Beal v. Blache

4 Citing cases

  1. Pimentel v. City of Methuen

    323 F. Supp. 3d 255 (D. Mass. 2018)   Cited 25 times
    Denying motion to dismiss because complaint's allegations, taken as true, did not lend any "apparent rational basis" to the disputed government actions

    "The standard of causation is quite high: the municipal custom or policy must be shown to have been the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional injury." Beal v. Blache , 2005 WL 352861, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 2005) (quoting Polk County. v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) ). Here, the complaint states a plausible Monell claim.

  2. Franklin v. City of Bos.

    Civil Action No. 16-10484-FDS (D. Mass. Aug. 30, 2016)   Cited 4 times

    Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (informal practice must be "so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law"). "The standard of causation is quite high: the municipal custom or policy must be shown to have been the 'moving force' behind the constitutional injury." Beal v. Blache, 2005 WL 352861, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 2005) (quoting Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)). Here, even liberally construed, the complaint falls considerably short of pleading a plausible municipal policy that was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

  3. Ramirez–Lluveras v. Pagan–Cruz

    833 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.P.R. 2011)   Cited 10 times

    “The deliberate indifference standard was set deliberately high by the Supreme Court to insure that § 1983 did not become a front of constitutional tort liability.” Beal v. Blache, No. 02–12447, 2005 WL 352861 at *7 (D.Mass. Feb. 14, 2005). Even if the supervisory defendants' conduct may have been negligent, to invoke section 1983 liability the plaintiffs must show more than mere negligence; they must show deliberate indifference.

  4. Putnam v. Town of Saugus, Mass.

    365 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D. Mass. 2005)   Cited 13 times

    Id. Within the District of Massachusetts, however, there is no such uniformity.See Beal v. Blache, No. 02-cv-12447-RGS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2151, *11 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 2005) (Stearns, J.) (failing to apply Praprotnik's framework and holding that municipality's failure to dispute that police chief was a "high-level" official "with policymaking authority in police matters" sufficient to establish police chief's final policymaking authority in such matters) (citations omitted) (unpublished opinion) (emphasis added); McCarthy v. Szostkiewicz, 188 F. Supp. 2d 64, 71 (D. Mass. 2002) (Ponsor, J.) (failing to cite Praprotnik and holding that a mayor's admission in his deposition testimony that he was "the sole appointing authority for appointments and promotions" to the city's police department sufficient to establish mayor's final policymaking authority respecting police promotions for purposes of summary judgment);Ford v. Suffolk County, 154 F. Supp. 2d 131, 146 (D. Mass. 2001) (Gertner, J.) (failing to cite Praprotnik and holding that parties' agreement that sheriff has final policymaking authority sufficient for imposition of municipal liability); Powell v.