Opinion
97 Civ. 4247 (HB)
May 11, 2001
OPINION ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Moises Batista ("Batista") has moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment entered by the Clerk of Court on December 5, 2000 that granted summary judgment in favor of UNITE pursuant to this Court's Opinion and Order dated November 30, 2000. For the following reasons, plaintiffs motion to alter or amend the judgment is denied.
In his complaint, plaintiff alleged discriminatory termination on the basis of race and national origin, disparate treatment with respect to compensation and other employee conditions, retaliation for plaintiffs support for a labor organization, retaliation for plaintiffs opposition to unlawful employment practices, and termination to prevent his disability retirement benefits from vesting. On November 30, 2000, I granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. While I will not re-state the reasoning for my decision, suffice it to say that, viewed in a light heavily favoring this pro se plaintiff, he failed to put forth sufficient evidence to support any of his claims.
Plaintiff now moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) which provides, "Any motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." The standard for a motion to alter or amend the judgment is the same as that for a motion for reconsideration or reargument under Southern District of New York Local Civil Rule 6.3. See Farkas v. Ellis, 783 F. Supp. 830, 833 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 979 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1992). Such motions may be granted only where the Court overlooked factual matters or controlling authority that may have materially affected the original decision of the case. Id. 83233. The standard is a strict one in order to prevent repetition of arguments that have already been made. Id. at 832. Parties may not present any new facts, issues or arguments to the Court. See Mullen v. Bevona, No. 95 Civ. 5838 (PKL), 1998 WL 148426, *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 1998).
After reviewing plaintiffs briefs andallowing him the opportunity for oral argument, it is clear that plaintiffs instant motion simply restates the argument that I have already considered and dismissed. There is nothing in plaintiffs papers that calls into question my conclusions contained in the November 30, 2000 Opinion granting summary judgment. Thus, I must deny plaintiffs motion.
There is one additional matter that I must address that results from a generous reading of plaintiffs papers due to his pro se status. In his briefs, plaintiff appears to object to the defendant's Notice of Request to Tax Costs Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1) and L. Civ. R. 54.1. Under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, costs are awarded to a prevailing pary "unless the court otherwise directs." Generally, a court should award costs, and the burden is on the losing party to show why costs, in a particular case, are not warranted. See Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[S]uch an award against the losing party is the normal rule obtaining in civil litigation, not an exception."). A court may elect not to impose costs due to "misconduct by the prevailing party, the public importance of the case, the difficulty of the issues, or the losing party's limited financial resources." Id. But a court denying costs must state its reasons therefor. See Cantrell v. Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 69 F.3d 456, 459 (10th Cir. 1995). Here, it may be that I should not award costs due to plaintiffs financial resources or some other reason. However, in order to make a finding on this ground, I must have additional information. If plaintiff wishes to pursue his objection based on financial limitation, he must submit to the Court evidence of his current financial resources, which may include pay stubs, bank statements, a list of monthly expenses, etc., no later than June 1, 2001. The plaintiff is, of course, free to offer argument on any other ground on which he believes that defendant should not be awarded costs. The defendant may respond to any submission no later than June 21, 2001.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion to alter or amend the judgment is denied. I reserve decision on plaintiffs objection to the taxation of costs. SO ORDERED