Further, any error by the trial court in omitting to give the instructions mandated by Rule 226a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is waived by the appellant's failure to timely complain of the same. Beacon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Young, 448 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dealers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 421 S.W.2d 669, 675- 76 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, Becky and Bill admit that they made no objection to the trial court's failure to give the instructions required by Rule 226a.

The "proof of mailing" policy provision operates to excuse the insurer of further proof of notice only where the insured died, or moved without leaving a forwarding address. That provision does not make the notice of cancellation conclusive if the receipt of the notice is controverted by the insured. Beacon National Insurance Co. v. Young, 448 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In policies as in this case where the insurer is required to give a certain number of days notice prior to the cancellation date, it cannot be determined whether the insured was afforded the number of days as agreed unless the insured received the attempted cancellation notice; and unless received, it is ineffective.

Sudduth, supra. See also, Western Fire Insurance Co. v. Reyna, 495 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.Civ.App. 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Beacon National Insurance Co. v. Young, 448 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The insurance company claims, finally, that the district court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment that Conn take nothing.

We think this statement taken in conjunction with the parties' position in their briefs reflects the fact that the trial court never ruled upon the motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, nothing with respect to the motion for summary judgment is presented for review. Beacon National Insurance Co. v. Young, 448 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n. r. e.). Appellant's points 1, 2, and 3 as it relates to appellant's action to void the trustee's sale and cancel the deeds, are overruled. Appellant's point 3 as it relates to the appellant's action for damages, contends the trial court erred in ruling that res judicata or collateral estoppel prevented appellant from bringing this action.

The copy of appellant's objections to the court's charge that was attached to his motion for rehearing that is being considered shows that such objections to the court's charge were not signed by the trial judge until April 1, 1976, which was 5 1/2 months after the last day for filing the transcript. Because appellant did not preserve his bill of exceptions complaining of the court's action in overruling his objections to the court's charge in the manner provided for in Rule 272, such objections were waived and cannot be considered by this Court on appeal. Southland Capital Corporation v. Clark, 526 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1975, no writ hist.); Beacon National Insurance Co. v. Young, 448 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1969, ref., n.r.e.); Tandy Corporation v. McGregor, 527 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1975, ref., n.r.e.); and Commercial S. Ins. Co. v. Southern F. Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 509 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Civ.App., Corpus Christi, 1974, ref., n.r.e.). Appellant's motion to supplement the transcript was based on Rule 428, T.R.C.P., which provides in substance that if anything material to either party is omitted from the transcript or statement of facts, the trial or the appellate court, either before or after the record has been sent to the appellate court, can direct a supplemental record to be certified by the clerk of the trial court supplying the omitted matter.

This is especially true in fact situations, such as we have in this cause, wherein the witnesses for the insurer have no independent recollection and no direct evidence that insured did receive the notice such as a signed receipt as required by certified or registered mail. See also Beacon National Insurance Company v. Young, 448 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In reviewing all the evidence, we overrule the insufficient evidence and great weight and preponderance of the evidence points of error.

The document appearing in the transcript containing the objections does not show either the signature of the trial judge or any endorsement of his ruling thereon as required by Rule 272, T.R.C.P. Nowhere in the statement of facts (which was signed by the trial judge) is it shown that the trial court ruled on any objections to special issue 18. Consequently, appellants' objections to the submission of the issue cannot be considered on appeal. Big Three Welding Equipment Company v. Roberts, 399 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex.Civ.App., Corpus Christi, 1966, wr. ref. n.r.e.); Texas General Indemnity Company v. Youngblood, 466 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.Civ.App., Ft. Worth, 1971, wr. ref. n.r.e.); Beacon National Insurance Company v. Young, 448 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1969, wr. ref. n.r.e.); Mergele v. Houston, 436 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1968, wr. ref. n.r.e.); Neuhoff Brothers Packers, Inc. v. McCauley, 399 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1966, wr. ref. n.r.e.); Melton v. State, 395 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.Civ.App., Tyler, 1965, wr. ref. n.r.e.). We, therefore, consider the charge as though no objections were made. Grabes v. Reinhard Bohle Machine Tools, Inc., 381 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Civ.App., Corpus Christi, 1964, wr. ref. n.r.e.); Gale v. Spriggs, 346 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1961, wr. ref. n.r.e.). In Burch v. Southwest Title Company, 450 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1970, n.w.h.), in discussing Rules 324 and 374, t.r.c.p. , the court held:

The transcribed objections to the court's charge without the endorsement of the trial court's ruling thereon and without the official signature of the trial judge is not a sufficient compliance with the rule. Under these circumstances, we shall consider the charge of the court as though no objections were filed. Kettle v. Smircich, 415 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.Civ.App., Corpus Christi, 1967, n.w.h.); Big Three Welding Equipment Company v. Roberts, 399 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex.Civ.App., Corpus Christi, 1966, wr. ref. n.r.e.); Grabes v. Reinhard Bohle Machine Tools, Inc., 381 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex.Civ.App., Corpus Christi, 1964, wr. ref. n.r.e.); Beacon National Insurance Company v. Young, 448 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1969, wr. ref. n.r.e.); State v. Turboff, 431 S.W.2d 953 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1st, 1968, n.w.h.); Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company v. Perez, 446 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1st, 1969, wr. ref. n.r.e.); Texas General Indemnity Company v. McNeill, 261 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1953, n.w.h.). We feel that we are required by the explicit and unambiguous provision of the rule and by the above authorities to hold, as we do, that such objections were not preserved for appellate review.

However, the transcript does not contain any order of the court overruling such objections or requests for special instructions and the record contains no bill of exceptions relating to such matters. In the absence of an order of refusal signed by the court the objection and requests were waived. Big Three Welding Equipment Company v. Roberts, 399 S.W.2d 912 (Corpus Christi, Tex.Civ.App., 1966, ref., n.r.e.); Neuhoff Brothers Packers, Inc. v. McCauley, 399 S.W.2d 929 (Waco, Tex.Civ.App., 1966, ref., n.r.e.); Melton v. State, 395 S.W.2d 426 (Tyler, Tex.Civ.App., 1965, ref., n.r.e.); and Beacon National Insurance Co. v. Young, 448 S.W.2d 812 (Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 1969, ref., n.r.e.). See other authorities cited in Note 38 under Rule 272, T.R.C.P.