Held, the contract is null and void," — following the cases of the Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County v. CoOperative Publishing Co., 104 Okla. 262, 231 P. 251; Board of County Com'rs of Tulsa County v. News-Dispatch Print. Audit Company, 104 Okla. 260, 231 P. 250; Board of County Com'rs of Tulsa County v. Tulsa Camera Record Co., 103 Okla. 35. 228 P. 1103. The above cited cases and the authorities therein cited and quoted from are decisive of the exact question presented here, under the statute law of this state, at the time the indebtedness was incurred in this cause.

Some effort had been made to get in touch with one of the county commissioners for the purpose of obtaining admission of Mrs. Vassor to a hospital at Perry, but contact was not made and no authority was obtained and no effort was made to obtain any authorization for treatment by the plaintiffs until a claim was filed by them with the county clerk of Noble county on July 11, 1935. It is conceded that if the plaintiffs were otherwise entitled to recover, the claim came within the estimate and appropriations provided for such purposes. As said in the case of Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County v. Tulsa Camera Record Co., 103 Okla. 35, 228 P. 1103: "One who demands payment of a claim against a county must show some statute authorizing it, or that it arises from some contract, express or implied, which finds authority in law, and it is not sufficient that the services performed for which payment is claimed were beneficial."

"The board of county commissioners is the lawfully constituted agency to contract for and bind the county within lawfully granted powers, and the members of the board of county commissioners do not act in their individual capacities, singularly or collectively, but as a duly assembled body, as a board of county commissioners in the way and manner provided by law." To the same effect see Board of Commissioners of Tulsa County v. Tulsa Camera Record Company, 103 Okla. 35, 228 P. 1103. In the case of Board of Commissioners of Garfield County v. Anderson, 167 Okla. 253, 29 P.2d 75, this court, speaking through Justice Riley, said:

The board of county commissioners is designated purchasing agent of the county by statute. Section 5793, C. O. S. 1921. It alone is authorized to enter into contracts for and in behalf of the county. Board of County Com'rs of Tulsa County v. Tulsa Camera Record Co., 103 Okla. 35, 228 P. 1103; Edelmann v. Bd. of Com'rs of Le Flore County, 110 Okla. 172, 237 P. 94; News-Dispatch Ptg. Co. v. Le Flore County, 112 Okla. 138, 240 P. 64."

" See, also, Board of County Com'rs v. Tulsa Camera Record Co. 103 Okla. 35, 228 P. 1103, and Jackson v. Board of Com'rs, 133 Okla. 263, 271 P. 1041. If the instrument relied upon had been executed by the board of county commissioners in regular session, it would not have authorized the trial court to render the judgment rendered, for, as held in Jackson v. Board of Com'rs, supra:

The board of county commissioners is designated purchasing agent of the county by statute. Section 5793, C. O. S. 1921. It alone is authorized to enter into contracts for and in behalf of the county. Tulsa County v. Tulsa Camera Record Co., 103 Okla. 35, 228 P. 1103; Edelman v. Bd. of Com'rs of LeFlore County, 110 Okla. 172, 257 P. 94; News-Dispatch Ptg. Co. v. LeFlore County, 112 Okla. 138, 240 P. 64. The judgment is erroneous for another reason.

However, in order to entitle a person to enforce a claim against a county, it is necessary that authorization therefor be found in the statutes. Board of Com'rs of Logan County v. State ex rel. Short, Atty. Gen., 122 Okla. 268, 254 P. 710; Schulte v. Board of Com'rs of Pontotoc Co., 122 Okla. 205, 253 P. 494; News-Dispatch Printing Audit Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Le Flore Co., 112 Okla. 138, 240 P. 64; Board of Com'rs of Tulsa County v. Tulsa Camera Record Co., 103 Okla. 35, 228 P. 1103. There is no authority for board of county commissioners by specific contract to employ attorneys for it and such employment would be ultra vires and void.

"A contract not in its origin obligatory upon the corporation, by reason of not having been made in the mode prescribed by the charter, cannot be affirmed and ratified in disregard of that mode by any subsequent action of the corporate authorities, and a liability be thereby fastened upon the corporation." (Citing Perry Water Ice Co. v. City of Perry, 29 Okla. 593. 120 P. 582; McKinney v. City of Wagoner, 45 Okla. 28, 144 P. 1071; Buckeye Engine Co. v. City of Cherokee, 54 Okla. 509, 153 P. 1166; Mitchell v. City of Atoka, 76 Okla. 266, 185 P. 96; Board County Commissioners of Tulsa County v. Tulsa Camera Record Co., 103 Okla. 35, 228 P. 1103. In the United States Rubber Co. Case, supra, in the body of the opinion, quoting from McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, sec. 1164, the court says:

A demurrer was sustained to plaintiff's petition, and when plaintiff elected to stand thereon, the trial court entered judgment dismissing plaintiff's petition. In Board of Commissioners of Tulsa County v. Tulsa Camera Record Co., 103 Okla. 35, 228 P. 1103, this court held that one who demanded payment of a claim against a county must show some statute authorizing it, or that the claim arose from contract expressed or implied and authorized by law, and that it was not sufficient that services performed from which the claim arose were beneficial. Therein it was also held that the board of commissioners is the constituted agency to contract for and bind the county within the scope of their authority; that such commissioners do not act in their individual capacities, singularly or collectively, but as a duly assembled body, as an entity, and in the manner provided by law.

The statute must be strictly construed; W.C.S. 1920, Sec. 5532; People v. Dolan, 5 Wyo. 243; Baker v. County Commissioners, 9 Wyo. 51; State v. Friars, (Wash.) 39 P. 104; Burke v. Knox, (Utah) 206 P. 712; State v. Leahy, 231 P. 197; Gibson v. Campbell, (Wash.) 241 P. 21. The petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute cause for removal, for the reason that the board complained of had gone out of existence, and the acts of a board are not the acts of an individual; 11 Cyc. 384; a county commissioner may exercise the duties of his office until his successor has been elected and qualified; 15 C.J. 452; 22 R.C.L. 487; 23 Am. Eng. Enc. Law, 2nd Ed. 379; Monnier v. Godbold, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 463. Acts of an individual member merge into acts of the board; 22 R.C.L. 569; Board v. Record Co., 228 P. 1103; Company v. School Dist., 79 Mo. App. 665; State v. Kennedy, (Kan.) 108 P. 837; Misconduct and malfeasance in office are never presumed; Hopkins v. Foley, 29 Cyc. 1437, 193 P. 361.