Opinion
No. CV08 5004290-S
June 16, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
FACTS
The present action arises out of a head-on collision between the defendant, Mohamed Ali Aden (Aden), and the plaintiffs, John and Catherine Battista. In their complaint filed on October, 6, 2008, the plaintiffs allege that on or about October 10, 2006, John Battista was driving in the right eastbound lanr of I-691, a limited access highway in Meriden, with Catherine Battista in the passenger seat at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs claim that Aden had wrongfully driven down an exit ramp onto the highway and was traveling westbound in the eastbound portion of I-691. Heading in the wrong direction at a high rate of speed, Aden's vehicle struck the plaintiffs' vehicle head-on causing a violent crash.
Counts one and two of the complaint allege Aden negligently caused injuries to John and Catherine Battista respectively. Included in the paragraph as one or more of the ways the defendant negligently or carelessly caused the collision are violations of Connecticut General Statutes § 14-218(a), § 14-222, and § 14-237. Count three of the complaint restates the negligence allegations as to the statutory violations made in the first two counts but adds that Aden "operated said motor vehicle deliberately or with reckless disregard . . . which were a substantial factor in causing [both] the plaintiffs' injuries." The plaintiffs' prayer for relief for counts one and two is monetary damages. The prayer for relief for the third count seeks double and treble damages pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-295, in addition to compensatory damages. On January 23, 2009, Aden filed a motion to strike the third count of the plaintiffs' complaint and the corresponding prayer for relief pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30, et seq., on the ground that it fails to allege facts sufficient to support a claim for double and treble damages under C.G.S. § 14-295. The defendant claims that the plaintiffs have failed to provide specific facts as to how the defendant's conduct rose to the level of recklessness beyond the negligence alleged in counts one and two. The plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to strike on March 6, 2009, and the parties were heard on the motion at short calendar on June 15, 2009.
DISCUSSION
"A motion to strike contests the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Novametrix Medical Systems v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 214-15 (1992) (quoting Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 170 (1988)). "The sole inquiry in ruling on a motion to strike is whether plaintiff's allegations, if proved would state a cause of action." Chatterton v. Infinity Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, at Milford, Docket No. CV98 0064615S (October 1, 1999, Arnold, J.) (quoting Faulker v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580 (1977)). "If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." S.M.S. Textile v. Brown, Jacobson, Tillinghast, Lahan and King, P.C., 32 Conn.App. 786, 796, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 903 (1993).
Connecticut General Statues § 14-295 provides that "[i]n any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death, or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, . . . 14-222, . . . [or] 14-237 . . . and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death, or damage to property." The defendant acknowledges that "[t]he trial courts of this state are divided on the issue of whether a plaintiff must allege additional facts to support a claim of recklessness that are distinct from the claims of negligence when seeking double or treble damages under General Statutes § 14-[2]95, in order to survive a motion to strike." Murray v. Krupa, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, at Norwich, Docket No. 107233 (October 2, 1995, Teller, J.). The majority view, "employing the principles of statutory construction, reads the language of § 14-295 literally and only requires that a plaintiff allege that the defendant violated one of the enumerated statutes deliberately or with reckless disregard, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries." Alves v. Brown, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV01 383322S (February 21, 2002, Rush, J.). The defendant also concedes that, should the court adopt the majority view, the plaintiffs have met this requirement in the third count of their complaint.
However, the defendant urges this court to follow the minority view, which requires specific allegations of recklessness, rather than simply pleading that the defendant has violated one of the enumerated statutory sections in C.G.S. § 14-295. Under this approach, a "plaintiff must plead the specific facts constituting recklessness, above and beyond the facts constituting mere negligence." Kurensky v. Church Hill Enterprises, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, at Bridgeport Docket No. CV 02 0390806 (July 16, 2002, Brennan, Jr., J.). The cases upon which the defendant would have this court rely, however, are distinguishable from the present case. In the cases cited by the defendant, the claims made by the plaintiff generally had not alleged conduct that rose to the level of reckless disregard of the rights of others. See e.g., Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn.App. 451 (1985) (considering a traffic accident where the defendant crossed into the plaintiff's travel lane while attempting to make a left hand turn); Bishop v. Kelly, 206 Conn. 608 (1988) (considering a traffic accident where the defendant drifted over the median into the plaintiff's traveling lane).
In addition, the line of cases the defendant urges this court to follow acknowledge that "[w]here the allegations of a count of a contested pleading support a cause of action of recklessness, the count sounding in recklessness may well be sufficient to withstand a motion to strike even though the allegations of reckless conduct are also alleged as a basis of negligent conduct in a count sounding in negligence." Haley v. Connecticut Light and Power, 1999 WL 1063178 (Conn.Super.). "There is no reason why the plaintiff, relying on the same set of facts in negligence counts, cannot set forth in separate counts, causes of action arising out of those same facts alleging recklessness . . . Focus must . . . primarily rest on the recklessness sufficiency of that count . . . it seems more appropriate . . . to examine . . . whether the facts that are alleged could, under any set of facts admissible under the pleadings, support a conclusion of recklessness." Ahmed v. Robinson et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV08 5008410 (September 25, 2008, Upson, J.) (quoting Drennan v. Geist, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 990089114 (January 29, 2002, Shapiro, J.)).
In this case, the plaintiffs have clearly met the standard required by the majority view, by pleading the defendant, deliberately or with reckless disregard, violated C.G.S. § 14-218(a), § 14-222, and § 14-237, and such violations were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' injuries. Furthermore, even applying the minority view urged by the defendant, this court finds that, the allegations that the defendant entered a limited access highway by wrongfully driving down an exit ramp and traveled in the wrong direction of such highway, which directly led to a head on collision with the plaintiffs, are sufficient to support claims of both negligence and recklessness. As such, the defendant's motion to strike the third count of the complaint is denied.