Opinion
No. CV09 4028444
September 18, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO
The plaintiffs, concerned citizens and residents of Fairfield, Connecticut, have filed a writ of quo warranto, dated April 28, 2009. The defendant/respondent, Gary Weddle "demurs" and has filed a motion to strike to the extent a motion to strike, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-39 et seq., may be applicable.
The named plaintiffs are Edward Bateson, Alexis Harrision, Jeanne Konecny, Philip Meiman, Pamela Ritter, Les Schaffer, Joycelyn Shaw and Jane Talamini.
This is an action brought pursuant to General Statutes § 52-491 which provides:
When any person or corporation usurps the exercise of any office, franchise or jurisdiction, the superior court may proceed, on a complaint in the nature of a quo warranto, to punish such person or corporation for such usurpation, according to the course of the common law and may proceed therein and render judgment according to the course of the common law.
The complaint of quo warranto alleges that Section 9.1 of the Fairfield Town Charter establishes the office of the Conservation Director and invests the director with the rights and duties of a town officer. Section 10.3.B.(1) of the Charter provides:
Section 9.1 of the Town Charter provides for the position of Conservation Director as an appointed Town officer.
The Conservation Commission shall have all of the powers and duties conferred by this Charter, by ordinance, and on conservation commissions generally by Section 7.131a of Chapter 97 of the General Statutes.
The complaint also alleges that Section 10.3.D of the Charter regarding the director and other employees and consultants, provides:
The Commission shall appoint a Director with the approval of the First Selectman. The Commission shall have the power to engage such employees or consultants as it requires to carry out its duties, including a wetlands administrator and assistants who, subject to the general supervision of the Director, shall enforce all laws, ordinances and regulations relating to matters over which it has jurisdiction and who shall have other such duties as the Commission or the Director may prescribe. (Emphasis supplied.)
The complaint alleges that Thomas Steinke, at all relevant times, was, and still is, the duly appointed Conservation Director for the Town of Fairfield. On January 15, 2008, the First Selectman of Fairfield, Kenneth Flatto, engaged the services of the defendant Weddle, as a consultant to exercise general supervision over other consultants who had also been hired by Flatto on behalf of the Conservation Commission. The duties of all such consultants and the defendant Weddle, relate to the project known as the Fairfield Metro Center ("Metro Center"). Prior to Weddle's hiring by Flatto, there had been no vote of the Conservation Commission to hire Weddle. The plaintiffs claim that the hiring of Weddle, therefore, was "illegal, null and void," as the Charter allows only the Conservation Commission to engage such consultants to perform duties on behalf of said Commission.
The complaint further alleges that on March 27, 2008, following Weddles' engagement as a consultant by the First Selectman, the Conservation Commission hired Weddle as the Wetlands Compliance Officer, to exercise general supervision over consultants engaged by the Commission, for the Metro Center project. At the same time, the Commission excluded Conservation Director Steinke from exercising his authority of general supervision over the defendant Weddle on the Metro Center project, although Steinke was allowed to continue his authority, pursuant to the Charter, over all other matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission. The plaintiffs allege and complain that the Commission's engagement of Weddle was illegal, null and void, in that the Commission failed to comply with the Charter's mandatory requirement that the Wetlands Compliance Officer shall be subject to the general supervision of the Conservation Director, as set forth in Section 10.3.D of the Town Charter.
The plaintiffs' complaint concludes by alleging that ever since Weddle's engagement by Flatto and the Commission, Weddle, by failing to recognize the Conservation Director Steinke's exclusive jurisdiction of general supervision over all consultants and Weddle himself, has usurped the office of the Conservation Director, as it relates to the Metro Center project. The plaintiffs allege that Weddle continues to exercise the rights, powers and privileges of the office as it relates to the Metro Center project, to the exclusion of Conservation Director Steinke in violation of the Charter.
I Standard of Law
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). A motion to strike shall be granted if "the plaintiff's complaint [does not] sufficiently [state] a cognizable cause of action as a matter of law." Mora v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 13 Conn.App. 208, 211, 535 A.2d 390 (1988).
A motion to strike "admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis omitted.) Id. "A motion to strike is properly granted where a plaintiff's complaint alleges legal conclusions unsupported by facts." Id. "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 170, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988). A motion to strike "is to be tested by the allegations of the pleading demurred to, which cannot be enlarged by the assumption of any fact not therein alleged." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541-50, 427 A.2d 822 (1980).
Upon deciding a motion to strike, the trial court must construe the "plaintiff's complaint in [a] manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). "The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 108-09. However, if the plaintiff has alleged mere conclusions of law unsupported by the requisite facts, the motion to strike should be granted. Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank, 188 Conn. 281, 285, 449 A.2d 986 (1982).
II Quo Warranto Actions CT Page 19409
The court must review the plaintiffs' complaint in a manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). In order to determine the complaint's legal sufficiency, the court recites the law regarding quo warranto actions.
A successful quo warranto action unseats an illegal office holder and declares the position vacant. It does not place the rightful claimant into the office. New Haven Firebird Society v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 219 Conn. 432, 436, 593 A.2d 1383 (1991). If the claimants can thereafter establish his clear right to the position, he may bring an action in mandamus to seek his own appointment. Beccia v. Waterbury, 185 Conn. 445, 456-57, 441 A.2d 131 (1981).
In a quo warranto proceeding, the title challenged must be to a public office. New Haven Firebird Society v. Board of Fire Commissioners, supra, 436; State ex rel. Stage v. Mackie, 82 Conn. 398, 400, 74 A. 759 (1909). There are two criteria to determine whether a governmental position constitutes a public office within the meaning of the quo warranto statute: (1) It must have its source in a sovereign authority speaking through the constitution or legislative; and (2) its incumbent, by virtue of his incumbency, must be vested with some portion of the sovereign power which he is to exercise for the benefit of the public. State ex rel. Neal v. Brethauer, 83 Conn. 143, 146, 75 A. 705 (1910).
In proceedings in the nature of quo warranto, the object is to test the actual right to the office and not merely a use under color of right. Marsala v. Bridgeport, 15 Conn.App. 323, 328, 544 A.2d 191 (1988); State ex rel. Southey v. Lashar, 81 Conn. 540, 545, 542 A. 636 (1899). "It is well established that in quo warranto proceedings the burden is upon the defendant to show a complete title to the office in dispute." Marsala v. Bridgeport, supra, 328; State ex rel. Gaski v. Basile, 174 Conn. 36, 38, 381 A.2d 547 (1977); see State ex rel. Barlow v. Kaminsky, 144 Conn. 612, 616, 136 A.2d 792 (1957); State ex rel. Wallen v. Hatch, 82 Conn. 122, 125, 72 A. 575 (1909); State ex rel. Reiley v. Chatfield, 71 Conn. 104, 40 A. 922 (1898); Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 256-57, 438 A.2d 88 (1980); see also Beccia v. Waterbury, supra, 456-57.
III Discussion
While the defendant has filed a motion to strike regarding the sufficiency of the complaint, the defendant has also raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction relating to his claim that the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this action. The defendant has not filed a motion to dismiss. The court must, therefore, consider the function of a motion to dismiss and a motion to strike.
"The motion to dismiss is governed by Practice Book §§ 10-30 through 10-34. Properly granted on jurisdictional grounds, it essentially asserts that, as a matter of law and fact, a plaintiff cannot state a cause of action that is properly before the court. By contrast, the motion to strike attacks the sufficiency of the pleadings. Egri v. Foisie, 83 Conn.App. 243, 247 (2004) 848 A.2d 1266 (2004); Practice Book § 10-31; Practice Book § 10-39; see also, 1 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 1997) § 72(a), pp. 216-17.
Despite the lack of a motion to dismiss, the court will address sua sponte, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction raised by the defendant, alleging that the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their quo warranto claim.
[A] court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought by persons who do not have standing . . . (Citation omitted.) Orsi v. Senatore, 230 Conn. 459, 470, 645 A.2d 986 (1994); see also Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co., 192 Conn. 591, 595, 473 A.2d 787 (1984) (`[t]he issue of . . . standing must be addressed before we reach the substantive merits of the [parties'] claim, because standing has jurisdictional implications'), overruled in part on other grounds by Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 545, 800 A.2d 1102 (2002). Moreover, concerns regarding subject matter jurisdiction implicate the court's fundamental authority and may properly be raised and decided by the court sua sponte. See, e.g., Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441, 870 A.2d 448 (2005) (`[I]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time . . . Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . .' [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). Furthermore, there is no question that this court has jurisdiction to consider, on its own initiative, the jurisdiction of the trial court. See, e.g., Commissioner of Transportation v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, 277 Conn. 696, 703, 894 A.2d 259 (2006); Lewis v. Planning Zoning Commission, 275 Conn. 383, 385, 880 A.2d 865 (2005).
The plaintiffs have had an opportunity to address the issue of standing and have done so in their memorandum of law.
Soracco v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 90-91, 971 A.2d 1 (2009).
"Where a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Arpaia, 55 Conn.App. 180, 183, 738 A.2d 715 (1999). "Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." (Citations omitted.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cottman Transmission v. Hocap Corp., 71 Conn.App. 632, 637-38 (2002) 803 A.2d 402. "[S]tanding does not hinge on whether the plaintiff will ultimately be entitled to obtain relief on the merits of an action, but on whether he is entitled to seek the relief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
"Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved . . . The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged action] . . . Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action] . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., quoting, Avalon Bay Communities, Inc. v. Orange, 256 Conn. 557, 568, 775 A.2d 284 (2001).
By established case law, a taxpayer, has standing to bring a quo warranto action. State ex rel. City of Waterbury v. Martin, 46 Conn. 479, 482 (1878); Carleton v. Civil Service Commission, 10 Conn.App. 209, 216, 522 A.2d 825 (1987); Civil Service Commission v. Perkul, 41 Conn.Sup. 302, 308, 571 A.2d 715 (1989), aff'd,, 221 Conn. 12, 601 A.2d 538 (1992). "The rationale for standing is that a taxpayer is interested in having the duties annexed to a public office performed by a person who has been legally elected or appointed thereto." State ex rel. City of Waterbury v. Martin, supra. A taxpayer maintains this right whether or not another person claims the office. Carleton v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 10 Conn.App. 216.
The defendant also claims that the plaintiffs are in essence seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the present role of the Conservation Director in the limited proceeding regarding a prerogative writ of quo warranto. The defendant argues that the court has no subject matter jurisdiction over any such declaratory relief, and again, states the plaintiffs have no standing. "The writ [quo warranto] cannot be invoked to prevent a public officer from performing a particular act or duty of office." 17 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, (3rd Rev.Ed. 2004) § 50:7 at 648. It is the defendant's position that quo warranto cannot be used to test the manner in which a respondent carries out his duties, nor to examine the internal structure of government. The defendant argues that the present action has not been brought by the plaintiffs as a declaratory judgment action. The Town of Fairfield and the Conservation Commission are not parties to the action, and their presence would be necessary if this were an action for a declaratory judgment. The defendant contends that the purpose of this action, in reality, is not to oust the defendant, but rather, to seek some type of declaratory relief regarding the internal workings of town government and the alleged responsibilities of others.
The plaintiffs respond that nowhere in their complaint do they seek "a declaration as to the role of the Fairfield Conservation Director." The plaintiff notes that the Charter is clear as to the role of the Director. The proposed judgment form affixed to the complaint is the form prescribed by Form No. 607.8 of the Connecticut practice Series, Civil Practice Forms, Vol. 3. Additionally, the plaintiff notes that in a quo warranto proceeding ". . . it is not essential that the relator [plaintiff] be a claimant for the office. He may simply be a taxpayer or a freeman." State ex rel. Martin v. Maxim Pepin, Conn.Sup. 225, 229-30 (1946); see also, Demarest v. Fire Dept. of Norwalk, 76 Conn.App. 24, 817 A.2d 1285 (2003).
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the present action is not an action to restrain the conduct of someone legally entitled to the public office. Rather, it is an action to challenge the legality of the defendant's appointment by the First Selectman and the Conservation Commission and to remove the defendant as his appointment was void ab initio and illegal for the failure of the First Selectman and the Conservation Commission to comply with the mandates of the Town Charter. The plaintiffs conclude by arguing that the defendant's arguments only apply to someone who has been legally appointed to office.
"Practice Book § 10-39(a) provides in relevant part: Whenever any party wishes to contest . . . (3) the legal sufficiency of any such complaint . . . because of the absence of any necessary party or . . . the failure to join . . . any interested person . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading . . . Practice Book § 9-18 provides: The judicial authority may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the judicial authority may direct that they be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the judicial authority, on its motion, shall direct that person to be made a party." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Galla v. Jodaitis, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 084016652 (November 7, 2008, Brunetti, J.); see also, City of Stamford v. Olive, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, No. FST CV 08-4015243S (Jun. 25, 2009, Pavia, J.)
"Parties are considered indispensable when they not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such condition that its final [disposition] may be . . . inconsistent with equity and good conscience . . . Indispensable parties must be joined because due process principles make it essential that [such parties] be given notice and an opportunity to protect [their] interests by making [them] a party to the [action] . . . Necessary parties, in contrast, are those [p]ersons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act or that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it . . . [B]ut if their interests are separable from those of the parties before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice, without affecting other persons not before the court, the latter are not indispensable parties." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 225-26 n. 10, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S.Ct. 1106, 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997); Demarest v. Fire Dept. Of Norwalk, supra, 76 Conn.App. 29. "The parties defendant or respondent in quo warranto proceedings are those charged with exercising the particular office or franchise without lawful right. Stated otherwise, a writ of quo warranto must be directed toward the objectionable person holding an office and exercising its functions in his or her individual capacity.") (Citations omitted.) Demarest v. Fire Dept of Norwalk, supra, 76 Conn.App. 29.
The plaintiffs are bringing a complaint in the nature of quo warranto only. "This differs from . . . actions involving . . . factual situations in which a quo warranto action is brought against the allegedly wrongfully appointed public official and a claim for injunctive relief is simultaneously brought against the body that appointed said official." City of Stamford v. Olive, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, No. FST CV 08-4015243S (Jun. 25, 2009, Pavia, J.) See, e.g., New Haven Firebird Society v. Board of Fire Commissions of New Haven, 219 Conn. 432, 593 A.2d 1383 (1991); Booker v. Jarijura, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 07 4014260 (May 2, 2008, Cremins, J.) (plaintiff filed quo warranto action seeking to remove an individual from office as member of zoning commission and an action seeking a permanent injunction requiring the members of the zoning commission to make appointments to minority positions on the zoning commission only from a list of specified candidates). As such, this action applies to the defendant specifically, who has the burden of showing title to the office in dispute. See General Statutes § 52-491. Even if the defendant does not meet his burden, this does not prevent the Conservation Commission from making another appointment for the defendant's office or the defendant himself, in compliance with the Town Charter. City of Stamford v. Olive, supra. The participation of the Conservation Commission, the First Selectman and/or the Town of Fairfield is unnecessary to grant the relief requested by the plaintiffs. The defendant's argument that the Conservation Commission and the Town of Fairfield are necessary or indispensable parties therefore fails. Id.; See also Demarest v. Fire Department of Norwalk, supra, 76 Conn.App. 28. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have standing as taxpayers to bring this action that sounds in quo warranto and does not seek declaratory relief. The court does have subject matter jurisdiction.
Having resolved the issues of standing and subject matter jurisdiction, the court proceeds to determine if the plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded a quo warranto action. The court must determine whether the position of Wetlands Compliance Officer, the position to which the defendant was appointed to, is a public office, as alleged by the plaintiffs. New Haven Firebird Society v. Board of Fire Commissioners, supra, 436; State ex rel. Stage v. Mackie, 82 Conn. 398, 400, 74 A. 759 (1909). To determine this question, the court must see if the position meets the two relevant criteria, which are: (1) the position must have its source in a sovereign authority speaking through the constitution or legislative; and (2) its incumbent, by virtue of his incumbency, must be vested with some portion of the sovereign power which he is to exercise for the benefit of the public. State ex rel. Neal v. Brethauer, 83 Conn. 143, 146, 75 A. 705 (1910).
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer." Kelly v. Bridgeport, 111 Conn. 667, 670, 151 A. 268 (1930); Silverberg v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 214 Conn. 632, 637, 573 A.2d 724 (1990); Mechem on Public Officers, § 1.
The Fairfield Conservation Commission is established under Section 10.3 of the Town Charter. Under Sections 10.3.B and 10.3.C of said Charter, the Commission is authorized to act as a Conservation Commission and as an inland wetlands agency pursuant to General Statutes § 7-131a and § 22a-42, respectively. The office of Conservation Director is established pursuant to Charter Sections 1.4.B(3) and 9.1.V. The appointed position occupied by the defendant is authorized by Section 10.3.D, which allows the Conservation Commission to engage the services of "wetlands administrator," to assist the Commission to carry out the Commission's duties. The wetlands administrator, "subject to the general supervision of the [Conservation] Director, shall enforce all laws, ordinances and regulations relating to matters over which it [Conservation Commission] has jurisdiction . . ." Section 10.3.D Town Charter. The court, therefore, finds that the plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that the defendant's position is a public office that is authorized by the Charter. A wetlands administrator in the Town of Fairfield, if properly engaged or appointed, in is invested with a portion of the sovereign power, which is to be exercised for the public good.
The defendant's title is Wetlands Compliance Office according to the plaintiffs. The office of Conservation Director is established pursuant to Charter Sections 1.4.B(3) and 9.1.V.
The next issue is whether the plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that the defendant's appointment to the position of wetlands administrator was illegal, null and void "in that it failed to comply with the Charter's mandatory requirement" that the wetlands administrator be subject to the general supervision of the Conservation Director. See Section 10.3.D. of the Town Charter.
"[A] town charter, whether adopted by special act of the General Assembly or . . . under the Home Rule Act; General Statutes § 7-188; constitutes the organic law of the municipality . . . It is well established that a [town's] charter is the fountainhead of municipal powers . . . The charter serves as an enabling act, both creating power and prescribing the form in which it must be exercised." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) West Hartford Taxpayers Ass'n., Inc. v. Streeter, 190 Conn. 736, 742, 462 A.2d 379 (1983); Palermo v. Ulatowski, 97 Conn App. 521, 524, 904 A.2d 1278, (2006), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 936, 909 A.2d 961 (2006).
The Fairfield Conservation Commission is a body of special and limited jurisdiction and has no powers except those given to it by the laws creating it. See. Jones v. Civil Service Commission, 175 Conn. 504, 508-09, 400 A.2d 721 (1978). A municipal commission's authority is measured and limited by the express language in which authority is given, or, by implication, necessary to enable the commission to perform some duty cast upon it in express terms. Perretta v. New Britain, 185 Conn. 88, 92-93, 440 A.2d 823 (1981); Carruthers v. Vumbacco, 4 Conn.App. 168, 171, 493 A.2d 259 (1985); Civil Service Commission v. Perkul, supra, 41 Conn.Sup. 302, 312. If the charter points out a particular way in which any act is to be done or in which an officer is to be appointed, then, unless these forms are pursued in the doing of the act or in the appointing of the officer, the act or the appointment is not lawful." State ex rel. Southey v. Lashar, 71 Conn. 540, 546, 42 A. 636; Bredice v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 287, 292-93, 206 A.2d 433 (1964).
The Charter states in Section 10.3.D. that the defendant's position of wetlands administrator shall be subject to the general supervision of the Conservation Director. In the plaintiffs' complaint, they allege that the appointment of the defendant on March 27, 2008 by the Commission included the power to exercise general supervision over consultants engaged by the Commission for the Fairfield Metro Center project to the exclusion of the Conservation Director, precluding the Conservation Director from exercising his authority over the defendant and other consultants involved on that same project. It is apparent by the allegations of the complaint and a review of the Charter that the plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that the appointment of the defendant to his position included powers and authority greater than that authorized by the Charter.
The plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded an action in quo warranto in that they allege that the appointment of the defendant to the public office of wetlands administrator with a granting of powers greater than those allowed by the terms of the Town Charter, render said appointment illegal and void. The burden is now upon the defendant to show a complete title to the office in dispute. Marsala v. Bridgeport, supra, 328; State ex rel. Gaski v. Basile, 174 Conn, 36, 38, 381 A.2d 547 (1977); see State ex rel. Barlow v. Kaminsky, 144 Conn. 612, 616, 136 A.2d 792 (1957); State ex rel. Wallen v. Hatch, 82 Conn. 122, 125, 72 A. 575 (1909); State ex rel. Reiley v. Chatfield, 71 Conn. 104, 40 A. 922 (1898); Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 256-57, 438 A.2d 88 (1980); see also Beccia v. Waterbury, supra, 456-57.
The court also finds that the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that appointment of the defendant by the First Selectman as a consultant to exercise control over other consultants working on the Fairfield Metro Center project in behalf of the Conservation Commission, was illegal and void. The Conservation Commission, pursuant to the Charter, retained the sole authority to hire consultants to assist it in carrying out its duties. Pursuant to the terms and mandates of the Town Charter, all such consultants hired by the Commission with the approval of the First Selectman, would be subject to the general supervision of the Conservation Director.
For all of the reasons stated herein, the defendant's motion to strike is denied.