Opinion
2014-10-15
Ana BATISTA, respondent, v. BOGOPA SERVICE CORP., et al., appellants.
Patterson & Sciarrino, LLP, Bayside, N.Y. (Shayne, Dachs, Sauer & Dachs, LLP [Jonathan A. Dachs], of counsel), for appellants. Omrani & Taub, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Forde & Associates, P.C. [James L. Forde], of counsel), for respondent.
Patterson & Sciarrino, LLP, Bayside, N.Y. (Shayne, Dachs, Sauer & Dachs, LLP [Jonathan A. Dachs], of counsel), for appellants. Omrani & Taub, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Forde & Associates, P.C. [James L. Forde], of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Velasquez, J.), dated September 18, 2012, which granted the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside a jury verdict in their favor on the issue of liability as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial on the issue of liability.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 134, 495 N.Y.S.2d 184). A jury's finding that a party was at fault but that such fault was not a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence only when the issues are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause ( see Das v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 98 A.D.3d 712, 713, 950 N.Y.S.2d 396; Garrett v. Manaser, 8 A.D.3d 616, 617, 779 N.Y.S.2d 565; Shaw v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 5 A.D.3d 468, 468, 772 N.Y.S.2d 573; Dellamonica v. Carvel Corp., 1 A.D.3d 311, 311–312, 766 N.Y.S.2d 854).
Under the circumstances of this case, the jury's finding that the defendants were negligent but that their negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the subject accident was not supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Gaudiello v. City of New York, 80 A.D.3d 726, 727, 916 N.Y.S.2d 606; Shaw v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 5 A.D.3d at 468, 772 N.Y.S.2d 573; Dellamonica v. Carvel Corp., 1 A.D.3d at 312, 766 N.Y.S.2d 854). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial.
The parties' remaining contentions are either academic in light of our determination or not properly before this Court.