Opinion
Case No. 2D18-1594
02-05-2020
Jamie Lee BAUMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew J. Salvia, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew J. Salvia, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
NORTHCUTT, Judge. Jamie Lee Bauman appeals her convictions for possessing drugs and drug paraphernalia, contending that the circuit court should have granted her dispositive motion to suppress evidence. We agree with Bauman that law enforcement lacked a lawful justification for stopping the car in which she was riding. We therefore reverse her convictions and remand for her to be discharged.
In the predawn hours of February 15, 2017, an unidentified person telephoned law enforcement to report that a woman in a "dark SUV" in a McDonald's parking lot had yelled for someone to "call the police." Deputy John Jones was dispatched to the scene to investigate. He arrived at the McDonald's about three to five minutes later.
In deposition testimony reviewed by the court at the suppression hearing, Deputy Jones testified that there were a number of vehicles in the parking lot, but the only one that might have matched the description of a "dark SUV" was a blue Chrysler PT Cruiser that was in the process of leaving. The deputy activated his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle. He acknowledged that he did so solely on the basis of the anonymous telephone tip; he observed no traffic infractions or illegal activity, nor did he see or hear anything to suggest that anyone inside the car might need assistance. Bauman was seated in the front passenger seat. When speaking with her through the passenger window, Deputy Jones saw a needle and spoon in plain view in a purse next to Bauman's leg. During a subsequent search of the car, the deputy also found a small container of methamphetamine, which Bauman eventually admitted was hers.
Charged with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, Bauman moved to suppress the physical evidence as well as her statements to police. She argued that the anonymous tip was insufficient by itself to support a stop of the vehicle. The circuit court denied her motion, reasoning that the tip was sufficient to justify the stop and that Deputy Jones' conduct during the stop was reasonable. Bauman then pleaded no contest while reserving her right to appeal the dispositive motion to suppress. She was sentenced to two years of drug offender probation.
Because the facts in this case are undisputed, the circuit court's denial of Bauman's motion to suppress is a purely legal issue that we review de novo. See Simpson v. State, 970 So. 2d 463, 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). As a preliminary matter, the parties agree that the telephone tip in this case was anonymous, and the record supports that conclusion, as no information was provided regarding the source of the tip. See generally State v. Evans, 692 So. 2d 216, 218–19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (discussing the distinction between an anonymous tipster and an identifiable citizen informant). As such, standing alone the tip was legally insufficient to justify stopping the vehicle. Rather, Deputy Jones first was required to corroborate the tip and confirm by his own observations that the circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative stop. See Baptiste v. State, 995 So. 2d 285, 292–93 (Fla. 2008) (stating that "for an anonymous tip to provide a reasonable basis for a Terry stop, the tip must contain specific details which are then corroborated by independent police investigation," and holding that a stop predicated on an anonymous tip was illegal when "there was no evidence that the officers at the scene confirmed or observed any illegal activity, unusual conduct, or suspicious behavior" before they initiated the stop); Rivera v. State, 771 So. 2d 1246, 1247–48 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that an anonymous tip could not on its own provide the requisite reasonable suspicion for an investigatory automobile stop) approved sub nom. Baptiste, 995 So. 2d 285.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Relying on two case authorities, the State maintains that the independent-corroboration requirement applicable to anonymous-tip cases should not apply here because the stop was justified by the need to conduct a welfare check. But that argument is unpersuasive. In the State's first case, Vitale v. State, 946 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), an anonymous caller reported that a person was slumped over the wheel of his car with the engine running while parked at a convenience store. When officers arrived, they observed the driver passed out over the wheel, excessively slumped forward. Id. They then opened the car door to render aid, at which point they saw a bag of cocaine in plain view. Id. Unlike this case, the officers in Vitale did not rely solely on an anonymous tip; they were specifically called to a medical emergency, and they independently corroborated by their own observations that the person needed assistance.
The State's other case, Greider v. State, 977 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), did not involve a tip at all. There, an officer on a late-night patrol observed a parked car with towels obscuring the windows, causing him to be concerned for the welfare of the occupants. Id. at 791. This court held that in those circumstances the officer was justified in approaching the vehicle and talking to the occupants to check on their welfare. Id. at 792. Like Vitale, and unlike our case today, the officer initiated the welfare check based on his own observations and not solely pursuant to an anonymous report.
In contrast is Fuentes v. State, 24 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), which we find to be instructive. In Fuentes, law enforcement received "an anonymous complaint that a white female and white male were punching each other" inside a U-Haul truck. Id. at 1233. A nearby officer soon saw a U-Haul truck with a white female driver and white male passenger. Id. The officer "did not notice any physical altercation going on between the passengers, nor did she observe any erratic driving, speeding, or swerving." Id. The officer stopped the vehicle, and while she was talking to the occupants she spied a bag of marijuana in plain view. Id. at 1233–34. The Fourth District held that the stop was illegal and that the evidence should have been suppressed because the officer "did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when she conducted the investigatory stop." Id. at 1236.
The facts known to Officer Keirnan at the time of the stop were not indicative of criminal activity. Specifically, Officer Keirnan observed a female driver and male passenger in a U-[H]aul truck—as described by the anonymous tipster—but did not corroborate this identification with any criminal behavior, i.e., she did not see the couple physically attacking each other or otherwise engaging in illegal or suspicious activity.
Id. (emphasis added).
In the present case, the deputy had even less justification for a stop than did the officer in Fuentes. Deputy Jones knew only that someone had allegedly yelled for someone to call the police, an ambiguous request that could have related to a wide range of circumstances, criminal or noncriminal, whereas Fuentes involved the much more detailed allegation that a couple was engaged in a physical altercation. Despite that specific description of apparent domestic violence, the officer in Fuentes nevertheless was obliged to corroborate the tip and independently develop reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, which she did not do.
Likewise, here the deputy did not independently corroborate the need for a stop. He acted solely pursuant to an anonymous tip containing a vague request for police assistance and a nebulous description of a vehicle. He stopped a vehicle—one that only faintly matched the scant description in the anonymous call—without observing anything that would have supported a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or of a need to assist someone experiencing a medical emergency. In sum, the stop of the vehicle in which Bauman was riding was legally impermissible. Accordingly, we reverse Bauman's convictions and remand for her to be discharged.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
LUCAS and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.