The Waters case was decided by the same court which decided the Pavesich case, supra, in 1905, which, we have noted, was the first decision by a state court of final jurisdiction to recognize the doctrine of the right of privacy, and which is considered a leading case. Moreover, it is the same court which, in 1930, decided Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194, relied upon by plaintiff. That it did not consider the Bazemore case in point is evident from the statement in Waters: "There is no decision in this State which is in point on its facts with the present case.

"* * * There are no allegations that these individual co-defendants in any way published to any third person the content of the calls they purportedly overheard and recorded. While it appears that there is a great deal of authority to the effect that the mere act of listening to the conversations would not, without more, constitute an action of invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy, Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company, 122 Ga. 190 [50 S.E. 68, 69 L.R.A. 101]; Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 [ 155 S.E. 194]; Prosser on Torts, 2nd Ed., Section 97, Page 641, nevertheless, the Court feels that a more compelling reason for granting the motions to dismiss filed by defendants would be the privilege accorded Government officers as respects civil suits to recover for actions taken by them in the exercise of their official functions."

Following Pavesich, supra, this court has continued to recognize the right of privacy. In Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 ( 155 S.E. 194) (1930), the court held that the parents of a child born with his heart outside his body, who died following surgery, could maintain a suit for invasion of their privacy against the hospital, a photographer and a newspaper which respectively allowed, photographed and published a nude post mortem picture of the child. On the other hand, in Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161 ( 91 S.E.2d 344) (1956), it was held that the mother of a 14-year-old murder victim could not recover for invasion of the mother's privacy from a newspaper which published and sold separately photographs of her daughter's body taken after it was removed from a river.

This jurisdiction is not without precedent in the "relational" area of the law. In Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 ( 155 S.E. 194) (1930), the parents of a deceased infant with an unusual birth defect sued a hospital, a photographer, and a newspaper for invasion of their privacy by publishing, or aiding the disclosure and publication of a photograph depicting their deformed infant. The opinion by this court said: "In this case the child was dead when the unauthorized acts were committed, and the right of action could not be in the child, but in the parents ... The petition in this case by the parents of a deceased child for general and special damages to the plaintiffs and for injunction because of the alleged tortious act, set forth a cause of action."

Its chief impetus to recognition as an independent right originated in an article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandies in 1890. Since the Pavesich decision the following cases in this State have followed it: Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 ( 155 S.E. 194); McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92 ( 2 S.E.2d 810); Davis v. General Finance Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 710 ( 57 S.E.2d 225); Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161 ( 91 S.E.2d 344); and the right of privacy has been recognized in the following jurisdictions: Alabama, Arizona, California, District of Columbia, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35 ( 133 N.E.2d 340).

The right, as Dean Prosser points out (The Law of Torts [2d ed], § 97, p 635), is a complex. It involves not only the right against appropriation of some elements of plaintiff's personality for commercial use (the Pallas Case) but also the right against the disclosure of private information concerning the private life of a private citizen in violation of the common decencies, such as the publication of a picture of one's deformed child ( Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 [ 155 S.E. 194]), the details of an humiliating illness ( Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo 1199 [ 159 S.W.2d 291]), or the fact that he has not paid his debts ( Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765 [ 299 S.W. 967, 55 ALR 964]). The common denominator in all of these cases is an unreasonable and serious interference with the plaintiff's interest in not having his affairs known to others.

See also 138 A.L.R. 50-55. The decision in Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 ( 155 S.E. 194), was not a unanimous decision. The trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers to the petition.

Such situation is readily distinguishable from cases where the right of privacy has been enforced with regard to the publication of a picture which was shocking, revolting or indecent in its portrayal of the human body. (See Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506 [149 S.W. 849, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 386, Ann.Cas. 1914B 374]; Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 [155 S.E. 194].) In fact, here the photograph may very well be said to be complimentary and pleasing in its pictorial representation of plaintiffs.

Remedies have been afforded for the protection of that right. (See Melvin v. Reid, supra; Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 211 P.2d 320]; Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal.App.2d 304 [ 95 P.2d 491]; Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal.App.2d 207 [ 127 P.2d 577]; Reed v. Real Detective Pub.Co., 63 Ariz. 294 [ 162 P.2d 133]; Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250 [ 37 So.2d 118]; Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198 [ 20 So.2d 243]; Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 [31 L.R.A. 283]; Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 [50 S.E. 68]; Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 [155 S.E. 194]; Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga. App. 662 [184 S.E. 452]; McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola BottlingCo., 60 Ga. App. 92 [2 S.E.2d 811]; Sikes v. Foster, 74 Ga. App. 350 [ 39 S.E.2d 585]; Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, dealing with California, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky and Missouri law; Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004; State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364 [ 66 N.E.2d 755]; Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883 [172 P. 532, L.R.A. 1918D 1151]; Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227 [ 18 S.W.2d 972]; Itzkovich v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479 [39 So. 499, 112 Am.St. Rep. 272, 1 L.R.A.N.S. 1147]; Pallas v. CrowleyMilner Co., 322 Mich. 411 [ 33 N.W.2d 911]; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652 [134 S.W. 1076]; Barber v. Time,Inc., 348 Mo. 1199 [ 159 S.W.2d 291]; Flake v. Greensboro NewsCo., 212 N.C. 780 [ 195 S.E. 55]; Norman v. City of LasVegas, 64 Nev. 38 [ 177 P.2d 442]; McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24 [ 43 A.2d 514]; Bedn

Citizens So. Nat. Bank v. King, 184 Ga. 238, 247 ( 190 S.E. 857). A pleading that sets forth a cause of action for any of the relief prayed will not be dismissed on general demurrer. Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 ( 155 S.E. 194); Johnson v. Key, 173 Ga. 586 ( 160 S.E. 794); O'Neal v. O'Neal, 176 Ga. 419 (4) ( 168 S.E. 262); Sutton v. Adams, 180 Ga. 48 (1) ( 178 S.E. 365). Tested by the foregoing rules, the response of Mrs. Dixon, in the nature of a cross-action, for specific performance of an oral contract for the sale of the seven-eighths interest of Mrs. Mozelle Higdon, Mrs. Henrietta King, and Mrs. Jessie Crespo, in the lands described, alleged a cause of action.