Opinion
355389
08-12-2021
ZACKARIA YOUSSEF BAZZI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FATEN KASSEM BAZZI, Defendant-Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 19-107249-DO
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Boonstra and Rick, JJ.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff appeals by right the portion of the trial court's judgment of divorce, entered after a bench trial, awarding defendant spousal support. We affirm.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 2018 and separated fourteen months later. Plaintiff filed for divorce in June 2019. A bench trial on the complaint for divorce was held in September 2020. Plaintiff testified that he worked in the mortgage industry before and during most of the marriage. Defendant, who had been living with her parents before the marriage, moved in with plaintiff after the marriage and, in January 2019, the parties purchased a home (the marital home). In the early stages of the marriage, defendant began experiencing depression. Plaintiff admitted to physically abusing defendant, and to pleading guilty to an unspecified misdemeanor related to this abuse, for which he had been sentenced to one year in jail. Defendant's depression, the physical abuse, and other issues between plaintiff and defendant caused a breakdown in the marriage. Defendant moved out of the marital home and back in with her parents in April 2019, and ultimately moved to Grand Rapids. Defendant testified that she currently worked full-time, and had begun attending medical school in August 2020. The parties had entered into a pre-nuptial agreement before the marriage.
The parties testified that this agreement, known as a "Mahr agreement," was made in accordance with Islamic religious principles and required plaintiff to set aside funds that would be transferred to defendant if the parties divorced.
During closing arguments, plaintiff argued that the facts of the case weighed against an award of spousal support because the parties were young, the marriage was very short, defendant had moved back in with her parents, defendant had obtained part-time employment to meet her financial obligations before enrolling in medical school, and defendant had obtained student loans to cover the cost of attending medical school and a portion of her living expenses in Grand Rapids. In response, defendant argued that an award of spousal support was warranted because plaintiff had provided for defendant financially during the marriage and had prevented defendant from working, defendant had not planned on a marriage of such a short duration, plaintiff had more work experience than defendant and more money than he had before the case began, defendant's student loans were interest-bearing debts and, in any event, did not completely cover her rent or living expenses, and plaintiff was at fault for the divorce. After closing arguments, with respect to spousal support, the trial court ruled:
Defendant testified specifically that her medical school tuition was $60,000 per year, that she had borrowed $41,000 for the first two (out of three) semesters of her first year of school, and that her rent in Grand Rapids was $1,085 per month. Defendant testified that she anticipated receiving a "refund" of a portion of the student loan amount paid to her school that she could use for her living expenses, and that she anticipated the amount would cover fifty percent of her living expenses for those semesters.
Here, it was clear to me that the parties joined in a partnership of marriage, they worked together to build this home, to build their lives together, and things did not work out as they should.
I do note that this is a very short marriage. But, again, domestic violence has a way of making a marriage shorter than it could have been.
I believe that in this case it would be appropriate for me to award spousal support simply to assist [defendant] in getting through her education so that she can get out and earn a living.
This was the parties['] plan, at least at some point, and this is, I think, the proper ruling by the Court. [Defendant] has a serious health condition. [Plaintiff] is healthy. Their current financial situations are quite different.
And . . . the fact that [plaintiff] is already, has allegedly another girlfriend lined up, shows that he's already moved on.
The trial court found that it was appropriate for plaintiff to financially support defendant in the amount of $1,604 per month to assist her during her time in medical school. The trial court found no basis for an award of spousal support in favor of plaintiff. On October 21, 2020, the trial court entered a judgment of divorce and an order awarding spousal support to defendant. The judgment of divorce awarded defendant spousal support commencing on November 1, 2020, and expiring on May 31, 2024. Plaintiff filed a motion to stay the enforcement of the judgment relative to the award of spousal support; the trial court denied the motion.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's factual findings underlying an order of support. Beason v Beason, 435 Mich. 791, 805; 460 N.W.2d 207 (1990); Smith v Smith, 328 Mich.App. 279, 286; 936 N.W.2d 716 (2019). The trial court's findings are presumptively correct, and the burden is on the appellant to show clear error. Beason, 435 Mich. at 805. A finding is clearly erroneous if the appellate court, based on all the evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Id. at 805.
If the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous, this Court must then determine whether the trial court's dispositional ruling was fair and equitable in light of the facts, Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich. 141, 151-152; 485 N.W.2d 893 (1992), or constituted an abuse of discretion, Woodington v Shokoohi, 288 Mich.App. 352, 355; 792 N.W.2d 63 (2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when the result is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Woodington, 288 Mich.App. at 355. The trial court's decision regarding support must be affirmed unless this Court is firmly convinced that it was inequitable. Sparks, 440 Mich. at 151-152; Berger v Berger, 277 Mich.App. 700, 727; 747 N.W.2d 336 (2008).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the facts of this case weigh heavily against the award of spousal support, that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, and that the trial court's decision to award spousal support to defendant was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.
MCL 552.13(1) provides that
[i]n every action brought, either for a divorce or for a separation, the court may require either party to pay alimony for the suitable maintenance of the adverse party, to pay such sums as shall be deemed proper and necessary to conserve any real or personal property owned by the parties or either of them, and to pay any sums necessary to enable the adverse party to carry on or defend the action, during its pendency.
"The object in awarding spousal support is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties so that neither will be impoverished." Berger, 277 Mich.App. at 726. To that end, the Legislature has authorized trial courts to order support "in gross or otherwise as the court considers just and reasonable, after considering the ability of either party to pay and the character and situation of the parties, and all the other circumstances of the case." MCL 552.23(1). A court may order periodic support payments. Staple v Staple, 241 Mich.App. 562, 566; 616 N.W.2d 219 (2000).
It is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether to award spousal support, and the amount of that support. Loutts v Loutts, 298 Mich.App. 21, 25; 826 N.W.2d 152 (2012). Courts do not apply a strict formula when calculating support; instead, a trial court must order what is just and reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 30. In making a support determination, trial courts should consider:
(1) the past relations and conduct of the parties, (2) the length of the marriage, (3) the abilities of the parties to work, (4) the source and amount of property awarded to the parties, (5) the parties' ages, (6) the abilities of the parties to pay alimony, (7) the present situation of the parties, (8) the needs of the parties, (9) the parties' health, (10) the prior standard of living of the parties and whether either is responsible for the support of others, (11) contributions of the parties to the joint estate, (12) a party's fault in causing the divorce, (13) the effect of cohabitation on a party's financial status, and (14) general principles of equity. [Olson v Olson, 256 Mich.App. 619, 631; 671 N.W.2d 64 (2003).]
Trial courts should make specific factual findings for each relevant factor. Myland v Myland, 290 Mich.App. 691, 695; 804 N.W.2d 124 (2010). The trial court must also consider all relevant factors but "not assign disproportionate weight to any one circumstance." Sparks, 440 Mich. at 158. A trial court may order one spouse to support another while the recipient obtains an education that would allow him or her to return to the work force and become self-sufficient. Richards v Richards, 310 Mich.App. 683, 692; 874 N.W.2d 704 (2015).
A. FACTUAL FINDINGS
In this case, and contrary to plaintiff's assertions, the trial court made numerous specific factual findings and clearly articulated those findings on the record. These findings were not clearly erroneous. Beason, 435 Mich. at 805. We will review each of the Olson factors with reference to the trial court's factual findings.
(1) The past relations and conduct of the parties. The trial court found that it was "unrefuted" that plaintiff had wanted defendant to be a stay-at-home wife until she went to medical school, and that plaintiff had "relied to her detriment" on plaintiff's "promise to support her." This finding is supported by the record. Plaintiff testified that he had not wanted defendant to work before attending medical school. Defendant testified that she had wanted to work during the marriage, but that plaintiff had prevented her from doing so. Plaintiff fully supported defendant financially during the marriage. Plaintiff also testified that he had encouraged defendant to go to medical school, had helped defendant complete a medical school application, had initiated some meetings with the associate deans of the schools defendant was interested in attending, and had expected that defendant would attend medical school during the marriage.
It appears that plaintiff assisted defendant with her application to Wayne State School of Medicine in Detroit, although defendant ultimately enrolled in the Michigan State University College of Human Medicine in Grand Rapids.
(2) The length of the marriage. The trial court confirmed the date of the marriage, the separation, and the filing of the divorce, all of which were undisputed.
(3) The abilities of the parties to work. The trial court found "persuasive" defendant's testimony, "irrespective of her current income from her current employment" that she would be unable to continue working full time while pursuing her medical degree, and that her current employer would not allow her to work less than full time. The trial court also noted that plaintiff's income had changed in 2020, after he "left a comfortable position to enter a job where it is commission [based]," but that plaintiff had the ability to "put his foot on the gas and put his foot on the break [sic] as he deems appropriate." These findings are supported by the record. Plaintiff testified that he had a high school diploma and was licensed to write mortgages in 24 states. In 2019, plaintiff earned $98,548.00, with an additional $13,172.57 in non-taxable benefits; however, plaintiff's work subsequently was affected negatively by the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant testified that before the marriage she worked at a minimum wage job paying $10 per hour, and was currently working 35 hours per work and making a salary of $36,000 per year. Defendant testified that she could not continue to work full-time while attending medical school, that her position was not available part time, and that she anticipated leaving her job when she obtained student loan funds to cover a portion of her living expenses. The trial court noted that the current financial situations of the parties were "quite different," and that irrespective of defendant's income from her current employment, it would not be prudent for defendant to work full-time while pursuing a medical degree. On the other hand, the trial court stated that it was concerned about the change in income for plaintiff.
(4) The source and amount of property awarded to the parties. Prior to addressing spousal support, the trial court ruled that defendant was entitled to enforcement of the pre-nuptial agreement's requirement that plaintiff pay her $50,000. The trial court also held that defendant should be awarded $9,000 as her share of equity in the marital home, payment of $7,500 of her personal credit card debt, and one half of the marital portion of plaintiff's retirement fund ($850). Some personal property, consisting of a two-year-old refrigerator valued by plaintiff at $1,000, and a used electronic tablet, was also awarded to defendant. In making the spousal support determination, the trial court addressed the pre-nuptial agreement and held that it did not preclude defendant from receiving spousal support while she attended medical school because it was a benefit that she had relied upon in marrying plaintiff.
This ruling was not challenged on appeal.
(5) The parties' ages. The trial court noted that plaintiff was 26 years old and defendant was 24 years old.
(6) The abilities of the parties to pay alimony. Although it did not specifically link this finding to the ability of the parties to pay alimony, the trial court did find that the parties' "current financial situations are quite different" and did make findings concerning each party's income and expenses. The trial court also found that defendant's monthly expenses were $1,600 per month.
(7) The present situation of the parties. The trial court found that plaintiff was currently living with another woman, whom he planned to marry, and that plaintiff would "walk[] away with a new fiancée" after the divorce, while defendant was "in medical school ringing up expenses, taking out a lot of loans.
(8) The parties' health. The trial court found that defendant had a "serious health condition," while plaintiff was healthy. This finding is supported by the record. Plaintiff testified that he had no health problems. During the marriage, defendant had suffered from depression, and also suffered from polycystic ovarian syndrome (PCOS), which she testified was chronic, painful, and could lead to other health problems.
(9) The prior standard of living of the parties and whether either is responsible for the support of others. The trial court did not specifically address this factor. Neither party testified to being responsible for the support of others.
(10) The contributions of the parties to the joint estate. The trial court did not specifically address this factor, but did note that plaintiff worked during the marriage and that defendant did not, as discussed.
(11) A party's fault in causing the divorce. The trial court stated that "the evidence on this record supports a finding that as [sic] the domestic violence that is a significant fault of the divorce [sic], because in my conception, the domestic violence led inescapably to withdrawal from the activities of life by [d]efendant mother [sic], she withdrew, she developed a thicker shell, and that is a consequence of his actions." The trial court additionally stated that "the facts support a finding that this downward spiral cascaded and likely interfered with the relationship of the parties." The trial court assigned "significant responsibility" to plaintiff for causing the divorce.
(12) The needs of the parties. The trial court found that it was not prudent for defendant to work a full-time job while in medical school and that defendant could not sustain her current employment. The trial court also found that defendant's budget was $1,600 per month. The trial court noted the change in plaintiff's income.
(13) The effect of cohabitation on a party's financial situation. We note that this factor considers whether either party is living in cohabitation with another person at the time of the divorce. See Ianitelli v Ianitelli, 199 Mich.App. 641, 644; 502 N.W.2d 691 (1993). The trial court did not specifically address this factor, but did note defendant's monthly expenses, which included payment of one-half of the rent on an apartment with a roommate.
(14) General principles of equity. The trial court found that plaintiff had become engaged to be married with a new partner during the divorce proceedings, and that the parties had entered their marriage with a "plan" for defendant to "one day pursue a professional lifestyle" that would result in "one of these they call them power couples where, um, each would be contributing greatly financially." The trial court held that defendant's "inability to repair the relationship was reasonable in light of plaintiff's domestic violence, which "either exacerbated [defendant's] preexisting depression or worsened it."
The trial court's findings in support of its spousal support award were supported by the record, and this Court is not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Beason, 435 Mich. at 805. The record provides ample support for the trial court's findings that plaintiff supported defendant during the marriage, that the parties had planned for defendant to attend medical school, and that plaintiff was significantly at fault for the dissolution of the marriage due to his domestic violence.
B. DISPOSITIONAL RULING
Finding no clear error in the trial court's factual findings, we next examine whether the trial court's award of spousal support to defendant was fair and equitable in light of those findings. Olson, 256 Mich.App. at 629-630. Although the marriage in this case was of a short duration, given defendant's testimony concerning her educational plans and her health, plaintiff's testimony concerning his income, retention of the marital home, and plans to remarry, and the parties' testimony concerning plaintiff's support of defendant during the marriage, a short-duration award was fair and equitable. Id. Although defendant was able to obtain a job shortly after leaving the marital home, the record shows that the job paid $36,000 per year at the time of trial, and could not realistically be maintained while defendant was in medical school. Defendant will still have living expenses as a medical student. Under these circumstances, it was appropriate for plaintiff to continue to support defendant while she completed her medical degree and became self-sufficient. Richards, 310 Mich.App. at 692. Moreover, the trial court noted that defendant suffered from a chronic, painful condition (PCOS), as well as depression; the disparity in health conditions also supports the trial court's determination that a short-term award was fair and equitable.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its award of spousal support. Woodington, 288 Mich.App. at 355. The trial court's award was fair and equitable in light of the facts. Sparks, 440 Mich. at 151-152. Although plaintiff argues that the parties did not contemplate that defendant would attend medical school in Grand Rapids, plaintiff presents no evidence that the expense of defendant doing so is significantly higher than if she had attended school in Detroit. Moreover, although plaintiff may not have anticipated that defendant would rent an apartment in Grand Rapids, it is hardly surprising that the party departing the marital home would have to rent an apartment somewhere, and again, plaintiff has not demonstrated that this expense is unreasonable in light of the circumstances; rather, plaintiff merely notes that defendant "could have saved rent money by living with her parents" if she had attended Wayne State. Even if true, plaintiff presents this Court with no authority indicating that defendant's living expenses are irrelevant merely because she could have moved back to her parents' home had she enrolled in a different medical school.
Similarly, plaintiff cites no authority for the argument that spousal support is not warranted because defendant did not begin school until 16 months after separating from plaintiff. The divorce proceedings spanned over a year, and defendant was enrolled in medical school before the divorce was finalized. The trial court's determination that plaintiff should support defendant while she obtained a degree that would allow her to become self-sufficient was not an abuse of discretion. See Richards, 310 Mich.App. at 692 (upholding an award of spousal support that was "designed to facilitate plaintiff's return to the work force" through further education).
Affirmed.