From this conclusion it follows that the allegations of the complaint to the effect that plaintiffs' property will not be benefited by the proposed improvement, cannot be considered in aid of the statement of a cause of action, since as to such question no evidence in support thereof would be admissible upon the trial ( Cake v. City of LosAngeles, 164 Cal. 705 [ 130 P. 723]; Duncan v. Ramish, 142 Cal. 686 [ 76 P. 661])." ( Beale v. City of Santa Barbara, 32 Cal.App. 235, 242 [ 162 P. 657]; Rutledge v. City ofEureka, 195 Cal. 404, 426 [ 234 P. 82].) The first cause of action makes certain allegations of the other causes of action a part of said first cause of action by reference to said allegations appearing in other causes of action of said complaint.

This notice was not subsequent but prior to, or at least concurrent with, the notice of street work. The decision of the court of appeal, Beale v. City of SantaBarbara, 32 Cal.App. 235, 243, [ 162 P. 657], cited by counsel for appellant, does not apply here, for the reason that such affidavit of mailing postal notices there involved was not made a condition precedent to ordering the work, under the Vrooman Act as then in force, which was under consideration in that case. Neither is there room for application of the rule referred to in Bailey v. Hermosa Beach, 183 Cal. 757, [ 192 P. 712], that jurisdiction does not depend upon record evidence or affidavit of notice, but upon the fact of notice.

It is manifest that if the taxing power is subject to review in this collateral manner, any exercise of it would generally be declared invalid." Also in Beale v. City of Santa Barbara, 32 Cal.App. 235 [ 162 P. 657], at page 242, appears the following: "Of course, the theory upon which the district is established, upon which the cost of the work shall be apportioned, is that it will derive special benefits from the improvement. But someone must determine that question, and, as stated, the legislature has seen fit to delegate such power to the city council.

[13] Moreover, it has been repeatedly held that in the absence of fraud the boundaries of an assessment district are a matter to be determined exclusively by officials of the city under authority delegated to them by the legislature. ( Beale v. City of Santa Barbara, 32 Cal.App. 235, 242 [ 162 P. 657]; Harney v. Benson, supra; Duncan v. Ramish, supra.) Appellants in the present case did not charge fraud; nor did they contend that their property was not benefited by the work; nor is there any evidence that the charge for the work is excessive when compared to the value of the property assessed (of which there is no substantial evidence).

There are many cases cited in the annotation in 42 A.L.R. 698 in support of this principle. It is also the rule that where the required majority exists without the vote of the disqualified member, his presence and vote will not invalidate the result and further that a majority vote need not be invalidated where the interest of a member is general or of a minor character. ( Beale v. City of Santa Barbara, 32 Cal.App. 235, 162 P. 657; Corliss v. Village of Highland Park, 132 Mich. 152, 93 N.W. 254, adhered to on rehearing 132 Mich. 159, 95 N.W. 416; 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, Etc. Section 172.) The difficult problem which is often presented in conflict of interest cases is in determining whether or not the personal interest of the commissioner or board member is of a nature justifying disqualification to act.

In the absence of such allegations the opinion of a witness as to the effect of such improvement would be irrelevant and immaterial, and respondents' objection to the testimony on that ground was properly sustained. [7] Where an assessment district is formed to pay the cost of improvements the determination by the trustees of a municipality that the property included in the district will be specially benefited is conclusive in the absence of fraud or such an abuse of discretion as is equivalent to fraud ( Beale v. City of Santa Barbara, 32 Cal.App. 235 [62 P. 657]); and the absence of benefit cannot be a judicial question unless the fact found by the Board be unsupported by evidence ( Duncan v. Ramish, 142 Cal. 686, [ 76 P. 661]), nor does the validity of the proceedings depend upon the ability to show that the benefits to the property included therein will be equivalent to the burdens ( Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404 [14 P. 71]; Federal Construction Co. v. Ensign, 59 Cal.App. 200 [ 210 P. 536]; Larsen v. San Francisco, 182 Cal. 1 [ 186 P. 757]).