Opinion
September 29, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Miller, J.).
Order reversed, on the law, with costs, motion denied, and the jury's verdict in the principal amount of $7,500 is reinstated.
Under the law in effect at the time of the trial, in order to warrant interference with the jury's assessment of damages, the excessiveness or inadequacy of the award must have been such as to shock the conscience of the court (see, e.g., Petosa v City of New York, 63 A.D.2d 1016, 1016-1017; Torro v Altman, 97 A.D.2d 819). The record establishes that the plaintiff's injuries, which were sustained in an automobile accident, included a simple fractured ankle and lacerations of the chin and right elbow. There were no unusual medical complications during the plaintiff's convalescence, and we note that the plaintiff's allegations of permanent injury were limited to subjective contentions of periodic pain. The plaintiff's medical expert, who was not a treating physician and who never examined the plaintiff, testified that the plaintiff might be prone to develop arthritis in the ankle joint due to the injury. However, this testimony did not forecast the probability of arthritis, and the jury could have regarded such an opinion as purely speculative in nature. In light of the evidence presented, we cannot say that the jury's $7,500 award was inadequate. Mollen, P.J., Lazer, Mangano and Lawrence, JJ., concur.