Furthermore, we have consistently held that district attorneys are neither a "judicial officer" nor a member of the judiciary. E.g. Beacom v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 657 P.2d 440, 445 (Colo. 1983) ("[T]he district attorney . . . is not a member of the judiciary. . . . [T]he district attorney is an executive officer of the state."); People v. District Court, 632 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Colo.
We reached that conclusion because, among other things, the 18th Judicial District encompasses multiple Colorado counties and because the Colorado Supreme Court has described the District Attorney as "an executive officer of the state." Id. (citing Beacom v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 657 P.2d 440, 445 (Colo. 1983)). Mr. Van De Weghe acknowledges our holding in Rozek but argues it no longer represents good law.
Dickerson v. State, 414 So.2d 998, 1008 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982), abrogated in part on other grounds by Ex parte Bohannon, 564 So.2d 854 (Ala. 1988). "He is only an officer of the court to the extent that all attorneys are officers of the court." 414 So.2d at 1008; see also, e.g., Beacom v. Board of County Comm'rs of Adams County, 657 P.2d 440, 445 (Colo. 1983)("The district attorney, although elected from a judicial district as provided in Colo. Const. Art. VI, Sec. 13, is not a member of the judiciary.
Although the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law §§ 13-51-101 to -115, 6 C.R.S. (1973 1984 Supp.), is to be liberally construed and administered, § 13-51-102, 6 C.R.S. (1973), we have nevertheless consistently required that "[a] proceeding for declaratory judgment must be based upon an actual controversy and not be merely a request for an advisory opinion." Beacom v. Board of County Commissioners, 657 P.2d 440, 447 (Colo. 1983); Farmers Elevator Co. v. First National Bank, 176 Colo. 168, 489 P.2d 318 (1971); Taylor v. Tinsley, 138 Colo. 182, 330 P.2d 954 (1958). Here, as already noted, the requested relief specifically based upon the dispute over Toney's discharge was unavailable because of the sheriff's failure to properly bring the action under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4).
In fact, the court favorably quoted a passage from an earlier Colorado Supreme Court case holding squarely that "[t]he district attorney is an executive officer of the state." Davidson, 83 P.3d at 655 (quoting Beacom v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 657 P.2d 440, 445 (Colo. 1983)). We cited this same language as support for our conclusion in Rozek.
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that the District Attorney is an executive officer of the state. Beacom v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 657 P.2d 440, 445 (Colo. 1983). The district court did not err in concluding that the Office of the District Attorney and the University of Colorado are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case.
Beacom In & For Seventeenth Jud. Dist., Adams Cnty. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Adams Cnty., 657 P.2d 440, 445 (Colo. 1983).
Beacom In & For Seventeenth Jud. Dist., Adams Cnty. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Adams Cnty., 657 P.2d 440, 445 (Colo. 1983). Here, plaintiff challenges the demolition of the Bridge, see Docket No. 26 at 12-13, ¶¶ 77-91, which is an executive action, not a legislative function.
The Colorado Supreme Court had repeatedly held that district attorneys are executive officers of the state. See, e.g., Davidson v. Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648, 655 (Colo. 2004); Beacom v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 657 P.2d 440, 445 (Colo. 1983). Further, Congress did not abrogate state sovereign immunity through its promulgation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In its Reply, Defendant argues that its Board, as the legislative body over SCBOCES, has the statutory, and discretionary authority and responsibility to vote on and adopt annual budgetary appropriations, such as the March 11 Resolution, and that “[i]t is not for a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the board.” (Reply at 8. [citing Beacom v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 657 P.2d 440, 446 (Colo. 1983)].) Nevertheless, the court “should apply an abuse of discretion standard” in reviewing the Board's decision.