Opinion
B320170
11-29-2023
B.B., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CRYSTAL LATOYA JENKINS, Defendant and Appellant.
DRE, Darren M. Richie and Tory M. Pankopf for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Order Filed Date 12/5/23
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 21IWR01337, Altus W. Hudson, Judge.
DRE, Darren M. Richie and Tory M. Pankopf for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
IT IS ORDERED that the opinion in the above entitled matter, filed on November 29, 2023, is hereby modified as follows:
The incorrect Los Angeles County Superior Court No. in the caption, 21IWR01337, is replaced with the correct No. 21IWRO01337.
There is no change in the judgment.
WILEY, J.
Crystal Jenkins seeks to dissolve a civil harassment restraining order protecting B.B. and her child. Jenkins claims insufficient evidence supports the order and the trial court violated her due process rights in granting it. We affirm. We use initials to protect the petitioner's privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(5).)
B.B. filed a verified request for a restraining order asserting, among other things, Jenkins threatened to harm B.B. and her family and "stalked my address multiple times." B.B. said she had "suspicious damage rendered to my vehicle on days Crystal Jenkins was seen at my residence." Jenkins also "made attempts for physical altercation" and "stated she was going to stab me." B.B.'s filing says these acts occurred in June, July, and August 2021.
At the December 2021 hearing, B.B. described Jenkins's behavior. She said Jenkins "just keeps harassing me" because B.B's boyfriend (D. Shepard) "doesn't want to deal with her [Jenkins] no more." B.B. described how she and Shepard had to switch phone providers to elude Jenkins's calls and messages to Shepard, who lived with B.B.; but then Jenkins called the new phone number a couple days later. Jenkins said she was going to kill B.B. so Shepard could be with her. B.B. told the court: "She's just threatening, and all of a sudden, she has my address....All of a sudden, here comes the people, knocking on my door." "Now she is attacking me because he don't want to deal with her no more.... she is driving by my house[.]" "I just ask that she stay away from me because I am a mother....I just want peace. I don't want her by my house or by me or calling his phone. Some type of way she's getting the phone number."
This is substantial evidence of unlawful harassment supporting a restraining order. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subds. (b)(1)-(3) &(i); see also Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497 &499 (Harris) [substantial evidence standard applies].) The death threat is a credible threat of violence toward B.B. The evidence shows Jenkins engaged in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at B.B. that seriously harassed her, served no legitimate purpose, and was not constitutionally protected. This conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. B.B.'s comments at the hearing reveal her emotional distress.
Jenkins argues certain text messages B.B. introduced undermine her claim of harassment. It was Jenkins's burden to provide an adequate record and to demonstrate error, but these messages are not in our record. (See Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) The messages apparently did not serve as the basis for the trial court's ruling.
We understand Jenkins to argue B.B.'s statements are entitled to no weight because B.B. lied under penalty of perjury in her filing, because B.B. was interested in Jenkins's previous relationship with Shepard despite signaling otherwise, and because B.B. did not testify under oath.
Each argument fails. The minute order for the hearing states the parties were placed under oath. And we resolve questions of credibility and factual conflicts in B.B.'s favor. (See Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 499.)
Jenkins also claims the trial court deprived her of a chance to present her case, to offer testimony, and to call witnesses, despite being required by statute to accept relevant testimony. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (i); see also Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners' Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 733, italics added ["if it is offered, relevant oral testimony must be taken from available witnesses"].)
The record shows otherwise.
Jenkins's response to B.B.'s filing included a general denial and minimal explanation of why she disagreed with the orders requested. At the hearing, Jenkins's counsel put on no witnesses. Counsel initially sought to introduce medical records but then withdrew them after realizing they were unredacted. The court asked if counsel would like to state anything else, and counsel responded, "No, not at this time, your honor." Counsel later tried to introduce a phone log showing restricted calls made to Jenkins. The court questioned the relevance and helpfulness of this evidence but permitted it. Finally, after B.B. and Jenkins's counsel concluded their statements, the court asked, "Anything further before I make my ruling?" Counsel responded, "No, your honor."
Only after the court ruled did counsel say she "would like proper testimony" and ask about the appeal process. To the extent this was a request to call witnesses and cross-examine B.B., it was tardy. Jenkins's cases are distinguishable on this basis. The time to present evidence is before the trial court delivers its final ruling.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court's order.
We concur: GRIMES, Acting P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.