Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga. v. One Sixty Over Ninety, LLC , 351 Ga. App. 133, 138 (1), 830 S.E.2d 503 (2019). We turn first to the text of the statute.

[15] Here, Maxine has pointed to evidence that Barrington’s signature was a forgery. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga. v. One Sixty Over Ninety, LLC, 351 Ga. App. 133, 134 (n. 1), 830 S.E.2d 503 (2019) ("A verified complaint serves as both pleading and evidence.") (citation and punctuation omitted).

Importantly, "statutes providing for a waiver of sovereign immunity are in derogation of the common law and thus are to be strictly construed against a finding of waiver." Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. One Sixty Over Ninety, LLC, 351 Ga.App. 133, 138 (1) (830 S.E.2d 503) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); see also Smith v. Chatham County, 264 Ga.App. 566, 568-569 (1) (591 S.E.2d 388) (2003).

Thus, by asking this Court to declare the limits of its potential indemnity liability, the City seeks an answer to a legal question that has not yet arisen. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. One Sixty Over Ninety, LLC, 351 Ga.App. 133, 139 (1) n.11 (830 S.E.2d 503) (2019) (holding that this Court had addressed the only relevant issue presented in the appeal and that any discussion regarding an issue on which the trial court did not rule would be advisory); Cheeks v. Miller, 262 Ga. 687, 688 (425 S.E.2d 278) (1993) (appellate court cannot render an advisory opinion on hypothetical and legal questions that have not arisen but which the appellant fears may arise at a future date). Because this enumeration of error seeks an improper advisory opinion, we do not address it further.

SeeEssex Grp., Inc. v. Southwire Co. , 269 Ga. 553, 501 S.E.2d 501, 503 (1998) ("The Act supersedes previous Georgia law on trade secrets."); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia v. One Sixty Over Ninety, LLC , 351 Ga.App. 133, 830 S.E.2d 503, 510 n.13 (2019) ("[T]he Trade Secrets Act superseded the common law tort of misappropriation [of trade secrets]."); ProNvest, Inc. v. Levy , 307 Ga.App. 450, 705 S.E.2d 204, 205–06 (2010) ("[GTSA] explicitly abolishes all other causes of action predicated on the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets, except breach of contract."). The Georgia Supreme Court made this clear in Robbins .

Georgia and Illinois have adopted the uniform act and have determined that their respective statutes do not permit an action against the state for the misappropriation of trade secrets. See Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. One Sixty Over Ninety, LLC, 830 S.E.2d 503, 507 (Ga.Ct.App. 2019); Management Assn. of Illinois, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Northern Illinois University, 618 N.E.2d 694, 707 (Ill.App.Ct. 1993). In doing so, these state courts explicitly rejected the same argument that the plaintiff is making here, namely that the state can be sued for misappropriation under the Trade Secret Act because the act’s definition of "person" includes a government or governmental agency.