Opinion
J-A27043-18 No. 3191 EDA 2016
04-16-2019
HEATHER BAUMGARDNER Appellant v. SOFITEL AND ACCOR NORTH AMERICA, INC. AND ACCOR BUSINESS AND LEISURE NORTH AMERICA, INC. AND NOVOTEL HOTELS USA, INC. AND ACCOR NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION AND ACCOR BUSINESS AND LEISURE MANAGEMENT, LLC AND ACCOR S.A. AND BRE EVERBRIGHT M6 LLC AND CHRISTOPHER WERELY
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 29, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): December Term, 2013 No. 3809 BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J. MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:
Heather Baumgardner appeals from the judgment entered on August 29, 2016, awarding her $25,000 in punitive damages after a jury trial. Baumgardner maintains that the trial court erred by dismissing her post-trial motion wherein she sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") or a new trial. Specifically, she argues that the jury returned an impermissible verdict contrary to the trial court's directed verdict and contends that the trial court improperly declined to admit evidence of certain prior "bad acts" by an employee of Appellees, Accor Business and Leisure Management, LLC, the owner and operator of the hotel, and Accor S.A., the parent company (hereinafter "Sofitel Defendants"). We affirm on the basis on the trial court's opinion.
The trial court set forth the facts established at trial as follows:
[O]n November 11, 2012, [Baumgardner], was alone and asleep in her rented Sofitel Hotel room following her birthday party which took place earlier that evening in the City of Philadelphia. [Baumgardner] had been drinking and fell asleep in her room after she and her fiancé had an argument. He left the hotel and went back to his home. After her fiancé had left, but before she had fallen asleep, she was in communication with her male friend, Christopher Werley, who then came to the hotel to visit her. Whether Werley was invited by [Baumgardner] as he claimed or he showed up at the hotel on his own as claimed by [Baumgardner] was a matter of dispute for the jury to decide.Tr. Ct. Op., 4/5/18, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
Upon his arrival at the [Sofitel Defendant's] hotel, Werley could not get in contact with [Baumgardner] by calling her cellphone, as a result, he informed the hotel staff of the situation. Sofitel employees, Michael Davis and Elgin Scott, knocked on the door to [Baumgardner's] room, but she did not answer. Thereafter, they opened the room's door using an all-access electronic keycard but the safety chain was in place, thereby preventing their entry. They called out for [Baumgardner] through the opened but chained door, but did not receive an answer. They could, however, see [Baumgardner's] feet on the bed. At that point, out of concern for [Baumgardner's] well-being, bolt cutters were used to cut the security chain and they gained access to the room.
The Sofitel employees then left the room, but permitted Werley to remain therein. When [Baumgardner] later awoke, she saw Werley in the room, but not realizing it was him at first, became startled and scared, believing that a stranger was in her room. Based upon these facts, [Baumgardner] claimed she suffered personal injuries as a result of the negligence and outrageous conduct of the [Sofitel Defendants] and Mr. Werley.
Prior to trial, the Sofitel Defendants filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence of the prior conduct of employee Davis. The trial court granted the motion without prejudice and specifically provided Baumgardner with the right to introduce this evidence if deemed relevant at trial. At trial, the trial court granted Baumgardner's motion for a directed verdict, finding that the Sofitel Defendants were negligent as a matter of law. Therefore, the issues left for the jury to decide were: 1) whether the Sofitel Defendant's negligence had caused any compensable injury to Baumgardner and 2) whether punitive damages were warranted.
The verdict slip, which had been agreed to by both Baumgardner and the Sofitel Defendants, mistakenly provided an opportunity for the jury to indicate if either Accor Business and Leisure Management, LLC or Accor S.A. were negligent, despite the trial court's directed verdict. While the jury indicated that it believed Accor S.A. was negligent, the jury found Accor Business and Leisure Management, LLC was not negligent. However, the jury also found that any such negligence did not cause Baumgardner any compensable injury and therefore did not make any monetary award therefrom. Moreover, the jury found that Accor S.A. had acted with reckless indifference toward Baumgardner's safety and thus awarded her $25,000.00 in punitive damages. Baumgardner did not object to either the verdict slip or the verdict itself at trial.
Baumgardner filed a timely post-trial motion on May 19, 2016, challenging, inter alia, the verdict. After the trial court inadvertently issued an order denying the motion on May 20, 2016, the court issued an order vacating the previous order and directing the parties to each file a memorandum of law within a 30-day period. A delay ensued and the trial court noted that the court reporter did not make the trial transcript available until July 19, 2016. Therefore, in light of its prior order, the court considered August 19, 2016 to be Baumgardner's due date for her memorandum of law. When Baumgardner's counsel did not file a brief by August 22, 2016, the court entered an order denying Baumgardner's post-trial motion. After judgment was entered, Baumgardner filed a motion for reconsideration that the trial court denied. The instant timely appeal followed.
Baumgardner's counsel contends that she did not receive the trial transcript until August 9, 2016, and thus considered her deadline to be September 8, 2016. Counsel also indicates that she had a death in the family over this time period.
Baumgardner raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas erred or abused its discretion when it failed to grant a JNOV and order a new trial after the Court granted a directed verdict as to negligence, but returned a verdict inconsistent therewith, thereby not reaching the question of proximate cause, as it should have?
2. Whether the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas erred or abused its discretion when it precluded evidence of [Sofitel Defendants'] past conduct, including serious and outrageous safety violations as discovered in the employment file of Michael Davis, the security supervisor who gained access into [Baumgardner's] hotel room for intruder Christopher Werley?
3. Whether the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas erred or abused its discretion when it prematurely denied [Baumgardner's] post-trial motion on August 22, 2016, based
upon the erroneous proposition that the trial transcripts were made available to [Baumgardner's] counsel on July 19, 2016 when [Baumgardner] did not receive the transcripts until August 9, 2016.Baumgardner's Br. at 4-5.
4. Whether the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas erred or abused its discretion when it prematurely denied [Baumgardner's] Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's August 22, 2016 Order, based upon the extraordinary circumstances cited therein, including the death of trial counsel's father during the thirty (30) day briefing schedule and the detailed timeline of events and correspondence relating to the transcription of the trial testimony?
We begin by noting that we will reverse an order denying a motion for JNOV only if the "trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case." Sears , Roebuck & Co. v. 69th Street Retail Mall , L.P., 126 A.3d 959, 967 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Wapner , 903 A.2d 565, 569 (Pa.Super. 2006)). "Abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court renders a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious; that fails to apply the law; or that is motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias or [ill will]." Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ., 903 A.3d at 569) (brackets in original). Moreover, it is axiomatic that "trial courts have broad discretion to grant or deny a new trial." Harman v. Borah , 756 A.2d 1116, 1121 (Pa. 2000).
Also germane to this case is the well-settled legal precept that failure to object to a flawed jury verdict prior to a jury's dismissal precludes a challenge to the verdict in post-trial motions. See Stapas v. Giant Eagle , Inc., 198 A.3d 1033, 1041 (Pa. 2018) (holding that where both parties to litigation approved verdict sheet and did not object to verdict before jury dismissed, post-trial objections to verdict were waived); Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(1) ("post-trial relief may not be granted unless the grounds therefore, (1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial proceedings or by motion, objection . . . or other appropriate method at trial."
Baumgardner also challenges the trial court's granting of Sofitel's motion in limine, albeit without prejudice. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. Brady v. Urbas , 111 A.3d 1155, 1161 (Pa. 2015). As aptly noted by the trial court, under Pennsylvania's Rules of Evidence, prior "bad acts" are not admissible to prove a person's character but may be admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Pa.R.E. 404(b).
In this case, the trial court concluded: (1) Baumgardner waived her challenge to the jury's verdict by failing to object at the time of trial prior to the jury's dismissal; (2) The trial court properly granted the Sofitel Defendant's motion in limine where evidence of employee's prior conduct was not relevant because the acts at issue were not substantially similar to the past acts; and (3) The trial court did not err by dismissing Baumgardner's post-trial motion as untimely and, in any event, the court determined the motion did not warrant relief on the merits.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Angelo J. Foglietta, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See Tr. Ct. Op., at 8-11, 13-14.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/16/19
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