The Nicholsons do not resurrect this view of Brewer and Robinson in their brief, and their failure to do so has abandoned the issue. BCCLW/Casey, Inc. v. S.O. Gillioz Partners, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo.App.1990). Although the Nicholsons were not required to file a brief, because they did so and failed to respond to many of the points raised by Surrey, including this point, we can only assume that they have no basis for a contrary opinion.
Rule 74.01(b), however, has created an exception. It allows an appeal to proceed even in cases in which some defendants have not been served or have been served but not disposed of by the circuit court. See, e.g., Garrett v. Finnell, 999 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Mo.App. 1999); LCA Leasing Corp. v. Bolivar Professional Pharmacy, Inc., 901 S.W.2d 342 (Mo.App. 1995); BCCLW/Casey, Inc. v. S.O. Gillioz Partners, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Mo.App. 1990). If at least one party's claim has been fully resolved, that matter may be appealed so long as the circuit court declares that it saw no just reason for delaying an appeal. Beckmann v. Miceli Homes, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 533, 538 (Mo.App. 2001).
In determining whether the trial court correctly ruled on Defendant's motion, we consider only the contentions briefed by Defendant-Respondent. See BCCLW/Casey, Inc. v. S.O. Gillioz Partners, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo.App. 1990). Plaintiff's petition alleged that his son was killed in an automobile collision on April 8, 1989, in Cherokee County, Kansas.
We conclude from the factors set forth in the three preceding paragraphs that National has abandoned its former position that the arbitration provision in the contract is unenforceable. Cf. BCCLW/Casey, Inc. v. S.O. Gillioz Partners, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo.App.S.D. 1990). The order appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court.
Therefore, this is the only contention we discuss. See BCCLW/Casey, Inc. v. S.O. Gillioz Partners, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo.App. 1990). One of the elements of a negligence per se action is that the violation of a statute was the proximate cause of the injury. Imperial Premium Fin., Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co., 861 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Mo.App. 1993).
SDC, as respondent in this appeal, was not required to file a brief. BCCLW/Casey, Inc. v. S.O. Gillioz Partners, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo.App.S.D. 1990). However, by doing so and briefing only the contentions it did, SDC abandoned — at least for the purpose of this appeal (which is all we need decide) — the contentions pled in the trial court but omitted from its brief.
Therefore, this is the only issue related to the statute of limitations which this court considers. See Burden v. Burden, 811 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Mo.App. 1991); BCCLW/Casey, Inc. v. S.O. Gillioz Partners, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo.App. 1990). A thorough discussion of the cases relative to the applicability of the ten-year or five-year statute of limitations was conducted by the Western District of this court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Livestock Market, 709 S.W.2d 897, 900-903 (Mo.App. 1986).
The court said, at 221: "A party to an action is a person whose name is designated on the record as plaintiff or defendant." See also State ex rel. Schweitzer v. Greene, 438 S.W.2d 229, 231[4] (Mo. banc 1969); BCCLW/Casey v. S.O. Gillioz Partners, 783 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Mo.App. 1990). Even if the entry of April 9, 1991, might be sufficient to dispose of the claim of plaintiff against defendant McMinn, it does not contain an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.