(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 10–11, 48 A.3d 652 (2012). In this public interest appeal, we consider whether, when an administrative agency has issued a license, certification, or waiver that is required by statute to hold a public office, a court may issue a writ of quo warranto because it has deemed a person to be unqualified for that office on the ground that the agency improperly granted the requisite license, certification, or waiver. The defendant Paul Vallas appeals, upon certification by Chief Justice Rogers pursuant to General Statutes § 52–265a, from the judgment of the trial court granting the writ of quo warranto sought by the plaintiffs, Carmen Lopez and Deborah Reyes–Williams, and ordering the removal of the defendant from his office as acting superintendent of the public schools of the city of Bridgeport. On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the trial court improperly concluded that he was not qualified to serve as a superintendent on the ground that he had failed to complete the “school leadership program” req

The determination of whether the trial court properly granted the plaintiffs' writ of quo warranto on the basis that the defendant's appointment to the office of corporation counsel violated the charter presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. See Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 13–14, 48 A.3d 652 (2012); Stewart v. Watertown, 303 Conn. 699, 710, 38 A.3d 72 (2012). “Because our resolution of this issue requires us to construe provisions of [a municipal] charter, we apply principles of statutory interpretation.

To prevail in a quo warranto proceeding, the title challenged must be to a public office. Id. see also Bateson v. Weddle, 2010 WL 3038562 *3 (Conn.Super.Ct. July 6, 2010), aff'd, 306 Conn. 1, 48 A.3d 652 (2012) (Arnold, J.). To determine whether a governmental position constitutes a public office within the meaning of quo warranto two criteria must be met: (1) It must have its source in a sovereign authority speaking through the constitution or legislature; and (2) its incumbent, by virtue of his incumbency, must be vested with some portion of the sovereign power which he is to exercise for the benefit of the public.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 17, 48 A.3d 652 (2012) ; In re Jusstice W., supra, 308 Conn. at 661–62, 65 A.3d 487 ; State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 248, 188 A.2d 65 (1963). Likewise, “[a] statute's plain meaning must be enforced, of course, and the meaning of a statute will typically heed the commands of its punctuation.”

Mr. Coke, however, has not alleged any facts to suggest that Mr. Samalot improperly holds the office of Assistant Attorney General. Cf. Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 3, 11 (2012) (“The purpose of [the writ of quo warranto] is to test the actual right to the office and not merely a use under color of right.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 14, 48 A.3d 652 (2012); see also DeMayo v. Quinn, 315 Conn. 37, 41, 105 A.3d 141 (2014). So long as the board has acted to fill the vacant position within thirty days, § 6.3 (B) of the charter, unlike § 9-222, does not provide for a special election to fill board vacancies.

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bateson v. Weddle , 306 Conn. 1, 14, 48 A.3d 652 (2012) ; see also DeMayo v. Quinn , 315 Conn. 37, 41, 105 A.3d 141 (2014). So long as the board has acted to fill the vacant position within thirty days, § 6.3 (B) of the charter, unlike § 9–222, does not provide for a special election to fill board vacancies.

“[T]he doctrine of [s]tare decisis, although not an end in itself, serves the important function of preserving stability and certainty in the law ... [and] a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it.... Stare decisis is justified because it allows for predictability in the ordering of conduct, it promotes the necessary perception that the law is relatively unchanging, it saves resources and it promotes judicial efficiency.... It is the most important application of a theory of decisionmaking consistency in our legal culture and ... is an obvious manifestation of the notion that decisionmaking consistency itself has normative value.... We, therefore, will respect our prior decisions unless strong considerations to the contrary require us to reexamine them....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 9–10, 48 A.3d 652 (2012). In considering whether this court should overturn the holdings of State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 120, 547 A.2d 10 (1988), which recognized the automobile exception under the state constitution, and State v. Longo, 243 Conn. 732, 739, 708 A.2d 1354 (1998), which affirmed Dukes with respect to the constitutionality of the search of a closed container during a warrantless automobile search, and conclude that the state constitution affords greater protections than the federal constitution, we turn to the factors set forth in Geisler: “(1) the text of the operative constitutional provisions; (2) related Connecticut precedents; (3) persuasive relevant federal precedents; (4) persuasive precedents of other state courts; (5) historical insights into the intent of our constitutional forebears; and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms, or as otherwise described, relevant public policies.”

Each of these issues raises questions of law over which this court exercises plenary review. Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 7, 48 A.3d 652 (2012) (standing); Walsh v. Jodoin, 283 Conn. 187, 195, 925 A.2d 1086 (2007) (retroactivity of statute and statutory construction); New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 745, 36 A.3d 224 (2012) (personal jurisdiction). Upon such review, we answer the certified questions in the affirmative.

(Emphasis omitted.) Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 8, 48 A.3d 652 (2012).