Summary
In Battison, the plaintiffs alleged that the city had "engaged in a in a pattern or practice of violating the constitutional rights of its citizens by engaging in negligent hiring, supervision, and retention."
Summary of this case from Rojas v. BrownOpinion
7:01-CV-037-R.
May 8, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On February 27, 2001, Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court against the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988, the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the common law of the state of Texas. Now before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Sever Claims of Multiple Plaintiffs, filed on March 20, 2001. For the reasons stated below, this Motion is DENIED.
Background
The Plaintiffs in this case each allege violations of their rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by individual members of the City of Electra police department. In addition, they allege that the City of Electra has violated their constitutional rights by maintaining an official policy, practice, or custom of negligently hiring, supervising, and retaining members of its police force. Plaintiffs allege that this policy, practice, or custom was a cause of the injuries suffered at the hands of the individual Defendants.The specific incidents, during which the Plaintiffs allege to have been injured, all involve accusations of excessive force, searches and seizures without probable cause, and unlawful censoring of the Plaintiffs' freedom of expression. Plaintiff Kimberly Battison's incident took place on July 31, 1999, and involved Defendant Officers Bartram and Kaiser. Plaintiff Rhonda Jones's incident took place on October 21, 1999, and involved Defendant Officers Bartram and McGuinn. Plaintiffs Albert, Roy, and Reononda Woodman's incident took place on January 22, 2000, and involved Defendant Officers McGuinn and Kaiser.
Discussion
The Defendants ask this Court to sever the Plaintiffs' claims based on when the initiating incidents occurred. Their Motion is made under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides severance of claims as a remedy for improper joinder pursuant to Rule 20(a). See Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 21. To determine whether parties are properly joined under Rule 20(a), a district court must consider: 1) whether the right to relief asserted by each plaintiff arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and 2) whether any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 20(a).
Certain guiding principles have consistently been applied by courts in determining whether severance is appropriate. First, a court has broad discretion to sever improperly joined parties.See Anderson v. Red River Waterway Co., 231 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing, Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994)). Second, "[t]he transaction and common question requirements prescribed by Rule 20(a) are not rigid tests . . . [t]hey are flexible concepts used by the courts to implement the purpose of Rule 20 and therefore are to be read as broadly as possible whenever doing so is likely to promote judicial economy." Weber v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2001 WL 274518, 2 (E.D. La. 2001) (citing, Wright, Miller Kane, Federal Practice Procedure, § 1653 (1986)). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has stated that, "joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
In this case, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' claims do not arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences because the claims asserted concern "three distinct incidents occurring on three different occasions," and "involve different police officers of the City of Electra." (Def's Mot to Sever, p. 2). The Defendants claim that the only thing these Plaintiffs have in common is their attorney, Ricky Bunch, and that trying the claims together would confuse the jury and cause prejudice to the Defendants. The Plaintiffs respond to this argument by pointing out that each claim involves allegations of the existence of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional acts by the City of Electra. Therefore, the Plaintiffs argue, the claims arise out of the same series of transactions or occurrences and share common questions of law and fact.
Where a claim is based on a pattern or practice of conduct, such conduct can constitute the "series of transactions or occurrences" required by Rule 20(a). See e.g., Porter v. Milliken Michaels. Inc., 2000 WL 1059849, 1 (E.D. La. 2000) (citing, Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974)). For example, in 1965, the United States Supreme Court held that it was proper to join six different County Registrars as defendants in one suit because allegations of a pattern or practice of discrimination against African Americans by Mississippi's Registrars constituted a single series of transactions or occurrences under Rule 20(a). See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142 (1965)). More recently, in Dixon v. Ford Motor Credit Company, 1999 WL 104425 (E.D. La. 1999), a court held that allegations of a vast conspiracy among car dealers, when added to separate allegations of fraudulent omissions by certain car dealers, met the same series of transactions and occurrences requirement of Rule 20(a). Id. at 3.
Here, the Plaintiffs allege that the City of Electra has engaged in a pattern or practice of violating the constitutional rights of its citizens by engaging in negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. This allegation alone suffices to meet Rule 20(a)'s common transaction or occurrence requirement. Moreover, the individual incidents described by the Plaintiffs are not as discrete as the Defendants claim. Each individual officer named in the suit participated in more than one of the alleged incidents, and the behavior described on the part of these officers had common characteristics. In addition, all three incidents took place within a six month period.
The second prong of Rule 20(a) is also met in this case. All five Plaintiffs allege the same constitutional violations, therefore there are common questions of law present. In addition, because all five Plaintiffs allege the existence of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct by the City of Electra, there are common questions of fact present as well. Because of these common questions of law and fact, judicial economy would be furthered by trying these claims together, instead of forcing the same evidence to be presented to three different juries.
In light of the nature of the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs, and the strong preference in favor of joinder by the courts, this Court finds that Rule 20(a)'s requirements have been met and the Defendants' Motion to Sever is DENIED.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Sever is hereby DENIED.It is so ORDERED.