Opinion
G061716
01-16-2024
ORANGE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AL MIJARES, as Orange County Superintendent of Schools, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Epstein Becker & Green, Jonathan M. Brenner and Susan Graham for Plaintiff and Appellant. Connor, Fletcher & Hedenkamp, Edmond M. Connor and Douglas A. Hedenkamp for Defendant and Respondent Al Mijares, in his official capacity as Orange County Superintendent of Schools. California Department of Education, Len Garfinkel, Bruce Yonehiro and Thomas Prouty for Defendant and Respondent Tony Thurmond, in his official capacity as State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 30-2019-01112665 Martha K. Gooding, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Epstein Becker & Green, Jonathan M. Brenner and Susan Graham for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Connor, Fletcher & Hedenkamp, Edmond M. Connor and Douglas A. Hedenkamp for Defendant and Respondent Al Mijares, in his official capacity as Orange County Superintendent of Schools.
California Department of Education, Len Garfinkel, Bruce Yonehiro and Thomas Prouty for Defendant and Respondent Tony Thurmond, in his official capacity as State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
OPINION
DELANEY, J.
After respondent Al Mijares, in his official capacity as Orange County Superintendent of Schools, allegedly refused to sign an annual budget adopted by appellant Orange County Board of Education (OCBE) in 2019, and respondent Tony Thurmond, in his official capacity as California Superintendent of Public Instruction, allegedly refused to review a copy of the OCBE adopted budget signed and submitted by OCBE's clerk, OCBE filed suit against Mijares and Thurmond. The initiating pleading sought a writ of mandate directing Mijares to sign the adopted budget based on purported ministerial duties prescribed by law and directing Thurmond to examine and approve or disapprove the adopted budget pursuant to Education Code section 1622. It also sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, as well as declarations that Mijares must sign and submit to Thurmond the 2019 OCBE adopted budget and that Thurmond must review it pursuant to section 1622.
All further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise stated.
OCBE appeals following the trial court's May 2022 grant of judgment on the pleadings to Mijares and Thurmond, without leave to amend, based on the court's conclusion the disputed matters were moot and any future disputes were not ripe for adjudication. From OCBE's perspective, the court erred in deeming its declaratory relief causes of action moot because the relevant allegations set forth a dispute that goes beyond the 2019 adopted budget. It alternatively contends the court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint which had not previously been amended or challenged. We find no error in the court's grant of judgment on the pleadings, but we conclude the court erred in denying leave to amend because OCBE demonstrated a reasonable possibility the justiciability issue can be cured by amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter with directions to the trial court to grant OCBE leave to amend the complaint.
Because this appeal arises after the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings to defendants, the facts underlying the parties' dispute which we recite are largely taken from OCBE's complaint.
In June 2019, OCBE adopted an annual budget for the Orange County Department of Education for the fiscal year 2019-2020. The adopted budget allocated approximately $170,000 less for lobbying, travel, and conferences than had been proposed by Mijares in a draft budget. In August 2019, it readopted the same budget.
Mijares refused to sign the adopted budget and submit it to the State. OCBE repeatedly requested he do so and adopted a resolution directing him to do so, all to no avail. The alleged reason for his refusal was his disagreement with the lobbying, travel, and conference expense cuts made by OCBE, as well as a "concern that cooperating in any [OCBE]-initiated changes to the budget will lead [OCBE] to make other changes to his proposed budgets in the future."
Both Mijares and OCBE ended up submitting budgets to Thurmond, but they were not the same. The one submitted by OCBE was the budget it previously approved and it was signed by the OCBE clerk. The budget submitted by Mijares was signed by him, not approved by OCBE, and included the $170,000 OCBE had stricken. Thurmond rejected OCBE's submitted budget allegedly because it was not signed or submitted by the county superintendent, Mijares.
In November 2019, OCBE filed a writ of mandate and complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Mijares and Thurmond. It alleged Mijares had a ministerial duty, under Education Code section 14050 and California Code of Regulations section 17340, to sign and submit the 2019 adopted budget to the California Superintendent of Public Instruction. In addition, it alleged Thurmond's requirement that the same budget be signed and submitted by Mijares amounted to a failure to follow the parameters specified in Education Code section 1622 for deciding whether to approve the budget.
The relief requested included the following: (1) a writ of mandate directing Mijares to sign and submit the 2019 adopted budget; (2) a writ of mandate directing Thurmond to examine and decide whether to approve the 2019 adopted budget based on factors set forth in section 1622; (3) a declaration stating Mijares "must sign and submit to the California Superintendent of Public Instruction the budget which [OCBE] has adopted"; (4) a declaration stating Thurmond "must examine and approve or disapprove based on the factors listed in section 1622 the budget which [OCBE] has adopted"; and (5) preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent Mijares from interfering with the submission of OCBE's adopted budget to the California Superintendent of Public Instruction and Thurmond from interfering with an examination and determination concerning the same budget based solely on the factors in section 1622.
Mijares and Thurmond answered the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting various affirmative defenses, including mootness. Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery, brought various discovery related motions, and worked with the trial court to determine how to proceed.
Ultimately, in January 2022, Mijares and Thurmond opted to move forward with a motion for judgment on the pleadings. They argued each of OCBE's claims was moot, the requested declaratory relief was an improper substitute for a writ of mandate under the circumstances, and the request for injunctive relief fell with the underlying claims because it was a remedy not a cause of action itself. From their perspective, there was no longer a live controversy involving the 2019 adopted budget because a budget for that fiscal year ended up being approved by Thurmond, the fiscal year was "long since" over, and the budgeted monies had been spent. Additionally, two subsequent budgets had been adopted by OCBE, signed and submitted by Mijares, and approved by Thurmond.
OCBE opposed the motion. From its perspective, the matters raised in the complaint were not moot because they were not "'one-off' dispute[s] from 2019[.]" Rather, they were ongoing disputes "concerning the parties['] respective roles, legal authority, and responsibilities in the budget adoption process," all involving interpretation of various statutes and regulations.
Recognizing the court could choose to grant the motion, OCBE also requested leave to amend the complaint. It proffered facts it would add to the complaint if such leave were granted, among which were the following: there was an ongoing dispute between OCBE and Thurmond regarding his requirement that OCBE must have its annual budget signed and submitted by the county superintendent in order for the budget to be accepted and processed pursuant to section 1622; there was an ongoing dispute between OCBE and Mijares regarding OCBE's authority to modify Mijares's proposed budgets and whether Mijares may require his agreement before he signs and submits all future budgets to the California Superintendent of Public Instruction; Mijares and Thurmond did not retract their allegedly unlawful requirements, but instead continued to impose them on OCBE's budget in 2020 and 2021; they would continue to do the same in subsequent years, thereby interfering with, and impacting, OCBE's decision making process regarding each future annual budget.
The court held a hearing at which the parties argued their positions. Regarding leave to amend, OCBE again specified matters it would allege if the court were to allow amendment of the complaint. Mijares and Thurmond contended none of the offered allegations would lead to a ripe claim.
The trial court took the matter under submission and later issued a minute order granting judgment on the pleadings on all claims to Mijares and Thurmond without leave to amend. The court concluded OCBE's complaint was limited to events surrounding the 2019 budget process, such matters were moot, there was no showing of a risk of reoccurrence, and any dispute as to future budget cycles was not ripe for adjudication. In so ruling, and at Mijares's request, the court took judicial notice of certain actions taken by OCBE, Thurmond, Mijares and others between June 2019 and September 2021 related to OCBE budget matters.
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of these same occurrences, but only as to the dates and nature of the official acts. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c) & (h), 459, subd. (a); Julian Volunteer Fire Co. Assn. v. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Protection Dist. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 583, 599-600.)
OCBE timely appealed following entry of judgment.
DISCUSSION
OCBE contends the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings with respect to its declaratory relief causes of action and, alternatively, in denying leave to amend. From its perspective, the original complaint's allegations continue to embody a live actual controversy notwithstanding the passage of time and events which have transpired since its filing. It argues that, in the very least, leave to amend should have been granted to provide it an opportunity to resolve any supposed mootness through pleading amendments which demonstrate the parties' dispute is ongoing. While we conclude the trial court properly granted judgment on the pleadings to Mijares and Thurmond, we agree the court erred in denying leave to amend.
OCBE does not challenge the trial court's conclusions and actions with respect to its writ of mandate claims and request for injunctive relief.
I. Judgment on the Pleadings, Generally, and Standard of Review
"'"'A judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is appropriate when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. [Citation.] A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of review.' [Citation.]'" [Citation.]" (York v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1193 (York).)
To withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "it is not enough that [a plaintiff] could assert a viable theory. '[Such a motion] tests the legal sufficiency of factual allegations in [the] complaint.'" (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ward (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 678, 689.) "'Under the governing legal principles, "we take as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint." [Citation.] We construe the "complaint liberally to attain substantial justice among the parties." [Citation.] Nevertheless, we "may not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation or allegations which are contrary either to law or to judicially noticed facts." [Citation.]'" (York, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1193.)
"When a motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted for failing to state facts sufficient to constitute a legally cognizable claim, appellate courts apply the same rules that govern the review of orders sustaining a general demurrer. [Citation.] Thus, appellate courts are not bound by the trial court's interpretation of the pleading but are required to render their independent judgment on the legal question of whether a cause of action has been stated. [Citations.]" (Davis v. Fresno Unified School Dist. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 911, 926.)
II. Mootness
The trial court concluded OCBE's declaratory relief causes of action were moot because the allegations only concern circumstances involving the budget adopted by OCBE in 2019 for a fiscal year that has since come and gone. On the record before us, the trial court did not err in this respect.
"'California courts will decide only justiciable controversies. [Citations.] The concept of justiciability is a tenet of common law jurisprudence and embodies "[t]he principle that courts will not entertain an action which is not founded on an actual controversy ....'"" (Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. County of Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714, 722 (Parkford).) Mootness is one principle that falls under the justiciability umbrella. "'[A] case that presents a true controversy at its inception becomes moot "'if before decision it has, through act of the parties or other cause, occurring after the commencement of the action, lost that essential character'" [citation].' [Citation.] Stated differently, moot cases 'are "[t]hose in which an actual controversy did exist but, by the passage of time or a change in circumstances, ceased to exist."'" (Ibid.)
"'The pivotal question in determining if a case is moot is . . . whether the court can grant the plaintiff any effectual relief. [Citations.] If events have made such relief impracticable, the controversy has become "overripe" and is therefore moot. [Citations.] [¶] . . . When events render a case moot, the court, whether trial or appellate, should generally dismiss it.'" (Parkford, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 722.)
Here, OCBE's declaratory relief causes of action sought two declarations, one as to Mijares and one as to Thurmond. Concerning the former, OCBE asked the trial court to declare that "Mijares must sign and submit to the California Superintendent of Public Instruction the budget which [OCBE] has adopted." Regarding the latter, OCBE prayed for a declaration that "Thurmond must examine and approve or disapprove based on the factors listed in Education Code section 1622 the budget which [OCBE] has adopted." The only OCBE adopted budget referenced elsewhere in the complaint is that adopted in 2019. As OCBE admits, that budget is, in fact, the only OCBE budget referenced in the complaint. Thus, the only plausible construction of the complaint is that OCBE's declaratory relief causes of action solely concern that particular budget. (See West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804 [complaint to be read as a whole].)
OCBE contends the complaint alleges disputes as to policies established by Mijares and Thurmond which are not tied to a particular budget year. It cites two isolated allegations regarding Mijares's and Thurmond's budget related positions that do not reference a particular budget. In its briefing, it argues those positions have never been retracted and they continue in effect. But the latter allegations are not in the complaint. And what is in the complaint, even when liberally construed as we must (York, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1193), makes clear the disputes alleged in the complaint only concern events surrounding the 2019 adopted budget. Specifically, the declaratory relief cause of action against Mijares states: "An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between and among [OCBE] and Mijares, in that [OCBE] contends that it has lawfully adopted a budget and that Mijares must sign and submit that budget, and Mijares disputes his obligation to do so." And the one against Thurmond states: "An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between and among [OCBE] and Thurmond, in that [OCBE] contends that it has lawfully adopted a budget and that Thurmond must examine and approve or disapprove the budget, and Thurmond disputes his obligation to do so."
Mijares asserts OCBE waived any argument concerning construction of the complaint's allegations by ignoring the trial court's precise reasoning on this point. But, the construction of a complaint's allegations is subject to de novo review, meaning the trial court's interpretation and explanation carry no weight. (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.)
With an understanding of the declaratory relief allegations pled, we turn to the crux of the mootness issue-whether the court can grant OCBE any effectual relief on those matters. Resolution of this issue is straightforward. The controverted budget concerned a fiscal year that has long since ended and for which a budget was ultimately approved by Thurmond. "'No purpose would be served in directing the doing of that which has already been done.'" (Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666, 671.) And, unsurprisingly, there is no indication the 2019 adopted budget would have any current force or effect if it were declared Mijares is obligated to sign and submit it to Thurmond, and Thurmond is obligated to review it and approve or disapprove it based on specific statutory criteria.
Relying on purported ongoing policies of Mijares and Thurmond consistent with their positions taken in 2019, OCBE argues a claim against a government entity who refuses to concede its previously employed practice violates the law is not moot because it can be presumed it will continue similar practices. However, the cases OCBE cites are inapposite on the mootness issue. One solely concerned the denial of discretionary statute based attorney fees (Common Cause v. Stirling (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 518), another concluded allegations in the complaint about ongoing practices presented an actual controversy (California Alliance for Utility etc. Education v. City of San Diego (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1030-1031), and the last determined the case was moot but leave to amend should have been granted (Center for Local Government Accountability v. City of San Diego (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1157-1158).
OCBE's last attempt to save the declaratory relief causes of action pled in the original complaint invokes an inherent power of courts to resolve an issue, notwithstanding technical mootness, when it involves "a matter of continuing public interest and the issue is likely to recur." (Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fales (1973) 8 Cal.3d 712, 715-716.) This discretionary alternative to mootness has found particular application at the appellate level when the disputed matter may evade judicial review. (California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 933; Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 524, fn. 1.)
The trial court acknowledged these legal principles, but concluded the record did not show a risk of reoccurrence. This conclusion was seemingly premised on judicially noticed matters demonstrating OCBE adopted budgets in 2020 and 2021 that were signed by Mijares and approved by Thurmond, as well as on the court's perception "[t]here [was] no allegation that what [was] alleged to have happened in 2019 has happened before . . . or since." Thurmond contends the lack of a similar situation in the four years since 2019 evidences the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding there was no likelihood of recurrence.
Assuming, without deciding, the invoked exception to the mootness doctrine applies at the trial court level, the record before us does not demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to override the technical mootness of the complaint's allegations.
Because no effectual relief can be granted concerning the 2019 adopted budget, the declaratory relief actions pled in the complaint are moot. (See Yorty v. Los Angeles City Council (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 138, 141 [concluding disputes concerning past fiscal year budget were moot].)
III. Leave to Amend
OCBE contends the trial court abused its discretion by granting Mijares' and Thurmond's motion without leave to amend. "In the case of . . . a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action." (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852.) That is, if "there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment . . ., the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm." (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank).) Where, as here, the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend in response to a demurrer or judgment on the pleadings, "leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment." (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.) "The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff." (Blank, at p. 318.) We review the record to determine whether OCBE met this burden.
Responding to a question from the trial court at the hearing on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, OCBE detailed how it would amend the complaint to address the specific challenges raised by Mijares and Thurmond, as well as a tentative concern expressed by the court concerning events surrounding adoption and approval of OCBE's budgets in 2020 and 2021. Specifically, OCBE's counsel indicated it would allege the following, among other potential allegations: in 2019, Thurmond adopted a rule requiring the annual budget adopted by OCBE be signed and submitted by the county superintendent, not directly by OCBE; the rule was not limited to the 2019 budget process and continues to be maintained by Thurmond; such a rule "violates the California Constitution, the California Education Code, Orange County's home rule authority, the Orange County charter and [Orange County] Board of Supervisor resolution granting exclusive authority to the Board of Education with respect to budgetary matters"; Thurmond violated and continues to violate the California Administrative Procedures Act (Govt. Code, § 11340 et seq.) and related regulations concerning administrative rulemaking; Mijares "has exercised his illegally delegated power under [Thurmond's] rule" and maintains he has approval authority over OCBE's budgetary power; and OCBE's budget process, discussions and decision making has been, and will continue to be, impacted each year by these position on the parties' relative authority.
No one contests these proposed amendments would resolve the existing mootness issue. The alleged dispute would no longer be about past actions for which no effective declaratory relief could be granted. But the question remains whether the claim, as amended, would be justiciable. From the trial court's perspective, it would not be because claims about future budget disputes are not ripe. We disagree.
Ripeness is an aspect of justiciability separate and distinct from mootness. "Unripe cases are '[t]hose in which parties seek a judicial declaration on a question of law, though no actual dispute or controversy ever existed between them requiring the declaration for its determination.'" (Wilson &Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573 (Wilson).) Because "'judicial decisionmaking is best conducted in the context of an actual set of facts so that the issues will be framed with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to make a decree finally disposing of the controversy[,]'" courts will not entertain unripe issues. (Ibid.) That is, they will not issue purely advisory opinions. (Ibid.)
In a case involving declaratory relief, such as this one, "an '"actual controversy" . . . is one which admits of definitive and conclusive relief by judgment within the field of judicial administration, as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts. The judgment must decree, not suggest, what the parties may or may not do. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Wilson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1573-1574.)
OCBE's proposed amendments describe at least two separate, but related, present controversies-one between OCBE and Mijares and one between OCBE and Thurmond. Each concerns legislatively prescribed authority and obligations related to the OCBE budget process, with OCBE believing Mijares's and Thurmond's relevant obligations are ministerial, and Mijares and Thurmond allegedly having an official position to the contrary. And each appears to be "live" and sufficiently concrete based on the proposed allegation that Mijares's and Thurmond's policies have impacted OCBE's decision making during its budgetary process each year since 2019, and they continue to have such an impact annually. As OCBE's counsel conveyed below, "[t]here's a chilling effect on [OCBE's] budgetary process and its ability to fully and freely consider issues . . ., and every budget process is now burdened and overshadowed by this."
To the extent Mijares and Thurmond dispute whether such official positions exist, our obligation at this stage in the proceedings is to take the proposed allegations as true. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)
Although it is not known exactly if and how these alleged policies and practices might be employed by Mijares and Thurmond in future budget years, such uncertainty does not dictate that OCBE's amendment request must fail. Declaratory relief is, to some extent, always about the future. (Kirkwood v. California State Automobile Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 49, 59 (Kirkwood) [declaratory relief is prospective]; Monterey Coastkeeper v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., etc. (2022) (Monterey Coastkeeper) 76 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 [declaratory relief used to advance preventative justice].) Indeed, "[t]he purpose of declaratory relief is to liquidate uncertainties and controversies which might result in future litigation." (Herrmann v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 560, 565; see Kirkwood, supra, at p. 59 [declaratory relief serves "to set controversies at rest before obligations are repudiated, rights are invaded or wrongs are committed"].)
As relevant here, the proper interpretation of statutes, clarification of obligations imposed thereby on government agencies and government officials, and determination of whether government policies or practices are contrary to law are ripe matters for declaratory relief. (Kirkwood, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 59; Gilb v. Chiang (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 444, 458-459; Hayward Area Planning Assn., Inc. v. Alameda County Transportation Authority (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 95, 103; see City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79 [declaratory relief is appropriate when parties dispute whether public entity has established policies in violation of applicable law]; Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1566 [""'The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to 'serve some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural relation'""].) This is so even absent reference to specific instances of use of the government's position or policy so long as there is a very significant possibility of future harm, as opposed to a mere abstract difference of opinion. (See Monterey Coastkeeper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 13; City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 64; see, e.g., Steinberg v. Chiang (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 338, 343-345 [complaint seeking declaratory relief regarding dispute between state controller and legislators over interpretation of statute with probable impact on future budget processes]; Kirkwood, at pp. 62-63 [complaint seeking declaration that insurance adjustment policy was inconsistent with applicable statute]; Venice Town Council, Inc., at pp. 1565-1566 [complaint seeking declaration city had certain ministerial duties under statute and city's informal policy violated same statute]; Californians for Native Salmon etc. Assn. v. Department of Forestry (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1419, 1427 [complaint seeking declaration that government policy violated statutory mandates].)
Mijares asserts OCBE's proposed amendments would amount to new claims because the declaratory relief claims in the complaint solely concerned the 2019 budget. However, the elimination of a determinate temporal aspect to the alleged dispute to make room for new allegations that the same dispute is an ongoing one, alone, does not result in a new cause of action. The alleged underlying disagreement and injury giving rise to the purported need for declaratory relief is the same. (See Wood v. DeLuca (1963) 211 Cal.App.2d 507, 511 [new cause of action involves wholly distinct legal liability or obligation].)
From a more global perspective, based solely on OCBE's preliminary articulation of its proposed amendments, it is premature to decide whether and to what extent the amendments will exceed what is allowable following a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. (See Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995, 1015 [following sustaining of demurrer, plaintiff is not "free to add any cause of action under the sun to [the] complaint," but may add cause of action which directly responds to court's reasoning regarding demurrer].) This includes any Administrative Procedures Act (Govt. Code, § 11340 et seq.) related action OCBE may choose to allege, with which Thurmond takes issue in his briefing. It is also premature to evaluate whether the revised allegations will state claims capable of surviving an attack on the pleading. (See, e.g., State of California v. Superior Court (12 Cal.3d 237, 249 [declaratory relief not appropriate means of reviewing administrative decision].) All of these assessments are more properly left for another day once the particulars of the amended pleading are known-i.e., when OCBE files an amended complaint-and specific challenges thereto are articulated. (See Shetty v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 796, 803.) The authorities cited by Mijares are not the contrary, as each involved a challenge to complaint amendments made following the sustaining of a demurrer to a prior version of the complaint. (See Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023; Zakk v. Diesel (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 431, 456.)
We express no view about whether OCBE will be successful in its attempt to amend the complaint, nor do we address the ultimate merit of its declaratory relief claims. We hold only that the record evidences OCBE demonstrated a reasonable possibility it could amend the complaint to state a cause of action. Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment and direct the court to grant OCBE leave to amend the complaint with respect to its two declaratory relief causes of action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. On remand, the trial court shall amend its order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings by vacating the portion denying OCBE leave to amend in its entirety and replacing it with a grant of leave to amend as to the declaratory relief causes of action only. OCBE is entitled to its costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. MOORE, J.