Opinion
6D23-2184
07-07-2023
Janet S. Baute, Petitioner, v. Diane T. Crenshaw, Respondent.
Daniel A. McGowan, of Adrian Philip Thomas, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Petitioner. Adam J. Steinberg and Robyn DiTocco, of Law Offices of Adam J. Steinberg, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Respondent.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Collier County. Joseph G. Foster, Judge Lower Tribunal No. 2022-CA-001410.
Daniel A. McGowan, of Adrian Philip Thomas, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Petitioner.
Adam J. Steinberg and Robyn DiTocco, of Law Offices of Adam J. Steinberg, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Respondent.
MIZE, J.
Petitioner, Janet S. Baute ("Baute"), filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the trial court's order granting a motion to stay litigation filed by Respondent, Diane T. Crenshaw ("Crenshaw"). We grant the petition and quash the trial court's order granting the motion to stay.
Background and Procedural History
The underlying action from which this proceeding arises is the second lawsuit involving these litigants. Baute previously filed a lawsuit against Crenshaw in Crenshaw's capacity as trustee of the Erna T. Leahy Revocable Trust (the "Prior Lawsuit"). In the Prior Lawsuit, Baute asserted claims against Crenshaw: (1) to compel Crenshaw, as trustee, to provide a trust accounting as required by section 736.0813, Florida Statutes; (2) for declaratory judgment removing Crenshaw as trustee and installing Baute as co-trustee; and (3) for breach of trust pursuant to section 736.001, Florida Statutes. Baute ultimately filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the Prior Lawsuit. After Baute filed the notice of voluntary dismissal, Crenshaw filed a motion for taxable costs in the Prior Lawsuit. The trial court in the Prior Lawsuit entered an order granting the motion for taxable costs as to entitlement and finding that Crenshaw is entitled to recover her costs incurred in defending the Prior Lawsuit from Baute. However, the trial court has not yet entered an order determining the amount of the award of costs or requiring Baute to pay any specific amount of costs.
The day before dismissing the Prior Lawsuit, Baute filed a new lawsuit against Crenshaw, this time in her individual capacity (the "Current Lawsuit"). Baute's Complaint in the Current Lawsuit asserts a single claim against Crenshaw for tortious interference with an expected inheritance.
Crenshaw filed a motion to stay litigation in the Current Lawsuit pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(d), which the trial court granted. Baute then filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari.
Analysis
We begin by noting that a petition for writ of certiorari is the proper mechanism to challenge a trial court's order granting a motion to stay litigation. See Homeowners Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Hurchalla, 171 So.3d 230, 232 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). But for the district court to have jurisdiction to review the order, the petitioner must first demonstrate that he or she will suffer a material harm that is impossible to remedy on direct appeal. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Am. Educ. Enters., LLC, 99 So.3d 450, 454-55 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998)). We reject Baute's argument that jurisdiction lies to review every stay order entered by a trial court. Not every stay causes a party irreparable harm. See generally Williams v. Williams, 48 Fla.L.Weekly D927, D927-28 (Fla. 5th DCA May 1, 2023); Flaig ex rel. Palmcrest Homes of Tampa Bay, LLC v. Sullivan, 141 So.3d 1274, 1276 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Under the unique circumstances of this case, however, we find that Baute has met this difficult burden.
To obtain a writ of certiorari, a petitioner must demonstrate that the nonfinal order constitutes "(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case, (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal." Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund, 99 So.3d at 454-55 (quoting Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Florida, Inc., 889 So.2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004) (internal alterations omitted)). The second and third prongs are referred to together as "irreparable harm" and they are jurisdictional. Id.; see also Florida Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Services v. Mahon, 293 So.3d 1091, 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020).
The trial court below unreasonably and indefinitely conditioned Baute's ability to pursue her lawsuit upon her performance of a condition that did not pertain to the lawsuit. The costs Baute was ordered to pay were costs from a different proceeding than the proceeding pending before the trial court. Further, at the time the trial court ordered Baute to pay the cost judgment, it was impossible to do so. Baute cannot pay a cost judgment that has not been entered and for which an amount has not been determined. Such a condition, imposed without a proper foundation, could operate to indefinitely deprive Baute of the ability to pursue her legal claim. This satisfies the irreparable harm requirement of a petition for writ of certiorari. We, therefore, turn to the issue of whether the trial court's order departed from the essential requirements of law.
As discussed below, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(d) mandates that, in the particular circumstance described in the rule, the ability to pursue one lawsuit is dependent on the payment of costs from a different lawsuit. However, where, as here, rule 1.420(d) did not apply, the trial court conditioned Baute's access to the court on satisfaction of a condition that did not pertain to the proceeding below without a legal basis to do so. We see no distinction between the case at hand and the trial court conditioning a litigant's ability to pursue a lawsuit on other conditions unrelated to the lawsuit, such as payment of unpaid parking tickets or payment of a judgment from a wholly unrelated civil action.
In her petition, Baute makes multiple arguments, only two of which we find it necessary to address. First, Baute argues that the trial court's order was improper because the Current Lawsuit involves different causes of action than the Prior Lawsuit. Second, Baute argues that the trial court's order was improper because rule 1.420(d) does not allow a second lawsuit to be stayed pursuant to that rule unless an order requiring payment of a specific amount of costs has been entered in the first lawsuit. We agree with Baute on both arguments.
I. The Current Lawsuit and the Prior Lawsuit do not involve identical causes of action.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(d) states in pertinent part:
If a party who has once dismissed a claim in any court of this state commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same adverse party, the court shall make such order for the payment of costs of the claim previously dismissed as it may deem proper and shall stay the proceedings in the action until the party seeking affirmative relief has complied with the order.
Thus, for a stay to be granted, the plain text of the rule requires that: (1) the second action must be "based upon or include" the same claim as the first action; and (2) the second action must be brought by the same party that filed the first action against the same adverse party against which the first action was filed. See Field v. Nelson, 380 So.2d 547, 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) ("The operation of the rule, therefore, requires that.. .there be an identity of parties and claims in both actions." (quoting Paley v. Cocoa Masonry, Inc., 354 So.2d 945, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978))).
Here, the identity of claims is lacking. All of the claims brought in the Prior Lawsuit were based on Crenshaw's failure to properly perform her duties as a trustee under the Florida Trust Code. In the Current Lawsuit, Baute asserts a single tort claim for tortious interference with an expected inheritance. These are different causes of action.
Baute also argues that identity of parties is lacking in this case because Crenshaw was sued in her capacity as a trustee in the Prior Lawsuit and in her personal capacity in the Current Lawsuit. Whether identity of parties exists when two lawsuits assert claims against a person in her capacity as a trustee and in her personal capacity, respectively, appears to be an open question under Florida law. We decline to decide that question because it is not necessary to do so to resolve this case.
"The general test when deciding whether the cause of action is the same is whether the facts or evidence necessary to maintain the suit are the same in both actions." Crescent Shore Condo. Ass'n. v. Kai, 330 So.3d 582, 585-86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting U.S. Project Mgmt., Inc. v. Parc Royale E. Dev., Inc., 861 So.2d 74, 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). "Identity of causes of action means an identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the action." Id. (quoting M.C.G. v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sch. Bd., 927 So.2d 224, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)); see also Portwood v. Portwood, 261 So.3d 670, 673 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) ("Identity of the causes of action is established where the facts which are required to maintain both actions are identical." (quoting Gold v. Bankier, 840 So.2d 395, 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003))); Woodward v. Woodward, 192 So.3d 528, 531 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("Identity of the cause of action depends on whether the facts or evidence necessary to maintain the suit are the same in both actions." (quoting Tyson v. Viacom, Inc., 890 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (internal quotations omitted))).
Here, the elements of the claims brought in the Prior Lawsuit and the elements of the claim brought in the Current Lawsuit are different. Different facts and evidence are necessary to prove the claim in the Current Lawsuit than would have been necessary to prove the claims in the Prior Lawsuit. For this reason, the Current Lawsuit is not an action based upon or including the same claims as the Prior Lawsuit.
In her Response, Crenshaw argues that there is an identity of causes of action in this case because both cases "involve the same set of facts." However, identity of causes of action is not established merely because two lawsuits involve some of the same facts. See Gold, 840 So.2d at 397 (stating that overlapping facts are not sufficient to establish identity of causes of action). Rather, for there to be identity of the causes of action, the same facts must be necessary to maintain, i.e., to prove, both causes of action. That is not the case here.
Because the Current Lawsuit is not an action based upon or including the same claims as the Prior Lawsuit, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by granting a motion to stay pursuant to Rule 1.420(d).
II. The trial court erred in staying the Current Lawsuit when no order to pay costs had been entered in the Prior Lawsuit.
Rule 1.420(d) states that "the court shall make such order for the payment of costs of the claim previously dismissed as it may deem proper and shall stay the proceedings in the action until the party seeking affirmative relief has complied with the order." Thus, by its plain language, the rule requires the trial court to order the plaintiff to pay the costs of the first action, and then requires the trial court to stay the second action until the plaintiff has complied with that order. We agree with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's statement in Milce v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.:
We read the rule as requiring the entry of an order or judgment for payment of a specific amount of costs before a defendant can be entitled to a stay. Under rule 1.420(d), it is the noncompliance with "the order" that triggers a defendant's entitlement to a stay of the second action. Here there was no order liquidating costs. Without such an order, a plaintiff cannot "comply" within the meaning of the rule by making payment.183 So.3d 1256, 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
In this case, the trial court has not entered an order or judgment for payment of a specific amount of costs in the Prior Lawsuit. The plain language of Rule 1.420(d) mandates that such an order must be entered, and not complied with, before a stay may be granted. Therefore, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by granting a motion to stay the Current Lawsuit when no order for the payment of costs had been entered in the Prior Lawsuit.
III. The trial court's discretion cannot otherwise justify the granting of the stay.
The trial court's order granting Crenshaw's motion to stay litigation states in part:
In its discretion, and based on the record and applicable law, including, without limitation Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(d), this action is stayed until the Taxable Costs Due [in the Prior Lawsuit] are paid by Plaintiff.
The trial court's use of the words "including, without limitation Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(d)" indicates that there may have been some basis for the trial court's granting of the motion to stay other than Rule 1.420(d). Crenshaw argues in her Response that we should sustain the trial court's order due to the broad discretion owed to a trial court in ruling on a motion to stay. Crenshaw also argues that Baute engaged in dilatory behavior in the Prior Lawsuit, which Crenshaw believes partially motivated the trial court's granting of the motion to stay. However, the trial court's order granting the motion to stay does not identify any other legal basis for the trial court's ruling to which we might give deference. We cannot defer to a trial court's exercise of discretion in granting a motion to stay if the reason for the exercise of that discretion is not identified by the trial court. The lack of an explanation for the trial court's exercise of discretion prevents meaningful appellate review. For this reason, we cannot uphold the trial court's order on the ground that the basis for the trial court's ruling was an exercise of discretion separate and apart from the requirements of Rule 1.420(d).
Additionally, the fact that the trial court's order stayed the Current Lawsuit only until the trial court entered an order determining the amount of costs to be awarded in the Prior Lawsuit and Baute paid that amount indicates that the sole basis for the trial court's order was in fact Rule 1.420(d). Moreover, Crenshaw's motion to stay litigation did not argue any basis for a stay other than Rule 1.420(d).
Conclusion
The only basis identified by the trial court for its order granting the motion to stay was Rule 1.420(d). As explained above, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by granting a stay under Rule 1.420(d). For this reason, we grant the petition, quash the trial court's order granting the motion to stay litigation, and order the trial court to allow the Current Lawsuit to proceed.
PETITION GRANTED.
NARDELLA, J., concurs.
WHITE, J., dissents, without opinion