Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2453 Section "L".
March 1, 2001.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mark Batiste ("Batiste") worked as a security officer for defendant Touro Infirmary ("Touro") from September 8, 1987 until his termination on March 30, 1999. Batiste normally worked the evening shift and held the position of Senior Security Guard at age forty-one in October of 1998. He alleges that Touro discriminated against him on the basis of age from October of 1998 to March of 1999 by assigning younger employees to the position of Officer in Charge despite his qualifications.
Batiste, an African American, also claims that Touro discriminated against him on the basis of race when it terminated him for "clocking out" another officer. On March 24, 1999, John Poumaroux, Touro's Support Services Director, learned that Marshall Garrison, an African-American security officer, had left his post without permission for more than two hours although his activity report noted a shorter period. Bruce Jackson, Touro's night shift security supervisor, reported to Poumaroux that he had observed Batiste retrieve Garrison's timecard from an open locker, clock-out twice at the end of his shift, and return Garrison's timecard to the locker. When questioned the following day, Garrison admitted that he had left his post without permission and that he did not clock-out. Batiste, however, denied encountering Garrison or clocking him out at the end of his shift. Nevertheless, Batiste could not explain why the timecards had been clocked-out at the same time. Because of this incident, Mark Gates, Touro's Human Resource Director, terminated Batiste on March 30, 1999 for violating Touro's Code of Conduct which provides that "improper use of the timeclocks may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination." Poumaroux Aff. ¶ 5.
Batiste brought suit in this Court on August 11, 1999 alleging race and age discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law. Defendant moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff also sought appointment of counsel which the United States Magistrate considered and denied. The Court now considers defendant's motion for summary judgment.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment will be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. If the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact "the nonmoving must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). "[A] dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. To oppose a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant cannot rest on mere allegations or denials but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-22 (1986).
The burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue is not met by "metaphysical doubt" or "unsubstantiated assertions." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The Court must "resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contrary facts." Id. The Court does not, "in the absence of proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Id. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, no genuine issue exists for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, "the mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; Rule 56 requires that the fact dispute be genuine and material." Willis, 61 F.3d at 315. If the evidence leads to only one reasonable conclusion, summary judgment is proper. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Age Discrimination
The Age Discrimination Employment Act ("ADEA") prohibits an employer from "fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or . . . [from] discharg[ing], or otherwise discriminat[ing] againstan individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 632 (a)(1). To succeed on a claim for age discrimination, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2105 (2000). The plaintiff meets his burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he was otherwise qualified for the position; (3) that he was denied the position by the defendant; and (4) that he was either replaced by someone outside the protected class, replaced by someone younger, or otherwise fired or denied opportunities because of age. See id.; Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Batiste's claim does not satisfy the elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination. To meet his initial burden, he must show that his age "actually played a role in [the employer's decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome." See Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2105 (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). While Batiste's undisputed age makes him a member of a protected class, he fails to demonstrate how his age was used by Touro to deny him employment opportunities. Batiste only claims that younger employees were assigned to the Officer in Charge position. He raises no genuine issue of material fact as to how he was denied employment opportunities because of his age. His allegations of age discrimination also lack evidentiary support. Factual disagreements alone cannot overcome summary judgment. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
Even if Batiste could establish a prima facie claim of age discrimination, summary judgment is appropriate because the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for assigning work and terminating him. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981). Touro explains that it assigned security officers to the position of Officer in Charge on the basis of competence and to provide them with supervising training. See Poumaroux Aff. ¶ 9. Touro does not make these assignments on the basis of seniority or length of service. See id. Moreover, Batiste was assigned to the Officer in Charge position eighteen times from January of 1998 to March of 1999. See id. Because Touro offers a nondiscriminatory reason for not assigning Batiste to the position of Officer in Charge, the focus then shifts to the ultimate question: whether the plaintiff can prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him. § See id. The plaintiff, therefore, "retains the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the case." Faruki v. Parsons SIP., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
Batiste may overcome Touro's proffered nondiscriminatory reason by providing evidence that its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is merely pretext. See St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 511. He can meet the burden of demonstrating pretext "if the evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [the plaintiff's protected status] was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains." Vadie v. Mississippi State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 374, n. 23 (5th Cir. 2000). Batiste, however, offers no evidence to suggest that Touro's proffered reason is a pretext for age discrimination. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate for Touro on the ADEA claim.
B. Race Discrimination
Batiste also raises a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII which prohibits an employer from failing or refusing to hire or discharge an individual "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1). The burden of production and proof required for his age discrimination claim is the same as for his race discrimination claim. See Bauer v. Albermale Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Batiste must first establish a prima facie claim of race discrimination by showing either that he did not violate the rule against clocking out, or that if he did, white employees who engaged in similar acts were not punished similarly. Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9 Cir. 1995) (quoting Green v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 612 F.2d 967, 968 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 879 (1980)). If Batiste establishes a prima facie claim of racial discrimination, then Touro must offer legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256-57. Batiste must then produce sufficient evidence to show that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 252-58.
Batiste fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of race because he offers no evidence to suggest that similarly-situated white employees were treated differently. During his deposition, Batiste alleged that Tommy Myrick, a white security officer, punched out another employee several years earlier although Batiste did not report the incident to a supervisor. See Batiste Dep. at 39, 43-44. This incident, however, bears little relation to Batiste's situation because Myrick was terminated later for unlawful entry into a business office. See Poumaroux Aff. ¶ 19.
Even if Batiste could demonstrate that he was disparately treated because of his race, Touro offers a nonpretextual reason for his termination. Touro terminated Batiste on the basis of its investigation of his conduct and the conclusion that he violated rules concerning the clocking-out of other employees. Touro's decision to terminate Batiste is supported by the investigations of its security department manager, the statements of Garrison, Batiste's fellow employee who was improperly clocked-out, and the observations of Jackson, an African-America night shift supervisor who witnessed the missing timecard. Finally, Touro explains that Batiste was replaced by Shane Martin, another African-American employee. Batiste presents no evidence with which to challenge Touro's proffered reason for termination as a pretext for racial discrimination. The only evidence he offers in opposition is an unauthorized affidavit of Garrison stating that Batiste did not punch him out from work. This statement, however, fails to support Batiste's specific claim of race discrimination. Therefore, on the basis of an undisputed nondiscriminatory reason for termination, the Court finds Touro entitled to summary judgment for plaintiffs claims of racial discrimination.
C. State Law Claims
In addition to his federal law claims of discrimination, Batiste alleges a claim under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, La. R.S. § 23:301 et. seq. Batiste's state law claim also fails because the burdens required to satisfy a claim under this statute are substantially similar to those required under Title VII and the ADEA. See Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc. 897 F.2d 815 (818 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Hicks v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., Inc., 97-1232 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/15/98), 712 So.2d 656, 658.
Finally, to the extent Batiste raises a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, he fails to present any evidence that Touro's conduct was extreme or outrageous. See Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 515 (5th Cir 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014 (1994).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.