Bauman v. Advance Aluminum Castings Corp.

7 Citing cases

  1. Flarsheim v. 2532 Broadway Corp.

    432 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. 1968)   Cited 48 times
    Proclaiming that under Missouri law, the judgment of the trial court will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous

    The defendant argues that the mandate to distribute the remaining assets to the shareholders would be interfered with if the fair value of plaintiff's shares is determined to be as much or more than his distributive share would have been. This may happen; however, the dissenter takes the risk of getting less than his distributive share, as was the case in Bauman v. Advance Aluminum Castings Corp., 27 Ill.App.2d 178, 169 N.E.2d 382. Faced with this prospect, the plaintiff in Bauman sought to dismiss. The court held he could not do so for procedural reasons and further stated that the statute gives an election to the dissenting shareholder, but once having made such election by filing suit he must carry it through to a legal conclusion and he cannot dismiss his suit and "resume his status as a stockholder."

  2. Stanton v. Republic Bank

    559 N.E.2d 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 1 times

    The more reasonable interpretation is that the drafters intended to provide the dissenter with an opportunity to opt out of a merger at a fair price, with the consequence being that the stockholder surrenders the rights normally associated with stock ownership. This conclusion is supported by the court's holding in Bauman v. Advance Aluminum Castings Corp. (1960), 27 Ill. App.2d 178, 169 N.E.2d 382, in addressing the issue of whether a dissenter could dismiss his suit to determine the fair value of his shares under a virtually identical dissenter's rights provision in the former Illinois Business Corporation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 32, par. 157.73). The court found that "once having made such an election by commencing suit, [the dissenter] is bound to carry his suit through to a legal conclusion and he cannot dismiss his suit and resume his status as a stockholder."

  3. In re Ratner

    146 B.R. 211 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992)   Cited 5 times

    336 (1987), not former Section 73 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act. In dicta, however, the Stanton court discussed both Section 73 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, and the statement from Bauman v. Advance Aluminum Castings Corp., 27 Ill. App.2d 178, 169 N.E.2d 382 (1st Dist. 1960), that once having made the election, a dissenting shareholder cannot dismiss his appraisal lawsuit and "resume" his status as a stockholder. Stanton further cited with approval Flarsheim v. Twenty Five Thirty Two Broadway Corp., 432 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. 1968), for the proposition that the clear intent of the Missouri statute, patterned after the Illinois Business Corporation Act, was to change the status of a dissenting shareholder to that of a creditor, at least superior to the distributive rights of the remaining shareholders.

  4. Bankeast Corp. v. Galdi

    480 A.2d 136 (N.H. 1984)   Cited 3 times
    In Beaumier, a police officer was contacted while off duty by Beaumier, who had been shot in a gunfight during a robbery attempt.

    In construing similar statutes the courts of several other jurisdictions have held that withdrawal from the appraisal process is not permitted. In Bauman v. Advance Aluminum Castings Corp., 27 Ill. App.2d 178, 184, 169 N.E.2d 382, 385 (1960), the court stated that "he is bound to carry his suit through to a legal conclusion and he can not dismiss his suit and resume his status as a stockholder." See Root v. York Corporation, 28 Del. Ch. 203, 211, 39 A.2d 780, 783 (1944); Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg. Co., 340 Mass. 136, 138, 163 N.E.2d 9, 11 (1959); Johnson v. Baldwin, 221 S.C. 141, 156, 69 S.E.2d 585, 592 (1952).

  5. Newlin v. Foresman

    432 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 12 times

    Foresman also argues, however, that the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of their claims against Hopper at the close of all the evidence proves the suits were not genuine in the first place. The defendant adds that these actions worked to his prejudice, because the jury must have viewed these motions as exoneration of Hopper. Counsel for Hopper reply that only after the evidence is presented at trial can the plaintiffs determine that no cause of action exists. • 3 A motion for voluntary dismissal of a plaintiff's suit after trial has begun is addressed to the discretion of the court and is reversible only for abuse of that discretion. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 52; Bauman v. Advance Aluminum Casting Corp. (1960), 27 Ill. App.2d 178, 184, 169 N.E.2d 382.) In Turnbull v. Porter (1965), 55 Ill. App.2d 374, 206 N.E.2d 97, this court ruled that, under proper circumstances, a plaintiff has a right to voluntarily dismiss his suit against a codefendant regardless of his motives for doing so. Unless the underlying motives manifest themselves in prejudicial acts, there is no basis for reversal. ( 55 Ill. App.2d 374, 374h.

  6. Miller v. Bloomberg

    60 Ill. App. 3d 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that "the two-year period provided in Section 72 for bringing the action is not applicable where relief is sought from a void decree, although the equitable defense of laches may be interposed"

    We conclude that the court possessed the authority to vacate the voluntary dismissal but that it erred in dismissing the section 72 petition without an evidentiary hearing. • 1, 2 Section 52 provides for a voluntary dismissal of a party-plaintiff after a hearing or trial has commenced; and the disposition of the motion when proper grounds are stated is a matter within the trial court's discretion. (See, e.g., Bauman v. Advance Aluminum Castings Corp., 27 Ill. App.2d 178, 184 (1960).) The fact that the motion was not made until the case was on remand does not change the rule.

  7. Juen v. Juen

    12 Ill. App. 3d 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)   Cited 14 times
    Noting that where there was no indication that the appellant paid or tendered the payment of costs, a motion to voluntarily dismiss was properly denied "[o]n this basis alone"

    On appeal, the standard to be applied is simply whether the trial court abused its discretion. ( Bauman v. Advance Aluminum Castings Corp., (1960), 27 Ill. App.2d 178, 169 N.E.2d 382; Voegele v. Kidd, (1958), 18 Ill. App.2d 400, 152 N.E.2d 887.) In the instant case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff-appellant's motion to dismiss.