Opinion
No. C 01-04592 TEH.
August 17, 2004
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on December 2-4, 2003, on Plaintiff's claims that Defendants subjected him to the use of excessive force during the execution of a search warrant on the evening of December 15, 2000. He seeks recovery of compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law. In order to accommodate the schedule of Plaintiff's counsel, the parties did not file their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law until March 1, 2004. On March 15, 2004, the parties filed their responsive objections. Having carefully considered all of the evidence and testimony adduced at trial, the parties' oral and written submissions, and the entire record herein, the Court find as follows.
BACKGROUND
On the evening of December 15, 2000, the Plaintiff, Melvin Battle ("Battle"), age 46, was present in the apartment of Donna Richardson, 419 Drake St. No. 3, Marin City, California. Battle lived with his mother in an apartment on a higher floor in the same building. Sergeant Yamanoha ("Yamanoha") of the Marin County Sheriff's office, executed a search warrant at Ms. Richardson's home the evening of December 15, 2000, to look for evidence of illegal narcotics. He was accompanied by officers Blair Auld ("Auld"), Dave Augustus ("Augustus"), Steve De La O ("De La O"), William Hernandez ("Hernandez"), Greg Garrett ("Garrett"), Matt Larson ("Larson"), and Rocky Martin ("Martin"), all of whom participated in the execution of the search warrant and were present in the apartment during the events at issue in this case. Battle was not named in the search warrant; nor was his name ever raised at the search warrant briefing prior to the execution of the search warrant.
Battle was arrested during the execution of the search warrant along with others present in the apartment. Battle claims that excessive force was used during and after his arrest, and that Defendants were retaliating against him because he had filed a lawsuit against some of the Defendants prior to December 15, 2000. Specifically, Battle asserts the following claims against Defendants Auld, Augustus, Hernandez, Garrett, and Yamanoha: (1) excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) retaliation in violation of § 1983, (3) negligence, (4) battery, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
This Court previously granted a summary judgment in favor of Defendants County of Marin and Marin County Sheriff Doyle on March 21, 2003.
Battle was criminally prosecuted in state court, along with others arrested on December 15, 2000, on various charges stemming from the execution of the search warrant. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that, pursuant to these proceedings, Battle was found guilty of (1) being present in a room where a controlled substance was being unlawfully used, and (2) resisting arrest.
The Court addresses each of Plaintiff's claims in turn.EXCESSIVE FORCE UNDER § 1983
In order to prevail under § 1983, Battle must demonstrate that Defendants violated his constitutional rights under color of state law. While Defendants do not dispute that they were acting under color of state law, they dispute that any excessive force was used against Battle during the evening of December 15, 2000. Given the fact that Battle was found guilty of resisting arrest in the underlying criminal case, this Court previously found that Battle's arrest was lawful and that the force used for purposes of effectuating the arrest was lawful. Accordingly, the only issue is whether Defendants used excessive force against Battle after he was arrested.
In deciding whether excessive force was used, courts should consider the totality of the circumstances at the time. The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged objectively from the information available at the time from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Thus, whether force is reasonably necessary or excessive is measured by the force a reasonable and prudent law enforcement officer would use under the circumstances. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d. 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003).
In this case, there is significant conflicting evidence between Battle's versions of events and Defendants' versions of events, although there is agreement on certain points. For example, Battle, along with Officers Augustus and Martin, all testified that Battle screamed for his mother at one point. See Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 26-27; Vol. III at 290, 319. Notably, there were also numerous inconsistencies between the testimony of the Officers at the scene. Having carefully weighed and assessed the credibility of the individual Officers and Battle, the Court concludes that there are elements of truth to both versions of events. At the same time, the Court finds that both Battle and the Officers were not credible with respect to certain aspects of the events. In short, the Court finds that Battle and each of the Officers were truthful in part and not truthful in part.
Having sifted through this mix of testimony, the Court concludes that the following occurred. In attempting to arrest Battle after entry into the apartment, Officers pushed Battle to the couch and then to the floor in the living room of the apartment. The primary resistance Battle offered to his arrest consisted of keeping his arms under his body while he lay on his stomach on the couch and then the floor. This required the Officers to forcibly pull Battle's arms out from under him and behind his back in order to handcuff him. Battle did not strike or kick the officers. At the time of Battle's arrest he was laying flat on his stomach on the floor with his arms handcuffed behind his back. He was not under significant cocaine intoxication.
While Battle resisted arrest, the amount and type of force required to place Battle under arrest does not adequately explain the injuries to his head and eye area as depicted in the photographs taken by Battle's sister on December 19, 2000. See Pl's. Ex. 2. Rather, the Court concludes that the head and eye injuries occurred when one or more of the Officers became upset that Battle was making the arrest difficult and decided to punish Battle for this conduct by banging his head multiple times against the floor after he had been arrested and handcuffed with his hands behind his back and was still laying prone on the floor. As Officer Augustus, at 15-year veteran of the Marin Sheriff's Office indicated, they were not used to encountering significant resistance when executing search warrants. "I've never had someone engage me like that during a search warrant. It's usually they would run [sic]." Trial Tr. Vol. III at 280.
While Battle recalls having his head hit against the floor "really hard" 25-30 times, Trial Tr. 26, 81, the Court finds that it was significantly fewer times than this, albeit a sufficient number of times to cause injuries to his face and eyes. At some point an Officer stated "Oh, look at him now. He ain't shit." Trial Tr. Vol. I at 28. While his head was being hit against the floor Battle feared what would happen to him and screamed out for his mother who lived in an apartment above.
The extent of the injuries to Battle's head and eye area were not immediately apparent, but worsened over time, resulting in Battle being returned to the emergency room several hours after being initially taken there by police immediately after his arrest. He also returned to the emergency room on December 20, 2000, the day after his release from jail, and complained of headaches, blurring of vision, and feeling dizzy upon sudden changes of position. His left eye was also completely red and significantly swollen and the right eye was slightly red and swollen. Dr. Bedard, who examined him on December 20, 2000, concluded that Battle had subjconjunctival hemorrhage, lateral left conjunctive, and a smaller medial right eye conjunctive. A CT scan was ordered but results were "unremarkable." His overall "impressions" were (1) cerebral concussion, (2) fracture (to hand), and subconjunctival hemorrhage. Battle was advised about post-concussion syndrome and released with instructions to be rechecked if his symptoms worsened. Defs.' Ex. C. Battle did not return for further treatment of his head or eye injuries.
Battle did not satisfactorily prove that the injury to his hand and abrasions to the knee occurred after his arrest.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Defendants used force beyond that which a reasonable and prudent law enforcement officer would have used under the circumstances when they banged Battle's head against the floor multiple times after he had been arrested and handcuffed and was no longer resisting arrest. Although Battle could not see, and thus could not identify, the specific Officer or Officers who banged his head upon the floor this is not necessary to establish liability in this case. See Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2002); Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court agrees with Battle that the evidence establishes that the three Officers primarily involved in the incident at issue are Officers Auld, Augustus, and Garrett, all of whom testified regarding their direct involvement in Battle's arrest.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Battle has prevailed on his claim for excessive force under § 1983 with respect to Defendants Auld, Augustus, and Garrett. RETALIATION UNDER § 1983
In order to prevail on this claim, Battle must prove at a minimum that he (1) engaged in constitutionally protected activity, and (2) that the activity was a substantial or motivational factor in the defendant's adverse conduct. See Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, Battle has failed to prove, beyond a preponderance of the evidence, that his filing of a lawsuit on December 13, 2000, against the County of Marin and Officer Hernandez (one of the officers present on December 15, 2000), was the substantial or motivational factor in the Defendant's use of excessive force as found above. Specifically, the Court is not convinced that Defendants were in fact aware of Battle's lawsuit filed just two days prior to the December 15, 2000 incident. Accordingly, the Court finds for the Defendants on this claim. The Court notes that, in closing argument, Battle argued that Defendants would have been aware of an administrative claim that was filed prior to the lawsuit; however, no evidence to support this argument was admitted into evidence.
NEGLIGENCE
In order to prevail on this claim, Battle must prove that (1) Defendants owed plaintiff a duty of care, (2) Defendants breached the duty of care, (3) the breach was a proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff, and (4) Plaintiff suffered damages. Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Assn., 114 Cal.App. 4th 208 (2003). Defendants agree that they had a legal duty to use reasonable care but argue that they did not breach this duty because no excessive forced was used. Given the Court's conclusion that Battle has prevailed on his claim of excessive force, the Court finds that Defendants Auld, Augustus, and Garrett are liable on this claim as well.
BATTERY
A battery is any intentional, unlawful and harmful contact by one person with the person of another. An officer commits a battery if she or he uses unreasonable or excessive force in connection with an arrest or detention. Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal.App. 4th 1269 (1998); see also Cal BAJI 7.54. Given the Court's conclusion that Battle has prevailed on his claim of excessive force, the Court finds that Defendants Auld, Augustus, and Garrett are also liable for battery.
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In order to prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must show that (1) Defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intent to cause, or the reckless disregard for the probability of causing, emotional distress, (2) suffering of severe or extreme emotional distress by the Plaintiff, and (3) Plaintiff's emotional distress is actually and proximately the result of Defendants' outrageous conduct. Cervantes v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal.3d 579, 593 (1979). While the Court finds that Battle suffered emotional distress as the result of the excessive used by Defendants on December 15, 2000, Battle failed to produce evidence to support his contention that his distress was sufficiently extreme or severe to prevail on this claim.
DAMAGES
Battle seeks to recover compensatory damages in the amount of (1) $2,985 for medical bills he owes, (2) $4,000 in wage loss, and (3) $100,000 for pain and suffering. A plaintiff who establishes liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is entitled to recover for all compensatory damages suffered, including actual expenditures and economic harm, and mental anguish and humiliation. Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1988). These same principles apply to Plaintiff's state law tort claims. Id.
With respect to the medical bills, Battle has submitted evidence that he received bills totaling $2,224.86 for medical care that he received after he was released from prison (excluding all bills that appear solely related to Battle's hand injury). Battle has not, however, provided any evidence that he has actually incurred these costs or that he has committed to incur these costs. Accordingly, the Court finds that he is not entitled to recover the $2,224.86.
With respect to wage loss, the Court agrees with Defendants that Battle did not satisfactorily document that he would have earned $4,000 in wages absent the injuries to his eyes and head. Moreover, the Court notes that given that Battle worked as a laborer for Manpower and sometimes as a mechanic "on the side," that his hand injury was the primary impediment to his inability to work during the period in question. Accordingly, the Court does not award Battle compensation for wage loss.
With respect to general pain and suffering, the Court finds that Battle suffered mental anguish and humiliation as a result of the use of the excessive force described above. Accordingly, it awards Battle $10,000.00 to compensate him for this injury.
Punitive damages may also be awarded if the defendant acted with an evil motive or demonstrated reckless indifference to the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1206 ((th Cir. 1991). Even where this standard is satisfied, "the factfinder must make `a discretionary moral judgment' that the `conduct merited a punitive award.'" Id. (citation omitted). The Court concludes that punitive damages are not warranted in this case.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds, for the reasons set forth above, that Plaintiff has prevailed with respect to his claims of (1) excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2) negligence, and (3) assault and battery. Specifically, the Court finds that excessive force was used against Plaintiff after his arrest that resulted in injury to his head and eyes. Judgment shall be entered against Defendants Auld, Augustus, and Garrett, and in Plaintiff's favor, on these claims in an amount of $10,000. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants Yamanoha and Hernandez on these claims.
The Court further finds, for the reasons set forth above, that Plaintiff has not prevailed on his claim of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Judgment shall be entered in favor of all remaining Defendants on this claim.
The Court notes that Plaintiff has prevailed in part in this action largely in spite of, rather than because of, his counsel, whose almost complete lack of preparation was apparent throughout the course of the trial.