (nonmoving party must show genuine issue of material fact by " counter affidavits and concrete evidence").
The defendant contends that C.G.S. § 14-60 provides support for a summary judgment. The statute provides in relevant part:" . . . No dealer or repairer may loan a motor vehicle or number plate or both to any person except for the purpose of demonstration of a motor vehicle, or when a motor vehicle owned by or lawfully in the custody of such person is undergoing repairs, or when such person has purchased a motor vehicle, the registration of which by him is pending, and in any case for not more than thirty days, in any year, provided such person shall furnish proof to the dealer or repairer that he has liability and property damage insurance which will cover any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of the loaned motor vehicle, motor vehicle on which the loaned number plate is displayed or both. Such person's insurance shall be the prime coverage. If the person for whom the dealer or repairer loaned the motor vehicle or the number plate did not, at the time of such loan, have in force any such liability and property damage insurance, such person and such dealer or repairer shall be jointly liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of the loaned motor vehicle or a motor vehicle on which the loaned number plate is displayed."
The defendant Danbury Hyundai has filed this motion for summary judgment claiming that it is not liable for damages as a result of compliance with this statute. The plaintiff argues that the defendant has not complied with the statute and that the dealer plates were on the motor vehicle beyond the 30 days permitted in the statute and thus summary judgment should be denied. This argument is not whether the defendant Danbury Hyundai is responsible in applying joint liability because the statute does not require such if the purchaser is insured. Cook v. Collins Chevrolet, Inc. et al., 199 Conn. 245, 506 A.2d 1035 (1986).
The parties have each relied upon prior case law in support of their positions. The defendant relies upon Cook v. Collins, 199 Conn. 245, 506 A.2d 1035 (1986) for the position that the loaning of the dealers' license plate does not create liability for the dealer based upon the facts alleged in this action. The plaintiff contends that Cook does not apply to the instant action and that the Superior Court decision in Dugay v. Brothers' Toyota, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 970572734 (September 11, 2000, Rubinow, J.) , is controlling in the instant action and supports a denial of the summary judgment. The factual and legal arguments in Dugay are not similar and are not supportive of the plaintiff's position. In particular, the defendant in Dugay could not satisfy the statutory requirement that they were given use of the car as a loaner car for purposes of awaiting a " pending" registration within C.G.S. 14-60. In fact the paperwork in Dugay indicated that the defendant was transferring his prior registration and not awaiting a " pending" registration. In Dugay, the paperwork submitted to the dealer by the purchaser specifically checked the box in his forms that he was transferring registration and there was no indication that it was a new registration and thus awaiting a " pending" registration. The questionable compliance in all respects with C.G.S. § 14-60 noted in Dugay are not present in this action. Unlike Dugay the defendants purchased an automobile which they were driving at the time of the accident and which car was awaiting registration for a new license plate. The facts are almost directly on point with the Cook case which involved a new purchase and the proof of insurance during the waiting period for the new registration. In Cook, the court specifically noted the legislative intent of C.G.S. § 14-60 was to impose " joint liability on a dealer only when the purchaser is uninsured." (Emphasis in original.) Cook v. Collins, supra, 199 Conn. 251-52, n.4. The plaintiffs also argue that the defendant failed to fully comply with the statute because the thirty-day period for the loan of the dealer's plate had expired.
The central issue to be resolved for purposes of the summary judgment is whether the 30-day period established in the statute had passed creating joint liability for the defendant. The defendant argues and provides documents in support of its position that the accident occurred within the 30-day period of time. The defendant has also provided the documentation confirming the insurance coverage by the Martins. (Affidavit of William Sabatini.) The plaintiff contends that the time period expired and thus the defendant has not complied with the statute requiring that the defendant is jointly liable. An examination of the documents reveals that on May 9, 2013 the Martins purchased the car and provided proof of insurance coverage for the time period beginning on May 9, 2013 until June 19, 2013. (Exhibit A.) There was an agreement which required that the plate be returned no later than June 9, 2013 at 6 p.m. (Exhibit A--subpart Exhibit M.) The court in determining the calculation of days for the application of the statutory protection has reviewed the documents in conjunction with case law interpreting the counting of days. " In general there are four ways of counting days; (1) Count no terminal days (beginning day or ending day); (2) Count only one terminal day; (3) Count both terminal days; and (4) Using one of the above methods but count only business days. The type of counting is determined by statute, Practice Book rule and language surrounding the mention of days in statutes, regulations, rules, contracts and case law." Midland Funding, LLC v. Garrett, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford, Docket No. CV-11-6011332 S (December 23, 2011, Tierney, J.T.R.) (53 Conn. L. Rptr. 161, 162). The Supreme Court continues to follow " the general rule . . . that where a period of time is to be calculated from a particular date or event, the day of such date or event is excluded from the computation." (Internal quotation marks omitted). Commissioner of Transportation v. Kahn, 262 Conn. 257, 264, 811 A.2d 693 (2003). " Unless settled practice or established custom, or the intention of the parties, or the terms of a statute, have included in the computation the date or act of accrual, it is to be excluded from the computation. This is not only our established rule, but the rule established by modern authority, applicable to all kinds of instruments, to statutes, and to rules and orders of court." Austin, Nichols & Co. v. Gilman, 100 Conn. 81, 123 A. 32 (1923); Lamberti v. Stamford, 131 Conn. 396, 398, 40 A.2d 190 (1944). The documents for the dealer plates indicated that the first date was the sale on May 9, 2013. This first date in accordance with the case law is the date of the event, that is, the purchase and receipt of the plates which is not included in the thirty days pursuant to the statute. The insurance which was provided actually included June 9, 2013 which is the day after the accident. However, in viewing the dates and the case law, there is a consistent practice of not including the first date which would be May 9, 2013. Therefore, in calculating the dates for the statutory protection, the court begins with May 10, 2013. Since the date of the accident then falls on day thirty, the remaining issue is whether the time of the accident is prior to the 30-day deadline on June 8, 2013. The Supreme Court has held " that when the word 'day' is used in a statute, or in a contract, it will, unless it is in some way restricted, be held to mean the whole twenty-four hours." Miner v. Goodyear Glove Mfg. Co., 62 Conn. 410, 26 A.643 (1892). Since Miner, at least one Superior Court decision has used this definition of day:
The plaintiff contends that because the terms of the return were after the calculation of thirty days, the agreement is invalid and the defendant has no protection from liability. This argument is contrary to the intent of the statute and although it refers to a June 9, 2013 date that is not the return date consistent with the claim by the defendant Danbury Hyundai.
" In the sense of the law a day includes in it the whole twenty-four hours." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaye v. Town of Westport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No 26-87-58 (August 21, 1990, Levine, J.T.R.) (2 Conn. L. Rptr. 453). The car was actually sold on May 9, 2013 and the parties on that date arranged for insurance. In order to accept the plaintiff's argument the court must accept the first date which is contrary to the case law as outlined above. Additionally, the time period for the " day" as interpreted by the court would include the twenty-four-hour period and thus concludes that the thirty-day period was still in effect. The plaintiff's argument that the date of the accident on June 8, 2013 was the passage of 32 days does not comport with any of the established case law as set forth herein. Thus the court finds that the defendant Danbury Fair Hyundai, LLC has complied with the statute and is protected from liability for this accident.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the analysis above, the court finds that the defendant satisfied its obligations pursuant to the statute in that the Martins provided proof of valid insurance coverage during the dates of May 9, 2013 and June 19, 2013, the defendants had possession of the loaner vehicle for 29 days and 21 hours at the time of the accident as they were awaiting the pending registration for the new vehicle. Thus the defendant is protected by C.G.S. § 14-60 and summary judgment is granted.