Opinion
Civil No. 02-651 (JRT/FLN).
May 26, 2004
Robert C. von Ohlen, Jr. and Daniel V. Santiago, KAPLAN VON OHLEN, Chicago, IL and Boyd H. Ratchye and Christopher R. Morris, BASSFORD REMELE, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant/third-party plaintiff.
Donald Chance Mark, Jr. and Erik F. Hansen, FAFINSKI MARK JOHNSON, Eden Prairie, MN, for third-party defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW OR A NEW TRIAL
Plaintiff BAX Global Inc. ("BAX") filed this action against Federal Express Corporation ("FedEx") after a FedEx aircraft taxied into a parked BAX aircraft at the Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport. BAX and FedEx settled their dispute for $850,000, and FedEx brought this third-party action for contribution against Signature Flight Support Inc. ("Signature"). FedEx asserted that Signature was negligent in its responsibilities, and claimed that Signature's negligence was a direct cause of the accident.
At trial Signature withdrew its challenge to the reasonableness of the settlement amount of $850,000, therefore the Court found as a matter of law that the settlement amount was reasonable.
The case was tried to a jury and on February 19, 2004, the jury returned its verdict. The jury determined that both FedEx and Signature were negligent, and that the negligence of each was a direct cause of the accident. The jury apportioned 59% of fault to FedEx, 31% to Signature and 10% to the Metropolitan Airports Commission, a nonparty. Signature has moved for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative requests a new trial. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the motion.
Signature is therefore responsible for 31% of the $850,000 settlement, or $263,500.
BACKGROUND
BAX is a global transportation and logistics company and owns and operates a fleet of cargo transport airplanes, including the DC-8 that was damaged. Defendant FedEx is a transportation and freight company, and owned and operated the MD-11 that was involved in the incident. Signature provides ground support at the Minneapolis St. Paul International Airport.
The incident took place on the evening of February 27, 1997 at the Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport ("MSP"). BAX's DC-8 was parked with its nose toward the plaintiff's office and warehouse. This parking spot was designated for use by the 727 aircraft, which is 34 feet shorter than the DC-8. The tail of the DC-8 extended into the taxi lane by 20 to 30 feet. There was evidence presented that no flags, cones or markers indicated the position of the tail. There was also evidence presented that the tail was fully visible. FedEx presented evidence that Signature was the entity responsible for parking the DC-8, or for marshaling the DC-8 to its parking spot, and that Signature employees parked the DC-8 on the day of the incident.
FedEx's MD-11 was parked about 100 yards north of BAX's DC-8. The FedEx MD-11 left its parking spot and traveled toward the DC-8. During this approximately 100-yard journey, the DC-8 was visible in front of, and to the right of the FedEx plane. The crew of the FedEx plane did not successfully maneuver around the DC-8, and the FedEx plane ran into the tail of the stationary DC-8. Although there might have been crewmembers on board the DC-8, there is no evidence that the engine of the DC-8 was running, or that the crew had taken control of the aircraft.
ANALYSIS
I. JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
"A motion for a judgment as a matter of law should be granted when all the evidence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inferences sustaining the position of the nonmoving party." Hunt ex rel. Hunt v. Lincoln County Mem'l Hosp., 317 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotation and citations omitted). In making this determination, the Court is to "consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, assume that the jury resolved all conflicts of evidence in favor of that party, assume as true all facts which the prevailing party's evidence tended to prove, give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the facts, and deny the motion, if in light of the foregoing, reasonable jurors could differ as to the conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence." Minnesota Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Lake Calhoun Assocs., 928 F.2d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. Dicon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 1989)); Century Wrecker Corp. v. E.R. Buske Mfg. Co., 913 F. Supp. 1256, 1267 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (noting that the court must not engage in a weighing or evaluation of the evidence or consider questions of credibility).
Signature raises the following three arguments in support of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. First, Signature suggests that reasonable minds could not disagree that FedEx's negligence was an intervening and superceding cause of the collision. Next, Signature argues that the failure to include a jury instruction and special verdict form question regarding negligence per se prejudiced Signature. Finally, Signature argues that because FedEx's negligence was greater than Signature's, FedEx cannot recover pursuant to Minnesota's comparative fault statute. Minn. Stat. § 604.01.
A. Intervening Superceding Cause
Determinations regarding breach and causation generally present questions of fact properly determined by a jury. See Smith v. Carriere, 316 N.W.2d 574, 575 (Minn. 1982); Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn. 1995) (causation). When reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion, however, the existence of proximate cause is a question of law. Lubbers, 539 N.W.2d at 402. Signature argues that reasonable minds could not disagree in the conclusion that FedEx's negligence, including the violation of several Federal Aviation Regulations ("FAR"), was the superceding, intervening cause of the accident, which relieves Signature of any liability for the accident.
There is no dispute (and in fact the jury found) that FedEx was negligent, and that its negligence was a direct cause of the accident. It is not beyond dispute, however, that FedEx's negligence was a superceding intervening cause. As the Court instructed the jury, a cause is a superceding intervening cause when four conditions are present: (1) It happened after the original negligence; (2) it did not happen because of the original negligence; (3) it changed the natural course of events and made the result different from what it would have been; and (4) the original wrongdoer could not have reasonably anticipated this event. Minnesota Practice, Jury Instruction Guides — Civil 27.20 (4th Ed.); Wartnick v. Moss Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1992).
As support for its argument, Signature points to Minnesota cases dealing with car accidents, in which cars collided with parked cars, and the courts determined that the negligence in colliding with a parked car superceded the negligence of parking/stopping the car even if that parking/stopping was itself negligent. See Sowada v. Motzko, 98 N.W.2d 182 (Minn. 1959); Goede v. Rondorf, 43 N.W.2d 770 (Minn. 1950); Medved v. Doolittle, 19 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1945). These cases, in addition to involving automobiles, rather than airplanes, and occurring on roadways, rather than parking lots (or their aircraft equivalents), are distinguishable and do not control the outcome of this matter.
In Medved v. Doolittle, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the extraordinary negligent and "well-nigh suicidal" act of driving a vehicle at over 40 miles per hour into a stationary vehicle on the side of the road amounted to superceding and intervening cause. Medved, 98 N.W.2d at 791. In Medved, the driver of the colliding car took no evasive action, despite the fact that a collision was clearly imminent. Here, there is no persuasive argument that the negligence of the FedEx's flight crew reaches the level of that of the driver in Medved. In addition, credible evidence was presented at trial that the FedEx crew took some evasive action. Goede v. Rondorf is even more easily distinguished. In Goede, William P. Goede was killed after the car he was driving was struck by defendant Rondorf's car. The cars became attached at the bumper, and Rondorf's car dragged plaintiff's vehicle, finally coming to a stop some three-hundred feet later. The Court was at a loss to explain how the hit-and-run driver hit Mr. Goede, while missing defendant: "It is not clear how this car could have missed defendant, who was farther out into the street than decedent, unless it swerved or turned momentarily after passing defendant. Decedent was also shielded by defendant's car." Id. at 771. This somewhat "freak" accident could not have been foreseeable, as the Court concluded: "It cannot be said that it reasonably could have been foreseen by defendant that when he stopped as he did a driver approaching from the west might unlawfully cross the center line and in some mysterious manner reach plaintiff's decedent, shielded as he was by defendant's automobile." Id. at 773. Unlike Goede, in this case, a reasonably foreseeable consequence of negligently parking the DC-8 was the very result that happened here — another aircraft might collide with it.
Finally, in the case of Sowada v. Motzko, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury instruction on intervening causation. 98 N.W.2d at 185. In this case, the Court determined that the third-party defendant was entitled to such an instruction, and the Court gave the instruction. See also Hafner v. Iverson, 343 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. 1984) (summary judgment reversed where truck driver ran into "bucket" used by electric repair crew because the bucket was at a "deceptive height" and a jury could find that it "created an unreasonable risk to traffic").
The evidence presented at trial amply supports the jury's determination that FedEx's negligence was not a superceding intervening cause. To establish superceding intervening cause, Signature would have had to establish each of the elements. Given the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury could have found that Signature had not established either the second, third, or fourth element. Therefore Signature is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this basis.
B. Negligence Per Se
Signature also argues that the violation of FARs is negligence per se, and suggests that Signature was prejudiced by the Court's failure to include an instruction on negligence per se and the Court's decision not to include a negligence per se question on the special verdict form. Contrary to Signature's assertion, it is not established that Minnesota would determine that the violation of FARs amounts to negligence per se. Some courts hold that violation of the FARs constitutes negligence per se. See, e.g., Wildwood Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 67, 71 (D. Minn. 1963); Dyer v. United States, 832 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1987); In re N-500L Cases, 1 F.2d 15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982); Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 407 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1968); Insurance Co. of North America v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 962, 967 (E.D. Ark. 1981). Other courts hold that violation of FARs constitutes some evidence of negligence. See, e.g., Campbell v. Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc., 138 F.3d 996, 1002-03, (5th Cir. 1998) (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport, 635 F.2d 67, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1980); Tilley v. United States, 375 F.2d 678, 680 (4th Cir. 1967)).
Although the Court did not instruct the jury on negligence per se, the Court did instruct the jury that the violation of FARs is evidence of negligence. The Court also read the requested FARs to the jury, and included them in the jury instructions. Even if Signature is correct, and the Minnesota courts would conclude that the violation of FARs amounts to negligence per se, Signature was not prejudiced by the failure to include this instruction. The jury found that FedEx was negligent. Had the jury received the requested instruction, the jury likely would also have found that FedEx was negligent. The critical issue, however, was whether Signature was also negligent, and whether FedEx's negligence was superceding and intervening. There is no compelling reason to think the jury's answer to that question would have come out differently depending on the distinction between "evidence of negligence" and "negligence per se" — a somewhat technical distinction that, under the facts of this case, may seem more important to attorneys than it is significant to jurors. There is no reason to think that a question on the special verdict form would have altered in any meaningful way the jury's apportionment of fault in this case. Signature has not established that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue.
C. Comparative Fault Rule
Signature argues that under Minnesota's comparative fault rule, as expressed in Minn. Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1, FedEx cannot recover from Signature, because the jury apportioned 59% of the fault to FedEx and only 31% of the fault to Signature. This reading would essentially bar third-party contribution actions. It is unlikely that the Minnesota legislature intended such a result, without explicitly so stating. See, e.g., Committee Notes to Minn. Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 ("The plaintiff's negligence is compared to that of the defendant and the plaintiff can only recover if he is less than 50% negligent. In cases involving more than one defendant the plaintiff's negligence is compared to that of each defendant separately and he can recover only from the defendant or defendants whose negligence exceeds his own.").
Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not adopted the reading urged by Signature. For example, in Peterson v. Little Giant Glencoe Portable Elevator, 366 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. 1985), a manufacturer who was 65% at fault recovered contribution from a dealer who was 35% at fault. Id. at 117. This case is even more straightforward than Peterson, and there is no substantive difference between requiring contribution from the 35% at fault dealer in Peterson and requiring contribution from the 31% at fault third-party defendant in this case. See also Engvall v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 632 N.W.2d 560, 567 (Minn. 2001) (discussing Minnesota's "time honored" contribution jurisprudence, and holding that since plaintiff could have brought an action against third-party defendant, third-party plaintiff could maintain a contribution claim against third-party defendant).
The court reversed and remanded for a finding of the amount of contribution due. Id. at 117. See also Minnesota Brewing Co. v. Egan Sons Co., 574 N.W.2d 54, 62 (Minn. 1998) (describing the Peterson holding as "that a negligent third party engaged in a common enterprise with an employer may be liable to another third party for contribution to a damage award in a tort suit.").
The cases cited by Signature do not compel a different result here. For example, in Horton v. Orbeth, 342 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1984), an individual injured in a boating accident sued the boat's owner as well as the person who operated the boat. The defendants brought a third-party action against plaintiff's companions. A jury apportioned 10% of the negligence to plaintiff himself; 74% to the operator of the boat, but only 8% to each of the third-party defendants. Id. The court rejected the operator's claims that he was entitled to contribution from the third-party defendants. The operator conceded that plaintiff had no viable claim against the third-party defendants, since the plaintiff was more negligent than either of the third-party defendants. Id. at 113, 114 ("had the plaintiff asserted claims against Johnson and Melchert [the plaintiff's boating companions] they would have been adjudged not liable to the plaintiff"). Not so in this case, where plaintiff BAX was not at all at fault for the accident. Had the plaintiff asserted a claim against Signature, Signature would not have been adjudged not liable. See id. at 114. In this case, Minnesota's "time-honored" law of contribution requires Signature — a party sharing liability for the accident and from whom plaintiff could have recovered — to shoulder its share of the responsibility of the damages resulting from the accident.
II. NEW TRIAL
Under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may grant a motion for a new trial to all or any of the parties on all issues or on particular issues. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). The standard for granting a new trial is whether the verdict is against "the great weight of the evidence." Butler v. French, 83 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 1996). In evaluating a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), the "key question is whether a new trial should have been granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice." McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1400 (8th Cir. 1994). Unlike a motion for judgment as a matter of law, in considering a motion for a new trial, the Court may "rely on its own reading of the evidence — it can weigh the evidence, disbelieve witnesses, and grant a new trial even where there is substantial evidence to sustain a verdict." Ryan v. McDonough Power Equip., 734 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
In this case, the verdict is well supported by the record developed at trial. The verdict reflects a considered decision by the jury, and a new trial is not necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
ORDER
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Third-party defendant Signature Flight Support Inc.'s motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative for a new trial [Docket No. 109] is DENIED.
2. The Clerk is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT against third-party defendant Signature Flight Support, Inc., and in favor of third-party plaintiff Federal Express Corporation in the amount of $263,500.