Opinion
03 Civ. 10121 (RWS).
November 23, 2004
MARITZA BATISTA, Bronx, NY, Plaintiff Pro Se.
HONORABLE DAVID N. KELLEY, New York, NY, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Attorneys for Defendant, By: LORRAINE S. NOVINSKI, Assistant US Attorney Of Counsel.
OPINION
Defendant Jo Anne Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"), has moved pursuant to Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss the complaint of pro se plaintiff Maritza Batista ("Batista"). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
Prior Proceedings
Batista filed her complaint on December 22, 2003, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits.
The Commissioner's instant motion for judgment on the pleadings was marked fully submitted on August 11, 2004 and was unopposed.
Administrative Proceedings
Batista filed an application for disability insurance benefits on June 21, 2000. Tr. 74-76. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. A hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") was held on May 1, 2003. Tr. 24. Batista, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at the hearing. Tr. 24-48. On May 30, 2003, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Batista had not been disabled at any time through that date. Tr. 15-22. This became the final decision of the Commissioner on August 29, 2003, when the Appeals Council denied Batista's request for review. Tr. 6-7.
Citations in the form "Tr. ____" are to pages in the transcript of the administrative record.
Batista, fifty-three years old, was born in the Dominican Republic and moved to the United States in 1987. Tr. 28. In the Dominican Republic, Batista studied accounting in college for three or four years without obtaining a degree. Tr. 32-34, 91, 120.
Batista worked as a bookkeeper or accountant for a New Jersey travel company from April 1987 to October 1999. Tr. 34, 84. When she applied for disability, Batista reported that she stopped working because she was unable to perform her work duties because of swelling throughout her body, pain in the joints, an ulcer, a cholesterol problem, and a thyroid problem. Tr. 83. In another report, Batista stated that she left her job because she was unable to commute to New Jersey. Tr. 106. At her hearing, Batista testified that she was laid off, and that she collected unemployment insurance benefits for twenty-six weeks after she stopped working. Tr. 35. In May 2002, Batista told a consulting physician that she had stopped working because of a bad back. Tr. 263.
When she filed her application for disability insurance, Batista stated that she had been unable to work since October 22, 1999, Tr. 83, that her medications were Synthroid (used to treat her thyroid condition) and Lipitor used to to treat her hyperlipidemia). Tr. 90.
Hyperlipidemia is a condition characterized by elevated levels of fat in the blood. Taber's Cyplopedic Medical Dictionary ("Taber's") 863 (16th ed. 1989).
On an updated questionnaire that was received by the Office of Disability Determinations on July 5, 2000, Batista stated that she did all the cooking and grocery shopping for her household without assistance; she did the other household chores, sometimes with assistance from her daughter; she traveled by herself on public transportation; and she handled the payment of her bills. Tr. 105-06. On a subsequent report dated May 10, 2002, she reported that she was able to do such household chores as cleaning, laundry, ironing, cooking and grocery shopping, but she needed assistance with the mopping, sweeping, and shopping. Tr. 127. She continued to be able to travel alone by walking or by using public transportation, but she did not go out often because she was depressed, and she did not want to be around people. Tr. 127, 129. At that time, she also reported pain in her lower back, stomach, and knees which radiated to her arms, feet, and ankles. Tr. 132.
At her hearing in May 2003, Batista testified that she had been unable to travel by subway for the previous month because she had difficulty climbing the stairs. Tr. 30. She testified that the most significant problem preventing her from working was pain in the lower back that occurred all day every day but was relieved for several hours at a time by taking Tylenol. Tr. 36. She estimated that she was able to sit for one to two hours at a time, stand for a half-hour, and walk for one block. Tr. 19.
Batista's first medical treatment after she stopped working was on October 27, 1999, when she complained of a four-week history of fever and pain and swelling in the area of the thyroid. Tr. 143, 207. She was diagnosed with subacute thyroiditis, and was started on a course of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medications. Tr. 143. One month later, Batista's pain was resolved and she was feeling fine. Tr. 139. She was subsequently diagnosed with hypothyroidism; after taking thyroid hormones for one week, she reported great improvement. Tr. 141.
Thyroiditis is an inflammation of the thyroid gland.Taber's at 1864.
Hypothyroidism is characterized by a deficiency of the secretions of the thyroid gland. Taber's at 879.
In December 1999, Batista was seen for complaints of constipation and hemorrhoids. Tr. 202. In January 2000, she complained of a two-day history of pain in the shoulder, knees and back. Tr. 200. One week later, she reported that the pain was improving and she felt better. Id.
In June 2000, Batista completed disability forms but Batista did not submit them to the Commissioner. Tr. 197.
In September 2000, Batista reported a one-week history of muscle aches and knee pain. Tr. 196. On examination, she looked well; she reported pain upon bending her knees and that her lower back was tender to the touch. Tr. 195. The physician's assessment was hypothyroidism, elevated cholesterol, gastro-esophageal reflux and degenerative joint disease. Id. An x-ray of the lower portion of her spine revealed no significant arthritic changes and the results were characterized as normal. Tr. 230. An x-ray of the left knee was entirely normal, while a study of the right knee was normal except for enthesopathy at the top of the patella. Tr. 229.
Enthesopathy is a disorder of the muscles or the tendons attached to the bone. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 561 (28th ed. 1994).
In November 2000, Batista was seen by a doctor for complaints of swelling all over her body, dizziness, and swelling and bleeding from a hemorrhoid. Tr. 194. On examination, she looked well, and the only abnormal finding reported was an inflamed prolapsed hemorrhoid with no bleeding seen. Tr. 193.
In August 2001, Batista was hospitalized for a hemorrhoidectomy. Tr. 244. She was discharged the following day with no limitations on her activities. Tr. 234.
A consulting physician, Dr. Polak, examined Batista on July 17, 2000. Tr. 165. She described a two-year history of diffuse pain in the lower back that did not radiate and for which she took Tylenol. Id. Batista reported her history of hypothyroidism but denied any current symptoms, weakness, or fatigue. Id. She did not identify any other problems. Id. She stated that she was unable to lift any heavy objects, but she nonetheless performed all household chores without any help. Id. Upon examination, Batista demonstrated no difficulty walking, rising from a chair, or getting on or off the examination table, and she had full use of both hands for fine manipulations. Tr. 156-57. She had a full range of motion of the spine and all joints with no spasm and no obvious deformity. Tr. 157. Dr. Polak diagnosed Batista with the following conditions: chronic back pain, hypothyroidism, and hyperlipidemia. Tr. 158. Dr. Polak ruled out lumbosacral degenerative joint disease as a condition effecting Batista.Id. In Dr. Polak's opinion, Batista was mildly impaired for lifting and carrying, pushing and pulling, bending and sitting, but she had no difficulty walking, standing, or performing activities requiring dexterity. Id.
On July 17, 2000, Dr. Levit, a medical consultant, reviewed the medical evidence in Batista's file and offered his assessment of her ability to perform work-related activities. Tr. 160-67. In his opinion, she could lift ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally, and in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks she would be able to stand and/or walk for about six hours, and she could sit for about six hours. Tr. 161.
On December 12, 2000, Dr. Schindler evaluated Batista's hearing, which was within normal limits in both ears. Tr. 174-75.
Dr. Rocker examined Batista on December 13, 2000. Tr. 169. She reported her history of thyroid problems and elevated cholesterol, but she denied any current symptoms. Id. She also reported episodes of cramping in her hands, occasional pain in her feet, swelling of her joints, and a history of an ulcer with no current symptoms. Id. She denied any other complaints. Id. Her medications were Lipitor, Pepcid and a thyroid medication.Id. On examination, Batista demonstrated a normal station and gait; she had no difficulty getting on or off the examination table; she had full use of both hands and arms for dressing and undressing; she had a full range of motion in all joints with no swelling or tenderness; she had a full grasp and was able to perform manipulations with both hands; and there was no muscle atrophy. Tr. 170. An x-ray of her left hand and fingers revealed no abnormalities. Tr. 172. Dr. Rocker diagnosed Batista as having the following conditions: (1) a history of hypothyroidism causing no limitations; (2) a history of hyperlipidemia with no organ damage; (3) a history of peptic ulcer disease with no current problem; and (4) a history of hearing impairment with no current complaints and no apparent difficulty hearing. Tr. 170. In Dr. Rocker's opinion, Batista was able to perform sedentary, light, and moderate work activity. Id.
A second medical consultant, Dr. Ford, reviewed Batista's medical records and offered a functional assessment on January 2, 2001. Tr. 176-83. In his opinion, Batista was capable of lifting twenty-five pounds frequently and fifty pounds occasionally. Tr. 177. Dr. Ford also determined that with normal breaks, she would be able to stand and/or walk and sit for six hours each. Id.
Dr. Polak examined Batista for a second time on May 10, 2002. Tr. 252. On that occasion Batista reported that she had suffered from back and knee pain for many years. Id. The back pain was said to be nonradiating, but it made her unable to bend or lift heavy objects. Id. The knee pain was said to occur behind the kneecap and it was associated with swelling and stiffness. Id. Batista reported that she treated these problems by taking Motrin once every eight hours. Id. She also reported a history of sickle cell anemia for which she was not receiving any treatment.Id. Finally, she reported her then-current treatment for hypothyroidism and hyperlipidemia. Id.
Batista stated to Dr. Polak that she performed the household chores — mopping, cooking, shopping, and making the beds — without any assistance. Id. She stated that she spent her leisure time reading and socializing with friends. Id. On examination, her station and gait were normal and her finger and hand dexterity were intact. Tr. 253. There was no deformity or spasm in the back, but motion was limited to fifty degrees of flexion and twenty degrees of extension. Id. There was no deformity, swelling, tenderness, or creaking in the knees, and she was able to flex them to 120 degrees. Id. In the remaining joints, she had a full range of motion with no deformity, swelling, tenderness, spasm, or atrophy. Id. An x-ray of the lumbosacral spine revealed a transitional vertebral body at L5, but her spine was otherwise unremarkable. Tr. 255. An x-ray of the left knee was negative. Id. Ruling out degenerative joint disease, Dr. Polak diagnosed Batista with the following conditions: chronic back and knee pain; sickle cell anemia of unknown etiology; hypothyroidism; and hyperlipidemia. Tr. 253. In his opinion, Batista was mildly impaired with respect to activities such as standing, walking, sitting, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling and bending, and she had no limitations with respect to sensory functioning, vision, or hearing. Id.
Dr. Allen, a consulting psychiatrist, examined Batista on May 10, 2002. Tr. 263. Batista reported a history of treatment for depression and stress, but she stated that she had not received any treatment for either condition since 1996. Id. She reported that she had stopped working in 1999 because of a bad back and that she remained unable to work for this same reason. Id. On examination, Batista's mood was depressed and her affect was constricted; her speech was relevant and coherent; she denied hearing voices but reported seeing shadows; she believed that people talked about her behind her back; she was not suicidal or homicidal; she was able to perform several memory tests; and her insight and judgment were good. Tr. 263-64. She reported that she was able to watch television and use her computer with good concentration; she did her own household chores and handled her finances; and she socialized at home. Tr. 264. Dr. Allen diagnosed Batista as suffering from depressive and anxiety disorder. Id. In his opinion, Batista had a satisfactory ability (1) to understand, remember, and carry out instructions and (2) to respond appropriately to supervisors and co-workers and to pressure in the work place. Id.
A medical consultant, Dr. Walia, reviewed the evidence in the record and offered an assessment of Batista's ability to perform the mental requirements of work on June 10, 2002. Tr. 265-82. In Dr. Walia's opinion, Batista was moderately limited with respect to handling detailed instructions and in concentrating for extended periods of time. Tr. 265. Dr. Walia determined that Batista had no significant limitations with respect to handling simple instructions, maintaining an appropriate work schedule, interacting with supervisors or co-workers, or adapting to changes in a work setting. Tr. 266-67.
At the request of Batista's attorney, see Tr. 26, Dr. Henoch, a family practitioner, examined Batista on April 30, 2003. Tr. 287-91. Batista reported a history of depression including hospital treatment in the past; pain in her shoulder and back; difficulty dressing; vertigo; constant crying; pain in the left leg; difficulty walking; and forgetfulness that caused her to forget to take her thyroid medication. Tr. 287. Dr. Henoch reported that during the examination, Batista was crying and that she was in moderate distress. Tr. 288. The following conditions were also reported: spasm in the lumbosacral muscles with flexion limited to forty degrees; evidence of nerve root irritation and of weakness in the left lower extremity although her gait was normal; and tenderness, creaking, and restricted motion in the left shoulder. Dr. Henoch's assessment was a sprain, muscle spasm and neuropathy of the lumbosacral spine; a sprain, post-traumatic joint disease, tendinitis, and synovitis of the left shoulder; vertigo; hypothyroidism; and major depression with suicidal ideation. Tr. 289. In Dr. Henoch's opinion, Batista could lift up to five pounds occasionally; she could neither sit nor stand for more than two hours a day; she could not travel regularly by bus or subway; she was unable to sustain even minimal attention and concentration and could not tolerate work stress; she would require unscheduled breaks at least three to five times a day; and she was unable to interact with co-workers or to follow simple instructions. Tr. 290. The Standard of Judicial Review
The Social Security Act (the "Act") provides that "the findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Donato v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 721 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 1983); Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 1980). Substantial evidence in this context has been defined as "`more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); accord Donato, 721 F.2d at 418; Parker, 626 F.2d at 231-32. If there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision, that decision must be upheld, even if there is also substantial evidence for the plaintiff's position. Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984); Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 1981); accord Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982).
Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in Social Security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 42 U.S.C. §§ 901, 902.
The substantial evidence test applies not only to findings of basic evidentiary facts but also to inferences and conclusions drawn from such facts. See e.g., Stone v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1983); Jolley v. Weinberger, 537 F.2d 1179, 1181 (4th Cir. 1976); Reyes v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. Welfare, 476 F.2d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1972); Rodriguez v. Califano, 431 F. Supp. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Commissioner's findings of fact, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from those findings, are conclusive even in those instances where a reviewing court's independent analysis of the evidence might differ from the Commissioner's analysis.See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982). The Commissioner's decision may be set aside only if it is "based upon legal error or not supported by substantial evidence."Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam)).
The Definition Of Disability
To establish disability under the Act, a plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating (1) that she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment that could be expected to result in death or that has lasted or could be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, and (2) that the existence of such impairment is demonstrated by evidence obtained by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1), 423(d)(3). Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d at 230-31; Gold v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1972).
The Act provides in relevant part:
[A]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability . . . if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
For a person to be found disabled within the meaning of the Act, it is not sufficient that she establish the presence of a disease or impairment. The claimant bears the initial burden of "showing that [her] impairment prevents [her] from returning to [her] prior type of employment." Berry, 675 F.2d at 467;accord Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981). It is the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity, not merely the medical condition, that must last for a continuous period of at least twelve months for the individual to be found disabled. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-22 (2002).
The Secretary has established a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The Second Circuit has summarized this process as follows:
First, the Secretary considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the Secretary next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the Secretary will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education and work experience; the Secretary presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a "listed" impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the Secretary then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.Berry, 675 F.2d at 467; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1987); Chico v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 947, 950-52 (2d Cir. 1983).
The Second Circuit has also set forth the burdens of proof at the various steps of this process. The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, i.e., through the determination of her ability to perform her past relevant work despite a severe impairment; the Secretary has the burden as to the last step, i.e., determination of the claimant's ability to perform other work available in the national economy. See e.g., Berry, 675 F.2d at 467; Carroll v. Sec'y of Health Human Serv., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983). The burden of proof never shifts to the Secretary unless the claimant satisfies her burden at each of the first four steps. See e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n. 5 (burden shifts to Secretary only if evaluation proceeds to fifth step).
In making a determination regarding a claimant's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner considers four categories of evidence: objective medical facts and clinical findings; diagnoses and medical opinions of qualified physicians; subjective evidence of pain and disability; and the claimant's age, education, and work history. See Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983);Parker, 626 F.2d at 231.
The Commissioner's Decision
The Commissioner denied Batista's claim at step four. At this step, the burden was on the claimant to demonstrate with medical evidence that she was unable to perform her past relevant work. To satisfy her burden at step four, Batista had to demonstrate that she was unable to perform her work either as she had actually performed it in the past or as that job function is usually performed. See Jock v. Harris, 651 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1981). See also Social Security Ruling 82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2. Her past work as a bookkeeper or account clerk, as it is usually performed, is properly considered sedentary work. The U.S. Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupation Titles 182 (bookkeeper), 190 (accounting clerk) (4th ed. 1991), classifies both jobs as ones involving sedentary exertion.
The only medical evidence in the record that supports Batista's claim that she is unable to perform her past work is the opinion offered by Dr. Henoch, a physician who examined her in April 2003. The ALJ considered Dr. Henoch's findings and his opinion, but he concluded that it was entitled to little weight.
In determining how much weight to accord to a medical opinion, an ALJ must consider such factors as the length of the treatment relationship; the frequency of examinations; the extent to which the opinion is supported by relevant evidence; the consistency of the opinion with other opinions as well as with the record as a whole; and the area of specialization of the physician offering the opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
Here, the record indicates that Batista obtained a statement regarding her alleged disability from her treating physician, but neither she nor her attorney ever submitted the statement to the ALJ. See Tr. 197-98. Accordingly, the only medical opinions in the record are those offered by consulting physicians who examined plaintiff or by non-examining medical consultants who reviewed the medical records without ever examining Batista. With the single exception of Dr. Henoch's opinion, none of these opinions indicates that she would be unable to perform her past sedentary work.
Sedentary work is defined as work that involves occasional lifting of such items as docket files, ledgers or small tools.See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). It never involves lifting more than ten pounds at a time. Id. While sedentary work is typically performed sitting down, it often involves some walking and standing. Id.
Here, based on Batista's reported medical history and on the results of his own examination of Batista, Dr. Rocker affirmatively stated that she was able to perform not only the exertional requirements of sedentary work, but also the more demanding requirements of light and moderate work as well. Tr. 170. This opinion is consistent with the assessments offered by each of the non-examining medical consultants.
Based on his review of the medical evidence in the record, Dr. Levit concluded that Batista would be able to perform the exertional requirements of light work, i.e., lifting ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally and doing a good deal of standing or walking. Tr. 161. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (defining light work). Absent evidence of additional limitations such as loss of dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time, an individual who is capable of performing light work is also considered capable of performing sedentary work. Id. With the exception of Dr. Henoch's report, the record in this case contains no evidence of any such limitations.
Dr. Ford, the second medical consultant, offered a positive opinion regarding Batista's functioning. In his opinion, she was able to perform medium work, i.e., work involving lifting twenty-five pounds frequently and fifty pounds occasionally. Tr. 177; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c).
The two opinions offered by Dr. Polak, who examined Batista on two occasions, do not include any quantitative assessments of her level of functioning. See Tr. 158, 253. Nevertheless, Dr. Polak's assessment — i.e., that her manual dexterity was intact and that she was, at worst, only "mildly impaired" with respect to standing, walking, sitting, lifting, and carrying — does not contradict the ALJ's finding that Batista could perform the requirements of the sedentary work she had performed in the past.
Not only are all the medical opinions in the record other than that offered by Dr. Henoch consistent with each other, they are also supported by (1) the findings reported by the physicians who examined Batista and (2) by the findings reported in the records of her medical treatment. The treatment records indicate that Batista's hypothyroidism responded promptly to medication and there is no evidence that this condition or Batista's hyperlipidemia resulted in any functional limitations. See Tr. 139-44, 190-238. While Batista's hemorrhoids were severe enough to warrant surgery, the record of her discharge from the hospital expressly noted that there were no limitations on her activities, including her "return to work." Tr. 234.
There was also the medical evidence regarding Batista's ability to perform the mental requirements of work. Dr. Henoch identified no basis for his diagnosis of major depression with suicidal features or for his opinion that Batista was unable to sustain even minimal attention or concentration, to tolerate work stress, to interact with her co-workers, or to follow even simple instructions. See Tr. 290. His report does not indicate that he ever performed a mental status evaluation.
Dr. Allen, the only psychiatrist who did perform a mental status evaluation, reported no evidence of major depression and expressly stated that Batista was not suicidal. See Tr. 263-64. He diagnosed only an unspecified depressive and anxiety disorder, and he stated that Batista had a satisfactory ability to perform all of the basis mental requirements of work. Tr. 264. Dr. Walia's assessment, indicating no significant limitations in 17 of the 20 types of functioning he considered and only moderate limitations in the remaining three, is consistent with Dr. Allen's assessment and contradicts that of Dr. Henoch.
Because Dr. Henoch's findings are inconsistent with those reported by the physicians who treated and examined Batista, and because Dr. Henoch's opinions regarding Batista's level of functioning are similarly inconsistent with all of the other medical opinions in the record, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Henoch's opinion was entitled to little weight. See Tr. 20.
The ALJ considered Batista's subjective complaints and her statements about the extent of her limitations, and concluded that they were not fully credible. See id. Subjective complaints alone are not sufficient to establish disability.See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) ("[a]n individual's statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability; there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques"); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) ("statements about [claimant's] pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that [claimant is] disabled"). Here, the record establishes that Batista received only minimal and sporadic treatment throughout the period at issue. Both the thyroid condition and her joint and back pain responded promptly to treatment. See Tr. 139, 141, 200. The only objective findings reported in the record showed minimal limitations. See Tr. 233 (xray of the left ankle negative); 221 (x-rays of both knees normal); 232 (chest x-ray normal); 229 (x-rays of knees normal except for enthesopathy in right knee); 230 (normal x-ray of the lumbosacral spine); 172 (negative x-ray of left hand); 255 (lumbosacral spine normal except for transitional vertebral body, negative x-ray of left knee).
Batista's claim that she stopped working because of her medical problems is not supported by the limited and sporadic nature of the medical treatment that she received after she stopped work, and this claim is contradicted by her sworn testimony that she stopped working because she was laid off. See Tr. 35. Her claim that she was unable to perform even sedentary work is also inconsistent with her statements that even after she stopped working, she continued to perform household chores including cooking, cleaning, and shopping. See Tr. 105-06, 127, 252, 264. In many cases, Batista performed these chores without any assistance. Id. Her complaints about her depression are inconsistent with the fact that she neither sought nor received treatment for such a condition at any time from the date that she stopped working through the date of the ALJ's decision.
The Commissioner's Decision Is Affirmed
Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the medical evidence in the record does not establish that Batista had any medical condition or combination of conditions that resulted in limitations so severe as to leave her unable to perform even the minimal requirements of sedentary work. Accordingly, she has failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating an inability to perform her past work, and the ALJ correctly found that she was not disabled.
Conclusion
The Commissioner's motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
It is so ordered.