Bayless v. Knox County

28 Citing cases

  1. Hyden v. Baker

    286 F. Supp. 475 (M.D. Tenn. 1968)   Cited 18 times

    The General Assembly was allowed to select the method of ratification to be required. The powers granted to the quarterly courts include, inter alia: the levying of taxes and the appropriation of funds for general county purposes, Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 286 S.W.2d 579 (1955); authorizing the issuance of general revenue and tax deficiency bonds for the purpose of financing industrial development, Jack's Cookie Corp. v. Giles County, Tenn., 407 S.W.2d 446 (1966); and authorizing the erection of public buildings, T.C.A. § 5-523, and local improvements, T.C.A. § 5-521. Although we have doubts as to the accuracy of characterizing the powers posessed by local governing bodies in terms of a traditional legislative-administrative dichotomy, we are of the opinion that the powers possessed and the functions performed by Tennessee quarterly county courts are such as to require that these governmental units be elected on an equal population basis.

  2. State ex Rel. Barker v. Harmon

    882 S.W.2d 352 (Tenn. 1994)   Cited 14 times
    Denying elision because statute at issue did not contain severability clause

    Id. at 551 (internal citations and quotations omitted). This Court faced a situation similar to that presented here in Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 286 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. 1956). There, a private act was passed in 1947 that attempted to increase the salary of three general sessions court judges during their terms of office.

  3. Trigg v. Mansfield

    648 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 17 times
    Distinguishing State ex rel. Vaughn v. King, 653 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. App. 1982)

    Suits for the use and benefit of any county in this state against any delinquent officer or his sureties, for moneys or funds due such county, shall be brought in the name of the state of Tennessee, for the use of the county for the benefit of which suit may be brought. Our decisions have held that such actions may be brought by private citizens and taxpayers. Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 274, 286 S.W.2d 579, 582 (1955); Peeler v. Luther, 175 Tenn. 454, 459-60, 135 S.W.2d 926, 928 (1940). The action authorized by T.C.A. § 5-1-106 has been described as analogous to a shareholder's derivative action.

  4. Boone v. Torrence

    63 Tenn. App. 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 8 times
    In State ex rel. Boone v. Torrence, 63 Tenn. App. 224, 470 S.W.2d 356 (1971) the distinction between corporation courts and other "inferior" courts, such as courts of general sessions, was discussed.

    It has been held in numerous cases that if a statute is capable of two interpretations, the Court will adopt the one which will sustain it rather than the one which will render it void as unconstitutional. Dugger v. Mechanics' and Traders' Co. of New Orleans (1895), 95 Tenn. 245, 32 S.W. 5, 28 L.R.A. 796; Garvin v. State (1884), 81 Tenn. 162; Donathan v. McMinn County (1948), 187 Tenn. 220, 213 S.W.2d 173; Bayless v. Knox County (1955), 199 Tenn. 268, 286 S.W.2d 579, and many other cases holding to the same effect in West's Tennessee Digest, Volume 5, under of "Constitutional Law." If we should adopt the theory of the relators and hold that they are now "likewise" Judges of the Metropolitan Court, as well as Judges of the General Sessions Court, an anomalous situation would be created in the event of a vacancy in the office of a Judge of the General Sessions Court.

  5. Hill v. McNairy County

    No. 03-1219-T (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 20, 2004)

    See Art. 11, § 12, Tenn. Const. Although counties were also established as arms of state government, counties were statutorily created by the state legislature, rather than by the state constitution. State v. Stine, 200 Tenn. 561, 292 S.W.2d 771, 772 (1956); Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 286 S.W.2d 579, 587 (1955). Additionally, Tennessee Courts have noted that counties and school systems perform separate functions.

  6. Rollins v. Wilson County Government

    967 F. Supp. 990 (M.D. Tenn. 1997)   Cited 5 times
    Tracing differences

    Although counties were also established as arms of state government, counties were statutorily created by the state legislature, rather than by the state constitution. State v. Stine, 200 Tenn. 561, 292 S.W.2d 771, 772 (1956); Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 286 S.W.2d 579, 587 (1955). Additionally, Tennessee Courts have noted that counties and school systems perform separate functions.

  7. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. McWherter

    817 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. 1991)   Cited 5 times
    Discussing general rule

    Franks v. State, supra, 772 S.W.2d at 431 (emphasis added; citing O'Brien v. Rutherford County, 199 Tenn. 642, 288 S.W.2d 708 (1956)). See also Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 279, 286 S.W.2d 579, 584 (1955). The fact that a prior notification statute was determined to be unconstitutional by a trial-level court some 12 years ago does not overcome the presumption that the law as reenacted in 1989 is constitutionally valid.

  8. State v. Bobo

    727 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn. 1987)   Cited 56 times
    In Bobo, our Supreme Court specifically held that just because a prospective juror's "views on capital punishment may have had a religious foundation does not necessarily transform the tests mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and Wainwright v. Witt, supra, into religious tests for the purposes of the Tennessee Constitution."

    See also, e.g., State ex rel. Maner v. Leech, 588 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tenn. 1979); Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 223 Tenn. 415, 420, 446 S.W.2d 260, 263 (1969); City of Chattanooga v. Harris, 223 Tenn. 51, 61, 442 S.W.2d 602, 606 (1969); Ellenburg v. State, 215 Tenn. 153, 157, 384 S.W.2d 29, 31 (1964); Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 275-276, 286 S.W.2d 579, 583 (1955). In this case, in accordance with the established rule of statutory construction, we have concluded that T.C.A. § 39-2-203(i)(12) may be constitutionally applied if the triggering offenses are shown only by convictions that have been entered prior to the sentencing hearing at which they are to be utilized to establish this aggravating circumstance. "We will not declare a statute unconstitutional when we are reasonably able to do otherwise — to preserve its meaning and purpose through a constitutionally correct construction.

  9. Armijo v. Cebolleta Land Grant

    105 N.M. 324 (N.M. 1987)   Cited 3 times

    A salary specified by law for the discharge of official duties impliedly excludes the allowance of any other compensation. See, e.g., DeSilva v. Brown, 38 Haw. 166, 173 (1948) (question of compensation is dependent upon the terms of the law which creates the office and prescribes its duties); Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 286, 286 S.W.2d 579, 587 (1956) (officer may not recover compensation additional to the compensation fixed by statute for expenses); State ex rel. Cromwell v. Myers, 80 Ohio App. 357, 362, 73 N.E.2d 218, 220 (1947) ("legislative intent to allow compensation in addition to that allowed under the salary law must clearly appear"). Underlying these decisions is the recognition that, by its very nature, holding public office creates opportunities for an officer to take advantage of or profit from his position.

  10. Metropolitan Government of Nashville v. Fulton

    701 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. 1985)   Cited 6 times

    In Trigg v. Mansfield, 648 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. App. 1982) the Court of Appeals permitted such a suit to proceed in the name of the State of Tennessee, where members of the county commission were also joined in the action and it was alleged that after learning of improper and unauthorized payments they failed to take any action. Cited in the Trigg case as authority for permitting such suits by private citizens were the cases of Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 286 S.W.2d 579 (1955) and Peeler v. Luther, 175 Tenn. 454, 135 S.W.2d 926 (1940). Special circumstances were shown in those cases that do not appear in the present complaint.