Opinion
2:19-cv-01727-AC
03-30-2021
ZELAJA ALCONNA BATTLES, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; BRAD CAIN, Superintendent of Snake River Correctional Institution; JULINA CLAUS, Mail Room Supervisor; K. WATTS, Education Coordinator for TVCC; M. PACHERO, Education Coordinator for TVCC; J. WOODLAND, Captain; and J. TAYLOR, Grievance Coordinator, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
JOHN V. ACOSTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Zelaja Alconna Battles (“Battles”) is an adult currently in custody at the Warner Creek Correctional Facility. He brings this civil action pro se against Brad Cain (“Cain”), Julina Claus (“Claus”), J. Woodland (“Woodland”), J. Taylor (“Taylor”), and Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”) (collectively, “State Defendants”); and K. Watts (“Watts”) and M. Pachero (“Pachero”) (collectively, “Education Defendants”). Battles asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for events that took place while he was in custody at Snake River Correctional Institution (“SRCI”). Currently before the court are Education Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Education Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 84) and State Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (State Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 86). Education Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against them. State Defendants seek dismissal of Battles's § 1997a claims against all State Defendants and dismissal of Battles's § 1983 claims against ODOC. For the following reasons, both motions should be GRANTED and the claims DISMISSED with prejudice.
Background
Battles previously was incarcerated at SRCI. At the time, defendants Watts and Pachero worked as education coordinators for the Treasure Valley Community College (“TVCC”) educational program at SRCI. Brad Cain worked as the superintendent of SRCI, Julina Claus was the mail room supervisor at SRCI, J. Woodland was a captain at SRCI, and J. Taylor was a grievance coordinator at SRCI. On March 17, 2018, Battles sent an internal request to the SRCI education department requesting that he be approved to participate in a Computer Programming correspondence course through the Stratford Career Institute. Defendant Watts sent Battles an Enrollment Request form, which Battles completed and submitted. In April 2018, Battles completed additional paperwork to apply for the correspondence course. On May 23, 2018, defendant Pachero informed Battles he was approved for the correspondence course and could order his course materials. Battles completed enrollment in the course and submitted a $20.00 down payment toward the total tuition payment of $499.00.
On August 8, 2018, Battles received his first course book. On September 19, 2018, Battles was informed by defendant Claus that some of the materials for his correspondence course had not been approved by ODOC Administration and that the books containing the materials were being withheld from Battles as prohibited mail. Consequently, Battles was unable to complete the correspondence course. Battles subsequently sent a letter to Stratford Career Institute and learned that if he cancelled the course, he would be responsible for $199.60 of the $499.00 cost of tuition. Battles notified defendants Cain, Taylor, and Woodland of his inability to receive course materials.
In December 2018, Battles filed a grievance with ODOC requesting reimbursement for his tuition and an injunction preventing ODOC from denying access to materials needed for approved correspondence courses. Battles's grievance was denied, and on appeal, the denial of the grievance was upheld. On March 21, 2019, Battles mailed a tort claim notice to the Oregon Department of Administrative Services Risk Management. Battles received notification of denial of his claim on June 6, 2019. On June 7, 2019, Battles sent a letter requesting reconsideration and a notice of appeal. His claim was denied again on June 24, 2019.
On October 28, 2019, Battles filed a complaint naming all present defendants and claiming negligence and constitutional violations. (Compl., ECF No. 2.) On January 7, 2020, Battles filed an amended complaint. (First Am. Compl., ECF No. 17.) On September 4, 2020, this court dismissed Battles's First Amended Complaint without prejudice. (Order Dismiss, ECF No. 71, adopting F&R, ECF No. 52.) Battles filed his Second Amended Complaint on October 26, 2020. (Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 80.) In the Second Amended Complaint, Battles alleges violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1997a and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his constitutional rights of free speech, due process, and equal protection. In his first claim for relief, Battles alleges all defendants violated § 1997a. In his second claim, Battles alleges under § 1983 that ODOC, Claus, and Woodland violated his rights to equal protection by denying him access to course materials. In his third claim, Battles alleges under § 1983 that all State Defendants violated his First Amendment free speech rights by preventing his receipt of materials. In his fourth claim, Battles alleges under § 1983 that all defendants violated his due process rights by depriving him of property and prohibiting continued enrollment in the correspondence course. In his fifth claim, Battles alleges under § 1983 that ODOC, “through it's [sic] agents, employees, contractors, and volunteers” Cain, Claus, Woodland, and Taylor, deprived him equal protection by enforcing various laws and practices. (Second Am. Compl. at 29.)
In his Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff identifies State of Oregon, Treasure Valley Community College as a defendant. (Second Am. Compl. at 1, 3.) There is nothing in the record suggesting that the State of Oregon, TVCC was ever served.
On November 4, 2020, Education Defendants moved to dismiss all claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Education Defs.' Mot. Dismiss.) On November 6, 2020, State Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) seeking dismissal of Battles's § 1997a claim against all State Defendants and Battles's § 1983 claims against ODOC. (State Defs.' Mot. Dismiss.) On March 23, 2021, Battles filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss his § 1997a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a). (Pl.'s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 94. ) The court granted Battles's motion on March 24, 2021. Therefore, the court addresses only State and Education Defendants' motions to dismiss Battles's § 1983 claims.
Legal Standard
A party may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A court may dismiss “‘on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.'” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also CallerID4u, Inc. v. MCI Commc'ns Servs. Inc., 880 F.3d 1048, 1061 (9th Cir. 2018). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017).
The court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 678; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Kwan v. SanMedica Int'l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2017). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Kwan, 854 F.3d at 1096. “[T]o be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint . . . may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
“In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). “A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment.” Aleman v. Amsberry, No. 2:19-cv-00922-YY, 2020 WL 2374970, at *2 (D. Or. Feb. 11, 2020), adopted 2020 WL 2341128 (May 8, 2020); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that leave to amend should be granted unless plaintiff cannot correct the defect), overruled in part on other grounds in Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014).
Discussion
I. Battles's § 1983 Claim against Education Defendants Fails
In his fourth claim for relief, Battles alleges that Education Defendants violated his due process rights by enforcing regulation and policy that deprived him of property without adequate procedural protections. Battles alleges that Education Defendants caused him lost tuition and deprived him of continued enrollment in the correspondence course. (Second Am. Compl. at 27-29.)
“[Section 1983] ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)), overruled on other grounds in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a cognizable claim under § 1983, an inmate must show: (1) defendant acted under the color of state law, and (2) defendant deprived plaintiff of a right under federal law or under the constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To successfully state a due process claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of something in which he had a recognized property or liberty interest. Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000). Education Defendants argue that Battles's due process claim against them fails because they were not personally responsible for the deprivation and they are immune from liability for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment.
A. Battles fails to allege that Education Defendants were personally involved in a due process violation.
To the extent Battles asserts a due process violation premised on the deprivation of his personal property rights in his education materials, his claim fails because he has not adequately alleged that Education Defendants were personally involved. Upon Battles's second leave to amend, the court noted that to adequately state a claim under § 1983, the complaint “‘must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.'” (F&R at 9-10 (emphasis added) (quoting Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988)) (citations omitted).) Upon amendment, Battles's allegations regarding Education Defendants' involvement in deprivation of his due process rights remain extremely vague. For both Watts and Pachero, Battles merely alleges that each defendant:
practiced and enforced regulation and policy that deprived the plaintiff Battles of property, without due process of law by prohibition against the continued enrollment in a graduate program in Computer programming. By it's [sic] practice and policy of Correspondence Course Procedure document, caused plaintiff to suffer loss of tuition and continued enrollment in a graduate program.(Second Am. Compl. at 28-29).
This language is vague and fails to allege that Education Defendants personally took any actions that violated Battles's due process rights. Battles alleges that it was State Defendants, and not Education Defendants, who enforced the “Prohibited Mail” rule, O.A.R. 291-131-0035, that prevented him from receiving required course materials. (Second Am. Compl. at 27-29.) As was true of Battles's first amended complaint, in his Second Amended Complaint “plaintiff does not allege how defendants Watts and Pachero personally participated in or undertook any action in connection with the alleged due process violation.” (F&R at 10-11.) Accordingly, his due process claim against Education Defendants fails.
B. Prisoner enrollment in an education course is not a property interest protected by the Constitution.
Battles alleges that Education Defendants deprived him of “continued enrollment in a graduate program.” (Second Am. Compl. at 28-29.) To the extent that Battles contends Education Defendants violated his due process rights by depriving him of continued enrollment in the correspondence course, Battles's claim fails as a matter of law. Inmates have no constitutional right to enrollment in vocational programs. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985); see also San Diego Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). While Battles may have a personal property interest in the materials for he already had paid, he does not have a protected interest in continuing the course. Because due process claims require allegations of deprivation of a protected interest, Wright, 219 F.3d at 913, Battles has failed to state a cognizable due process claim against Education Defendants regarding course enrollment.
C. The Eleventh Amendment bars Battles's claim for monetary damages against Education Defendants.
To the extent that Battles contends that Education Defendants are liable for his lost tuition, his claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Under the Eleventh Amendment, “‘dependent instrumentalities of the state'” have immunity against claims brought in federal court by citizens. Andrews v. Treasure Valley Cmty. Coll., No. 2:19-cv-01314-SU, 2020 WL 1678050, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 18, 2020) (quoting Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1994)) adopted 2020 WL 1674119 (Apr. 6, 2020). Treasure Valley Community College is such an instrumentality of the state. Andrews, 2020 WL 1678050, at *3 (holding that “consistent with Ninth Circuit and district court precedent, the TVCC Defendants are ‘arms of the State of Oregon,' and in the absence of waiver, are immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment”).
The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for retroactive monetary relief against state officials. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (explaining that “a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment”). Thus, Education Defendants cannot be held liable for Battles's alleged monetary damages.
The Eleventh Amendment “does not preclude suits . . . for injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacity [or] . . . actions for declaratory relief brought against state officials.” Native Vill. of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1511, 13-14 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds in Bd. Trs. of Glazing Health & Welfare Tr. v. Chambers, 941 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2019).
II. Battles Cannot Bring a § 1983 Claim against ODOC
Battles brings his § 1983 claims against ODOC for violation of his constitutional rights to free speech, due process, and equal protection. As State Defendants correctly explain in their motion to dismiss, ODOC is not an appropriate defendant for a § 1983 claim. (State Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 3.)
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may bring a claim against
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). It is well-established that state agencies, such as ODOC, are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983”); Wise v. Washington State Dep't of Corrs., 244 Fed.Appx. 106, 108 (affirming dismissal of prisoner's § 1983 claim because the state corrections department was not a “person” under § 1983). As a matter of law, Battles cannot bring a § 1983 claim against ODOC. Therefore, the court recommends that State Defendants' partial motion to dismiss Battles's § 1983 claims against ODOC be granted.
III. Leave to Amend
The court may dismiss a claim with prejudice “only when it is clear that no amendment could cure [the] defect in the complaint.” City of Oakland v. Hotels.com LP, 572 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, Battles cannot cure any of the dismissed claims with amendment. Battles's § 1983 claim against Education Defendants cannot be cured by amendment because Education Defendants did not personally enforce the regulation that withheld Battles's course materials. Indeed, Battles specifically alleges State Defendants were responsible for the claimed deprivation. Battles previously has been provided an opportunity to plead facts to establish Education Defendants' personal involvement in withholding the education materials and, having failed to allege additional facts, the court concludes such facts cannot be pleaded. Moreover, because Education Defendants are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, Battles cannot recover his lost tuition from them. Finally, departments of a state are improper defendants for a § 1983 claim as a matter of law. Thus, Battles cannot amend his complaint to bring ODOC within the scope of a § 1983 claim.
Accordingly, providing Battles with leave to amend would be futile. The court therefore recommends that the § 1983 claims against Education Defendants and ODOC be dismissed with prejudice.
Conclusion
Based on the above, Education Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 84) and State Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 86) should be GRANTED and the claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
Scheduling Order
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, then a response is due within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement.